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Dissertation Abstract  
 In this dissertation I defend the claim, long held by Donald Davidson, that truth is a 
primitive concept that cannot be correctly or informatively defined in terms of more basic 
concepts.  To this end I articulate the history of the primitive thesis in the 20th century, working 
through early Moore, Russell, and Frege, and provide improved interpretations of their reasons 
for advancing and (in the cases of Moore and Russell) eventually abandoning the primitive 
thesis.  I show the importance of slingshot-style arguments in the work of Frege, Church, 
Davidson, and Gödel for resisting certain versions of the correspondence theory of truth.  I argue 
that most slingshots fail to convincingly establish a collapsing conclusion, but that a Gödelian 
version of the slingshot is terminal to certain varieties of the correspondence theory of truth. I 
then provide a Davidsonian theory of truth and interpretation that is consistent with and makes 
use of the primitive thesis.  Finally, I provide an account of predication, properties, and 
universals that I argue is both serviceable and consistent with Davidson’s overall program. 
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 Donald Davidson argued that truth is the central semantic concept, and so is immune to 
conceptual analysis: he argued that truth is a primitive concept.  In this dissertation I aim to 
articulate and defend a Davidsonian conception of truth.  Of course, the thesis that truth is 
primitive isn’t exclusive to Davidson.  The first two chapters concern the history of the primitive 
thesis.  In the third chapter, I attempt to block any attempt to informatively reduce truth to 
correspondence.   The fourth and fifth chapters are my attempt show the positive work the 
primitive concept of truth is capable of performing in the diverse domains of interpretation, 
predication, properties, abstract objects, and common names. 
 In Chapter 1, I address the history of the primitive thesis in the early work of G.E. Moore 
and Bertrand Russell.  During the years from 1898-1912, both Moore and Russell maintained 
that truth was in some sense primitive, though both ended up abandoning their respective 
versions of the primitive thesis.  This chapter helps reinforce the idea that what one says about 
truth (be it the concept of truth or the property of truth) places constraints on plausible 
conceptions of truth-bearers and truth-makers. 
 In Chapter 2, I examine the primitive thesis as it is found in the work of Frege.  Frege 
maintained a version of the primitive thesis that he never abandoned.  I pay special attention to 
Frege’s theory of predication, in particular the claim that predicates are functions which map 
objects onto truth-values.  The discussion of Frege’s theory of predication sets the stage for the 
discussion of Davidson’s theory of predication that I undertake in the final chapter.  In Chapter 2 
I also consider two Fregean arguments to bolster Frege’s claim that truth is indefinable.  Frege 
sowed the seeds of a family of arguments that came to be called Slingshot arguments.  I construct 
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a slingshot-style argument from Fregean premises and argue that the argument doesn’t succeed.  
I note that it isn’t clear, however, that the argument I provide is in the Frege proper.  The focus of 
the chapter is twofold.  I want my discussion of Frege’s theory of predication to foreshadow the 
Davidsonian account of predication that I provide in Chapter 5, and I want the discussion of the 
Fregean Proto-Slingshot to pave the way for Chapter 3, which is devoted to slingshot arguments 
and the consequences that can be derived from them. 
 Chapter 3 concerns slingshot arguments and, in particular, the problems that such 
arguments pose for certain conceptions of the correspondence theories of truth.  I articulate some 
commonly held versions of the correspondence theory of truth.  If certain versions of the 
correspondence theory of truth are correct, then truth can be defined informatively as 
correspondence to facts; facts would be truth makers, and we could explain truth in terms of 
truth-bearers, correspondence, and truth-makers.  I explain how slingshot arguments work 
generally as collapsing arguments (regardless of their targets).  I work through the slingshots of 
Church, Davidson, and Gödel.  My claim is that the slingshots of Church and Davidson involve 
dubitable premises, but that Gödel’s slingshot is terminal to the versions of the correspondence 
theories that I mentioned earlier in the chapter.  My claim is that it is impossible to informatively 
define truth in terms of correspondence to facts.  
 In Chapter 4 I turn to a positive role for the concept of truth in a theory of meaning and 
interpretation generally.  I want to make clear that the Davidsonian approach, far from dismissing 
the concept of truth, holds that the concept is central to our understanding each other and, 
ultimately, ourselves.  In this chapter I discuss the role of the concept of truth in a Davidsonian 
theory of meaning and interpretation.  It is here that I introduce Davidson’s idea of triangulation, 
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and his claim that the triangle of two interpreters and a shared objective world is the source of 
the concept of truth.  In the chapter I discuss what I take to be is a misunderstanding of 
Davidson’s theory of interpretation by John Campbell.  I claim that a discussion of the 
misunderstanding helps explain when we ought to attribute thought to an object we are trying to 
interpret. 
 I end Chapter 4 discussing predication in a basic interpretive scenario, and in Chapter 5 I 
turn to Davidson’s discussion of the problem of predication generally: what is sometimes called 
the problem of the unity of the proposition.  My aim is to elucidate Davidson’s strategy of 
explaining predication in terms of truth.  I then employ a similar strategy in giving what I think is 
a Davidsonian conception of properties, universals, and abstract objects.  I argue that Davidson’s 
version of externalism with regard to semantic content has certain anti-skeptical conclusions, a 
point with which we find some agreement (though even more disagreement) in the work of Barry 
Stroud.  Finally, I give an account of what I call common names in terms of predication, and in 




History of The Primitive Thesis: Early Russell and Moore 
1.1 Overview 
 The thesis that truth is, in some sense, primitive, can be traced through 20th century 
analytic philosophy, beginning with the early thought of Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore.  
Though both philosophers came to disavow the primitive thesis, examining the reasons for their 
eventual disavowal will be useful.  This chapter begins with Moore, and moves back and forth 
between Russell and Moore to reflect the interplay that I claim their work had on each other.  As 
an advocate of a version of primitivism, I claim that it is useful to work slowly through versions 
of the primitive thesis which have been deemed unworkable before articulating a version of the 
primitive thesis that I intend to defend. 
1.2 Introduction to Moore’s Early Primitivism  
 In 1899 Moore was in the process of breaking from F.H. Bradley’s idealism, and 
published an influential essay The Nature of Judgement.   Situating Moore’s 1899 essay helps 1
explain the complicated account of judgement that Moore leaves us with.  Though Moore 
himself (in his later 1911 lectures) diagnoses problems with the 1899 theory, it is Russell who 
supplies an account of the motivation for the theory, in particular as a realist rejection of the 
idealism of Hegel and Bradley, an idealism Russell himself briefly maintained.  Since I consider 
 While the paper is ostensibly an attack on Bradley, the paper is littered with statements like “All that exists is thus 1
composed of concepts necessarily related to one another in specific manners, and likewise to the concept of 
existence” (Moore, 1899, p. 181) and “It seems necessary, then, to regard the world as formed of concepts.  These 
are the only objects of knowledge” (p. 182).  While these claims might seem (on their face) to support a kind of 
idealism, Moore intended them to support a radical kind of realism.
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this break to be the labor pains of the birth of Anglophone analytic philosophy, I think examining 
the motivation behind the break is fruitful.  Russell, admitting that he himself went through an 
idealist period, claims “so, for a short time, did G. E. Moore. But he found the Hegelian 
philosophy inapplicable to chairs and tables, and I found it inapplicable to mathematics; so with 
his help I climbed out of it, and back to common sense tempered by mathematical logic.”   Later, 2
Russell elaborates: 
I came to disbelieve Bradley’s arguments against relations, and to distrust the 
logical bases of monism.  I disliked the subjectivity of the ‘Transcendental 
Aesthetic’. But these motives would have operated more slowly than they did, but 
for the influence of G. E. Moore. He also had had a Hegelian period, but it was 
briefer than mine.  He took the lead in rebellion, and I followed, with a sense of 
emancipation.  Bradley argued that everything common sense believes in is mere 
appearance;  we reverted to the opposite extreme, and thought that everything is 
real that common sense, uninfluenced by philosophy or theology, supposes real. 
With my mental development and a sense of escaping from prison, we allowed 
ourselves to think that grass is green, that the sun and stars would exist if no one 
was aware of them, and also that there is a pluralistic timeless world of Platonic 
ideas.  3
Bradley’s metaphysics was monist and idealist.  He argued that reality is best understood not as 
independent from our experience of it, nor as consisting of entities which exist independently of 
each other.  Moore and Russell, in rebellion, wanted to bring philosophy back into accord with 
common sense, maintaining that ordinary objects like tables and chairs exist, and exist in an 
ordinary manner (that is, not merely as our perceptions of them, etc).  It was pursuing this goal 
 Russell, 2009, p 7.2
 Russell, 2009, pp 15-16.3
 5
that Moore and Russell developed (and then moved away from) a theory of truth in which truth 
is in some sense primitive.  4
  Moore himself provides a succinct summary of his view that truth is in some sense 
primitive, though we need to do some work to determine the relevant sense: 
It is a theory which I formerly held, and which certainly has the advantage that it 
is very simple... ‘Truth’ therefore, would, on this view, be a simple unanalyzable 
property which is possessed by some propositions and not by others.  5
To fully articulate the view we can turn to Moore’s earlier 1899 work The Nature of Judgment, 
where Moore’s primitivism is originally articulated (let us call this view M1).  It is impossible to 
understand Moore’s account of truth without first examining his account of truth bearers, which 
are propositions. 
 Propositions are, for the Moore of 1899, composed of concepts.  Here is Moore 
discussing propositions and their conceptual composition: 
A proposition is composed not of words, nor yet of thoughts, but of concepts.  
Concepts are possible objects of thought… they may come into relation with a 
thinker; and in order that they may do anything, they must already be something.  
It is indifferent to their nature whether anybody thinks them or not.  They are 
incapable of change; and the relation into which they enter with the knowing 
subject implies no action or reaction… It is of such entities that a proposition is 
composed.  In it certain concepts stand in specific relations with one another.  6
 It is often unclear whether they are talking about the concept TRUTH or the property truth.  Throughout this and 4
later chapters, I’ll use TRUTH to refer to truth considered as a concept, truth to refer to truth considered as a 
property.
 Moore, 1956, p 284.  This summary was given by Moore in 1911, after he had already abandoned the theory.5
 Moore, 1899, p 179.6
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Concepts here appear to be an odd sort of entity; it is unclear how they would come into relation 
either with thinkers or with each other.  According to this view, propositions would be structured 
abstract entities, as later Moore goes on to claim that propositions are constituted by “any 
number of concepts, together with a specific relation between them.”   It is only propositions, 7
and not concepts taken singularly, which are truth bearers (singular concepts are, for Moore, too 
simple to be truth bearers).  Moore entertains a theory about the nature of truth such that a 
proposition is true if and only if it “consists of a combination of concepts that is actually to be 
found among existents” only to reject the theory for two reasons.  First, such a theory would 
likely result in individual concepts being among the truth bearers (red would be a true concept, 
as there actually are red existents).   Secondly, and more problematically, Moore claims that 8
mathematical truths intuitively don’t depend on existents, arguing that 2+2=4 would be true even 
if no two things existed, and further arguing that it stretches our notion of existence beyond 
intelligibility to argue that 2 is an existent.    9
 Moore claims that concepts have a kind of primacy of existence over existents, such that 
“the opposition of concepts to existents disappears, since an existent is seen to be nothing but a 
concept or complex of concepts standing in a unique relation to the concept of existence.”   That 10
is, what it is for a thing like a chair to exist, to be an existent, is just for the particular concept 
 Moore, 1899, p. 180.7
 Asay, 2013, seems to contend that the primary reason Moore abandons the view that truth depends on existents is 8
that concepts themselves would thereby be eligible truth bearers, and that the resolution of the problem about truths 
without a dependence on existents is an afterthought, while I contend that the opposite is the case.
 Moore, 1899, p 180.  As will be made clear shortly, Moore here has an interesting (and counter-intuitive) view on 9
what it is to be an existent.  Two is a concept, as is red, and existents can be two or red without talking of two or red 
as existents.
 Moore, 1899, pp 182-183.10
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CHAIR to stand in a unique relation to the concept EXISTENCE:  This seemingly equates 
existents with true existential propositions, and so enables Moore to claim that “truth cannot be 
defined by a reference to existence; but existence only by a reference to truth,” and that 
“existence is logically subordinate to truth.”   According to Moore: 11
A proposition is constituted by any number of concepts, together with a specific 
relation between them; and according to the nature of this relation the proposition 
may be either true or false.  What kind of relation  makes a proposition true, what 
false, cannot be further defined, but must be immediately recognized.  12
It is here that I believe we find Moore’s primitivism.  Some propositions are true, and some are 
false, and there is a specific, undefinable relation of concepts with which a proposition is 
constituted that accounts for their truth or falsity, a relation which is “immediatley known, like 
red or two.”   This relation which unites the concepts into a proposition, is immediately known 13
and undefinable, and is the property of truth or of falsity.  14
 While M1 might seem ontologically confused, it is important to reflect that Moore is only 
beginning to shed his idealism in this paper.  Russell noted that in their rebellion he and Moore 
wanted to do justice to our commonsense beliefs that chairs and tables existed; in Moore’s 1899 
paper we have an account in which chairs do exist; what it is for a chair to exist is just for 
CHAIR to stand in a true relation to EXISTENCE.  Thus the strategy Moore employs is to 
ground the metaphysical status of existents on possible relationships between concepts, where 
concepts are non-mental.  We may say that Moore has reified meanings in the struggle to account 
 Moore, 1899, p 180.11
 Moore, 1899, p 180 emphasis added.12
 Moore, 1899, p 181.13
 Interestingly, Moore here seems to argue that truth values are the key to the problem of the unity of the 14
proposition, a position which will be key to our understanding of Davidson’s conception of truth and predication.
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for our common sense intuitions.  Moore here seems committed to an odd kind of ontological 
pluralism: concepts in a sense certainly are, but they don’t appear to belong to the world of 
chairs or other existents.  Rather, the manner in which concepts are related accounts for the 
world of existents.  This is the manner in which existence is logically subordinate to truth.  In 
order to find out if any particular thing X exists, we need to see whether X is truthfully related to 
EXISTENCE.  Thus, questions about what exists dissolve into questions about truth.  Questions 
about whether a given proposition is true cannot then be answered by appealing to what exists, 
but rather depend upon whether the proposition has the immediately recognizable and 
unanalyzable property truth.  Moore seems to have worked his position out more clearly by 
1902, when he composed an encyclopedia entry for truth and falsity: 
It seems plain that a truth differs in no respect from the reality to which it was 
supposed merely to correspond: e.g., the truth that I exist differs in no respect 
from the corresponding reality – my existence. So far, indeed, from truth being 
defined by reference to reality, reality can only be defined by reference to truth: 
for truth denotes exactly that property of the complex formed by two entities and 
their relation, in virtue of which, if the entity predicated be existence, we call the 
complex real – the property, namely, expressed by saying that the relation in 
question does truly or really hold between the entities.   15
Truths, according to this view, are no different from the reality with which a correspondence 
theorist would maintain truths correspond.  Again, what it is for X to exist is for there to be a true 
existential proposition involving X.  So, for Moore at this stage there is no proposition/fact or 
truth/fact dichotomy; facts are mentioned in 1899 and 1902 only in the innocuous sense of 
 Moore, 1902.  I think we can confidently count both the 1902 and 1899 papers as articulations of M1, with the 15
1902 as a more mature version of M1.
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truths.   Interestingly, the above might provide motivation for an identity theory of truth, 16
although as Asay notes, this isn’t quite right.   For Moore, TRUTH is the primitive concept, and 17
as is clear above reality is defined in terms of TRUTH, not the other way around.  Thus the 
identity theory that Moore seems to espouse here doesn’t tell us anything about TRUTH but 
rather about reality.  TRUTH, Moore thinks, resists analysis. 
 And Moore hasn’t yet elaborated what it is for a property (or a concept) to be 
unanalyzable, or immediately recognizable.  For such an elaboration, we need to turn to his 
Principia Ethica, in particular his discussion of the concept good.  My suggestion is that if we 
replace ‘good’ with ‘truth’ in the following passages, we obtain an accurate picture of Moore’s 
claim that truth is indefinable, unanalyzable, and immediately recognizable: 
Good, then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, 
when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition, in the most 
important sense of that word.  The most important sense of ‘definition’ is that in 
which a definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain 
whole; and in this sense ‘good’ has no definition because it is simple and has no 
parts. 
and finally: 
My point is that ‘good’ is a simple notion, just as ‘yellow’ is a simple notion; that, 
just as you cannot, by any manner or means explain to any one who does not 
already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is.  Definitions 
of the kind that I was asking for, definitions which describe the real nature of the 
object or notion denoted by the word, and which do not merely tell us what the 
word is used to mean, are only possible when the object or notion in question is 
 The problem of distinguishing between truths and facts, seemingly hinted at by Moore here, crops up in Frege, 16
Wittgenstein, Russell, and, I’ll argue, Davidson.
 Asay, 2013, p 57.17
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something complex... But yellow and good, we say, are not complex:  they are 
notions of the simple kind, out of which definitions are composed and with which 
the power of further defining ceases.  18
I submit that since Moore uses color concepts in both Principia Ethica and The Nature of 
Judgment to illustrate unanalyzable primitivity (yellow and red, respectively), there is reason to 
believe he had the same quality in mind in both cases: Moore holds truth, along with yellow and 
good as primitive, and for the same reasons.  Truth is therefore a simple kind of notion, one out 
of which definitions can be composed, but not itself constitutively definable. 
1.3 Russell Abandons Primitivism 
 By 1911 Moore had abandoned his commitment to M1.  What happened?  I think the 
importance of Russell’s philosophical output during that decade to Moore’s thought cannot be 
underestimated.  Russell’s papers On The Nature of Truth in 1906 and On the Nature of Truth 
and Falsehood in 1909 moved from a Moorean primitivist conception of truth to a pure 
correspondence theory.  In the 1906 paper Russell advances two views of truth, and contends that 
he can’t decide which view he finds more plausible: the views in question are a variant of 
Moore’s primitivism and a version of the correspondence theory.  By 1909 Russell has settled 
firmly in the correspondence camp, and he’s convinced Moore to abandon M1 as well.   
 In the 1906 paper false beliefs pose a particularly vexing problem for Russell, who (like 
Moore) wants our beliefs to have objects.  Maintaining this is easier with regard to truth than 
with regard to falsity; for when we truly believe that the sun is shining, we seem to have an 
 Moore, 1993, pp 7-8 italics added. 18
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intuitive answer to the question of what we believe, for what we believe, is what is the case.  
Hence, after claiming that all our beliefs must have objects, Russell laments: 
But this simple view is rather difficult to defend from objections of various kinds, 
tending to show that there are not only mistaken beliefs, but also non-facts, which 
are the objectively false objects of mistaken beliefs.  The main reason for this 
view is the difficulty of answering the question: “what do we believe when our 
belief is mistaken?”  19
Russell sketches his two theories of truth as candidates to help answer that question.  Here is 
Russell’s version of Moorean Primitivism: 
If we accept the view that there are objective falsehoods, we shall oppose them to 
facts, and make truth the quality of facts, falsehood the quality of their opposites, 
which we may call  fictions. Then facts and fictions together may be called 
propositions. A belief always has a proposition for its object, and is knowledge 
when its object is true, error when its object is false. Truth and falsehood, in this 
view, are ultimate, and no account can be given of what makes a proposition true 
or false.  20
This looks like a form of metaphysical primitivity (let us call this view R1): some propositions 
have a property of truth, others falsity.  In both cases we err in trying to account for why 
propositions have the truth values that they have, as no account can be given.  In contrast, we 
might think that there are no such things as ‘objective falsehoods,’ and that the facts are all that is 
the case.  In this case (let us call this view R2) we might say that it is our beliefs themselves 
which are true or false, and not the objects of our beliefs.  Our true beliefs would be those that 
succeeded in corresponding to facts.  Russell notes that this is a form of the correspondence 
 Russell, 1906, p 45.19
 Russell, 1906, p 48.20
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theory, but that it has the unpleasant consequence that “error is the belief in nothing.  For, when 
we believe truly, our belief is to have an object which is a fact, but when we believe falsely, it 
can have no object, unless there are objective non-facts”  and that “when [facts and our beliefs] 21
correspond, the beliefs are true, and are beliefs in facts; when they do not, the beliefs are 
erroneous, and are beliefs in nothing.”   The paper concludes with Russell torn between the 22
primitive theory (R1) and the correspondence theory (R2), espousing neither but prophetically 
leaning towards correspondence, as he considers the idea of ‘objective falsehoods’ abhorrent.  By 
1909 he will have abandoned the primitive thesis, and by 1912 when Russell published The 
Problems of Philosophy, the primitive thesis will be a distant memory, a theory not worthy of 
consideration in print. 
 Russell’s 1909 paper (which can be seen as a rough draft for the 1912 work) can be seen 
primarily as Russell jettisoning the idea that beliefs or judgments have singular objects: 
If every judgment, whether true or false, consists in a certain relation, called 
"judging" or "believing", to a single object, which is what we judge or believe, 
then the distinction of true and false as applied to judgments is derivative from the 
distinction of true and false as applied to the objects of judgments. Assuming that 
there are such objects, let us, following Meinong, give them the name 
“Objectives”.  23
This is just Russell’s setting up a reductio: instead of the objective falsehoods mentioned above 
that Russell found problematic, it is false objectives that cause the trouble.  The difference is 
negligible at best, so it is interesting that a position (R1) Russell thought of as defensible but 
 Russell, 1906, pp 45-46.21
 Russell, 1906, p 49.22
 Russell, 1909, (in Russell 1994) p 151.23
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problematic in 1904, has by 1909 been deemed intolerable.  The change is more drastic than that. 
Recall that true objectives (or, objective truths) previously posed no problem for Russell; what 
seemed objectionable was the baggage they brought along with them in the form of false 
objectives. Curiously, in 1909 Russell seems to doubt whether it makes sense to say of any 
judgment, whether true or false, that it corresponds to a singular object.  Discussing this, and 
noting that Charles I did indeed die on the scaffold, Russell claims that “it is difficult to believe 
that there are such objects as ‘that Charles I died in his bed’ or even ‘that Charles I died on the 
scaffold…. Thus if we can avoid regarding "that so-and-so" as an independent entity, we shall 
escape a paradox. This argument is not decisive, but it must be allowed a certain weight.’” .   24
Russell here registers distrust of propositions period, whether true or false; for Russell surely 
would not deny that there was an event <Charles’ death on the scaffold>.  Recalling that in 1904 
Russell distrusted objective falsehoods, it now seems like Russell objects to the reification of any 
sentential meaning, if those meanings are intended to be singular entities, entities over and above 
the entities which correspond to individual terms in a sentence.  25
 And yet in the 1909 paper Russell vigorously defends his correspondence conception of 
truth.  The correspondence is best illustrated by highlighting what exactly 1909 Russell thinks a 
judgment is: 
The theory of judgment which I am advocating is, that judgment is not a dual 
relation of the mind to a single Objective, but a multiple relation of the mind to 
the various other terms with which the judgment is concerned. Thus if I judge that 
 Russell 1909, p 151.24
 Note that Russell doesn’t have to deny that the object of “Charles” is Charles and the object of “scaffold” is 25
scaffold (since both Charles and scaffolds exist(ed)) to deny that the object of “Charles died on the scaffold” is a 
singular entity: that Charles died on the scaffold.  Also, though this does skirt the problem of falsity, it doesn’t skirt 
the problem of sentences containing fictional names (“Godzilla”, “Hamlet”, etc).
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A loves B, that is not a relation of me to "A's love for B", but a relation between 
me and A and love and B. If it were a relation of me to "A's love for B", it would 
be impossible unless there were such a thing as "A's love for B", i.e. unless A 
loved B, i.e. unless the judgment were true; but in fact false judgments are 
possible.  26
So for 1909 Russell judgments are relations between minds and what he calls terms.  It is wildly 
ambiguous what Russell means by ‘terms’.  Indeed in the passage just quoted, my judging A to 
love B involves a (structured) relation between myself, A, B, and love.  This suggests that ‘term’ 
be read as objects (whether physical or abstract), where we would normally think of terms as 
linguistic and objects as non-linguistic.  Notice that Russell doesn’t say that the judgment 
involves a relation between my idea of A, my idea of B, and my idea of love, but rather a relation  
between myself and those three things. When are such judgements true?  Russell later continues: 
We may now attempt an exact account of the "correspondence" which constitutes 
truth. Let us take the judgment "A loves B". This consists of a relation of the 
person judging to A and love and B, i.e. to the two terms A and B and the relation 
“love”…. The "corresponding" complex object which is required to make our 
judgment true consists of A related to B by the relation which was before us in our 
judgment…. Thus the judgment that two terms have a certain relation R is a 
relation of the mind to the two terms and the relation R with the appropriate 
sense: the "corresponding" complex consists of the two terms related by the 
relation R.… The judgment is true when there is such a complex, and false when 
there is not. The same account, mutatis mutandis, will apply to any other 
judgment. This gives the definition of truth and falsehood.   27
 Russell, 1909, p 155.26
 Russell, 1909, p 157. Emphasis added.  I have omitted part of the account that accounts for the structure of the 27
corresponding complex.  Russell recognized he needed an account that distinguishes between “A loves B” and “B 
loves A”.
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The above (which I’ll refer to as R3) is, I think, Russell’s first comprehensive endorsement of 
correspondence as a definition of the nature of truth, and it isn’t without problems.  First, its not 
clear how Russell’s mutatis mutandis is going to be able to be fleshed out in order to do the work 
he requires of it for all other judgments.  Secondly, it remains unclear what we judge when we 28
judge Godzilla to be non-self-identical.  A third problem with R3 is whether we can make sense 
of correspondence at all as attempted here.  For if judgments are composed of terms in the sense 
where terms just are objects, it is unclear that anything like ‘correspondence’ obtains, since 
objects don’t intuitively correspond to themselves, they simply are themselves.  It appears 
difficult to differentiate between the ‘corresponding complex’ of terms which plays the role of 
truth-maker and the complex of terms which are constituents in the judgement itself.  Thus, we 
run the risk of ending up with a kind of identity theory of truth where truths are indistinguishable 
from facts.  Russell is aware that this will not do: It is this third problem which I want to 
examine, but I think the discussion works best in light of Russell’s 1912 The Problems of 
Philosophy, where he articulates a more mature version of the correspondence theory mentioned 
above with a rather elegant attempt at a solution to this third problem. 
1.4 Moore Rejects M1 
 Moore’s lectures in 1910 and 1911 reflect Russell’s progress.  It is in these lectures that 
Moore abandons M1, doing so for reasons which echo Russell’s disdain for ‘false objectives’.  
Remember that M1 depended on truth being a primitive, immediately recognizable property of 
 Many contemporary debates in current truth-maker theory deal with this very problem for things like negative 28
existential statements, and it is unclear what the status of ethical claims would be under this conception, issues 
which we’ll discuss in subsequent chapters.
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propositions, where propositions are composed of concepts.  Early Moore (M1) might say the 
following.  “Bears exist” expresses a proposition (and so the proposition expressed is) composed 
of BEARS and EXISTENCE , a proposition which has the primitive and immediately 
recognizable property truth.  The fact that bears exist is a result of the truth of the proposition.  
“Unicorns exist” expresses a proposition (and so the proposition expressed is), but this 
proposition is composed of UNICORNS and EXISTENCE, and has the property falsehood.  
According to this view there are objective falsehoods: falsehoods are propositions that in 
Moore’s terminology are, in the sense that those propositions ‘have being,’ but they refer to facts 
which do not ‘have being.’  Furthermore, those propositions refer to facts: falsehoods express 
propositions that refer to facts which have no being.   By 1911 Moore recites this position not to 29
endorse it, but in order to raise two objections to the primitive theory.   
 Noting that he doesn’t seem to have any decisive arguments against the theory, and that 
he’s unclear how to state his objections clearly, Moore spends pages trying to articulate just why 
he no longer holds the primitive thesis.  The first objection concerns the truth-making relation.  
Moore no longer finds it plausible to maintain that the relation between facts and propositions is 
such that facts depend for their existence on the truth-values of propositions: 
It is this: namely, that the fact to which a true belief refers - the fact, which is, 
only if the belief be true, and simply has no being at all, if it be false - does not, if 
you think of it, seem to consist merely in the possession of some simple property 
by a proposition - that is to say, something which has being equally whether the 
belief be true or false .  For instance, the fact that lions really do exist does not 
seem to consist in the possession  of some simple property by a proposition which 
 Moore, 1956, p 286.29
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we believe, when we believe that they exist, even if we grant that there is such a 
thing as this proposition.  30
I think the intuition Moore is getting at here is that M1 gets things explanatorily backwards.  
Intuitively, the existence of lions doesn’t depend on the truth of the proposition expressed by 
“lions exist,” rather the existence of actual lions explains why the proposition expressed by 
“lions exist” is true; the truth of the proposition depends on actual lions, and not the other way 
around.   I share the intuition that if there is to be a truth making relation that obtains between 31
facts and propositions, then it ought to exhibit the kind of directionality Moore’s objection seems 
to indicate, from fact to proposition.  Whether or not we need to posit a truth-making relation I’ll 
discuss further in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. 
 The second objection Moore raises is, he argues, deadly not only to M1, but to his 
analysis of belief in general. It is a doubt that there are such things as propositions at all: 
But this is the sort of objection I feel.  It is that, if you consider what happens 
when a man entertains a false belief, it doesn’t seem as if his belief consisted 
merely in his having a relation to some object which certainly is.  It seems rather 
as if the thing which he was believing, the object of his belief, were just the fact 
which certainly is not - which certainly is not, because his belief is false.  This, of 
course, creates a difficulty, because if the object certainly is not - if there is no 
such thing, it is impossible for him or for anything else to have any kind of 
relation to it.  32
This objection would be terminal to the theory of belief Moore has been entertaining, where the 
relation is a one-to-one relation between the believer and the belief, where the belief is a 
 Moore, 1956, p. 286.30
 Asay makes a similar remark (he uses ‘penguins’) 2013, pp 62-63.31
 Moore, 1956, pp 286-287.32
 18
proposition; it is also terminal for Moore’s earlier theory that propositions exist and have the 
immediately recognizable and primitive property of truth or falsity.  If the intuition driving 
Moore’s second objection is sound, it’s unclear how anyone can entertain a false belief.  A page 
later Moore gives up on the existence of propositions entirely, saying “there simply are no such 
things as propositions” but he thinks we can (and must) go on speaking about them as if they 
existed nonetheless.  33
 Having abandoned propositions, Moore needs to give us an account of belief and the 
relation between beliefs, facts, and truth.  Moore elaborates (let us call this view M2):  
To say that a belief is true is to say that the fact to which it refers is or has being; 
while to say that a belief is false is to say that the fact to which it refers is not - 
that there is no such fact… Every belief has the property of referring to some 
particular fact, every different belief to a different fact; and the property which a 
belief has, when it is true  - the property which we name when we call it true, is 
the property which can be expressed by saying that the fact to which it refers is.  
This is precisely what I propose to submit as the fundamental definition of truth.  34
This definition of truth (and the ontological baggage it brings along), while less intuitively 
problematic than M1, might be thought unpalatable for a few reasons.  First, M2 needs to 
account for falsity: he is committed to the thought that every belief refers to a fact, and that only 
some facts ‘have being.’  Thus a belief can refer to something that is not, which Moore noted 
earlier is problematic, and might be deemed problematic for reasons very similar to those that 
prompted Russell’s rejection of ‘false objectives.’  I confess that I too think M2 is problematic in 
its account of false beliefs, but I think M2 is problematic concerning true beliefs as well. 
 Moore, 1956, p 289.33
 Moore, 1956, p. 291.34
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 The problem with M2 and its account of truth, belief and fact with respect to true beliefs 
is in the granularity of Moore’s facts, which Moore brings up while trying to shed light on what 
the relation of referring must be for his above definition of truth to be accurate: 
Take any belief you like; it is, I think, quite plain that there is just one fact, and 
only one, which would have being - would be in the Universe, if the belief were 
true; and which would have no being - would simply not be if the belief were 
false.  And as soon as we know what the belief is, we know just as well and as 
certainly what the fact is which in this sense corresponds with it.  35
According to this theory, facts appear as finely grained as the true beliefs that refer to them (each 
and every belief has its very own fact).  The reasoning is as follows: according to M2, to 
understand a belief is just to understand what corresponding fact would ‘have being’ were the 
belief true.  Since every belief corresponds to one and only one fact, it is rational to think that 
there must be a one-to-one correspondence between true beliefs and facts.  36
 Moore also needs an account of what the referring/corresponding (Moore freely 
substitutes the two terms)  relation in M2 is, and here he seems to leave us wanting: 
Obviously, this expression “referring to” stands for some relation which each true 
belief has to one fact and to one only; and which each false belief has to no fact at 
all; and the difficulty was to define this relation.  Well, I admit I can’t define it, in 
the sense of analyzing it completely…[but] it doesn’t follow that we may not 
know perfectly well what the relation is; we may be perfectly acquainted with it; 
it may be perfectly familiar to us; and we may know both that there is such a 
relation and that this relation is essential to the definition of truth.  37
 Moore, 1956, p. 292.35
 I indicate why I think this is problematic in Chapter 3: this is an example of what I there call the problem of fact 36
fission.
 Moore, 1956, pp 291-292.37
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Ignoring the claim that false beliefs don’t refer (Moore previously has said that they do refer to 
facts which lack ‘being’), I think it is interesting that according to M2 the referring relation itself 
cannot be analyzed; we simply know that true beliefs refer to facts, and M2 permits no further 
analysis.   
 A further problem for M2 arises when Moore tries to give an account of what exactly a 
fact is: “I am going, then, to use the name “facts” simply and solely as a name for the kind of 
constituents of the universe which correspond to true beliefs.”   One might wonder how 38
informative Moore’s M2 definition of truth is, considering that he considers reference/
correspondence itself undefinable, and he defines ‘fact’ in terms of truth.  Even more 
problematically, Moore thinks that ‘a fact’ and ‘a truth’ are interchangeable, so that it is perfectly 
reasonable to think that true beliefs correspond/refer to particular truths: “It is, I think, important 
to notice that ‘a truth’ is merely another name for a fact…”  and finally, noting that truths/facts 39
are different from true acts of belief, Moore states: 
It may be asked: What, after all, is the property which all truths have in common, 
and which is not shared by anything which is not a truth? How are we to 
distinguish the sort of thing you mean by a “truth,” from all the sorts of things 
which are not truths?  And in answer to this question, I confess I don’t know how 
to describe the property which belongs to all truths and only to truths: it seems to 
me to be a property which can be pointed out and seen, but if it can be analyzed, I 
don’t see how to analyze it.  The case seems to me to be the same, as if you were 
asked what a “a colour” is.  All of us, who are not blind, know perfectly well what 
 Moore, 1956, p. 32438
 Moore, 1956, p. 32439
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a color is, and, with regard to anything whatever which may come before our 
minds, we can tell, with perfect ease, whether it is a color or not.  40
It might seem that Moore hasn’t really abandoned primitivism about either truth or TRUTH, for 
what he has told us is that there are two properties of truth; truth(b) is a property of beliefs, a 
property of all and only those beliefs which refer to truths, and the property that all truths (or, 
facts) have in common (which we may call truth(f)) is unanalyzable and, one might think, 
primitive.  The use of the primitivity of color terms parallels what Moore said in M1 and in 
Principia Ethica.  In short, I’m not convinced that reading M2 as departing from M1 in virtue of 
Moore abandoning primitivism is the correct interpretation; arguably Moore has simply changed 
his mind about which property of truth is in fact primitive.   It seems then that the difference 41
between M1 and M2 isn’t that Moore abandons the primitive thesis.  Rather he abandon’s M1’s 
odd contention that questions about existence are actually questions about the truth of existential 
propositions, and M1’s insistence that propositions themselves exist. 
 I want to raise a final problem for M2.  Since true beliefs are in a one-to-one 
correspondence with facts, and ‘fact’ and ‘truth’ denote the same thing, one might wonder what 
philosophical use ‘facts’ are if they are as finely grained as the individual beliefs to which they 
correspond and which they make true.  According to M2, a true belief is a belief which has the 
property truth(b), a property it has because it bears the unanalyzable relation of reference to a 
truth (fact), which itself has an unanalyzable property of truth(f), though this property of truth 
 Moore, 1956, p. 336.40
 Asay’s 2013 reading of Moore here is an example of the interpretation I find questionable (though not entirely 41
incorrect).  For instance, on p. 75 he writes “By 1911, Moore and Russell had both moved away from primitivism 
and adopted a form of correspondence theory.”  But if I am correct above, Moore’s correspondence theory is 
compatible with some form of primitivism regarding truth, as he explicitly endorses the primitivity of truth(f) to 
explain the correspondence relation that grounds truth(b), and accounts for why truth(b) is not a primitive property.
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ought not to be confused with the property of truth which belongs to beliefs.  One could be 
forgiven for thinking that truths or facts have simply been posited to serve as the referents of true 
beliefs, provided we are already wedded to the thesis that truth must be in some sense grounded.  
When we reflect that Moore thinks that the fact that x and the true belief that x both ‘have the 
same name,’  and that “‘truths’, therefore, are one of the two classes of things with regard to 
which it may, I think , be plausibly said that they are, but don’t exist”   we might wonder why 42
Moore doesn’t simply say that true beliefs possess the unanalyzable property of truth, and 
thereby avoid appealing to an unanalyzable referring relation to a non-existent entity (which is) 
which shares the same name as the belief, but itself has a different unanalyzable property of 
truth(f).  43
1.5 Russell Abandons the Primitive Thesis 
 By 1912 Russell has fleshed out his multiple-relations theory of judgment, and with it a 
correspondence theory of truth containing an explicit ontology of both truth-bearers (judgments 
and beliefs) and truth makers (facts).  Taking the case of Othello believing that Desdemona loves 
Cassio, Russell claims the following (which we may call R4): 
The relation involved in judging or believing must, if falsehood is to be duly 
allowed for, be taken to be a relation between several terms, not between two…
This relation, therefore is a relation of four terms since Othello is also one of the 
terms of the relation…Thus the actual occurrence, at the moment when Othello is 
 Moore, 1956, p 338.42
 Perhaps Moore is worried that true beliefs need to be grounded in the right manner by a relation to the way the 43
world is.  Tarki’s satisfaction relation arguably achieves this grounding without positing entities that correspond to 
sentences as a whole; Frege’s ‘the true’ might be seen as another possible way to ground truth.  In short, it’s not clear 
that Moore needs to postulate facts to satisfy the grounding requirement.  I will have more to say on this subject in 
upcoming chapters.
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entertaining his belief, is that the relation called ‘believing’ is knitting together 
into one complex whole the four terms Othello, Desdemona, loving, and Cassio.  
What is called belief or judgment, is nothing but this relation of believing or 
judging, which relates a mind to several things other than itself.  44
This passage warrants careful scrutiny.  Notice that for R4, a belief isn’t something that a 
believer is put into a one-to-one relation with, rather a belief is a relation involving the believer 
himself as a constituent.  Thus in the passage above it is the believing relation which knits 
together Othello, Desdemona, loving and Cassio, and knits them together in a specific ordered 
sense (this ‘ordered sense’ is to differentiate the belief in question from, for example, 
Desdemona’s belief that Othello loves Cassio, which has the same constituents as the belief in 
question, yet the two beliefs must be distinct). 
  Facts must be different from true beliefs if they are to serve as truth-makers, and I 
alluded above that Russell has a clever solution for differentiating true beliefs from facts.  A 
belief is, remember a relation between a believer, the term(s) of the belief, and a relation.  A fact, 
on the other hand, is a complex composed of the terms of the belief united by the relation: 
The relation ‘loving’, as it occurs in the act of believing, is one of the objects - it 
is a brick in the structure, not the cement.  The cement is the relation ‘believing’.  
When the belief is true, there is another complex unity, in which the relation 
which was one of the objects of the belief relates the other objects… the relation 
which was one of the objects [of the belief] occurring now as the cement that 
binds together the other objects of the belief.  45
Thus we are able to distinguish between facts and true beliefs, and to see that facts are not 
constituents of true beliefs, although true beliefs and the facts with which they correspond do 
 Russell, 1912, p 21.44
 Russell, 1912, p 23.45
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have constituents in common.  In belief it is the believing relation which unites all the terms of 
the belief (even when a term in the belief is itself a relation), while in the corresponding fact the 
relation which was a term in a belief is now what knits together the terms into a complex whole, 
a fact.   
 With R4 Russell is able to differentiate fact from true belief, and seems to have an 
account of correspondence that seems plausible for at least some classes of beliefs.  However, 
well-known problems arise for R4 when we believe (truly, it would seem!) of non-existing 
objects that they do not exist, or of existing objects that they have metaphysically impossible 
properties, etc.  Another possible problem for R4, like M2, consists in how finely grained facts 
are, and how we are to individuate the facts that any true belief corresponds to (I’ll explore these 
challenges further in Chapter 3). 
1.6 Conclusion 
 We’ve established that both Russell and Moore maintained versions of the primitive 
thesis at different points in their intellectual development, only to abandon the thesis.  
Importantly, we’ve seen how decisions concerning the nature of belief, reference, and 
predication constrain possible explanations of truth and the truth-making relation.  In the next 
chapter we’ll discuss the views of Frege, who accepted and never abandoned a version of the 
primitive thesis.  
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“Truth is obviously something so primitive and simple that it is not possible to reduce it to 
anything still simpler.”  -Gottlob Frege, Logic.   46
Chapter 2 
History of the Primitive Thesis: Frege 
2.1 Overview  
 In 1919 Gottlob Frege wrote to the historian of science Ludwig Darmstaedter, outlining 
the achievements that Frege thought he had made: 
What is distinctive about my conception of logic is that I begin by giving pride of 
place to the content of the word ‘true’, and then immediately go on to introduce a 
thought as that to which the question ‘is it true?’ is in principle applicable.  So I 
do not  begin with concepts and put them together to form a thought or 
judgement; I come by the parts of a thought by analyzing the thought… Truth is 
not part of a thought.  47
Frege, like Moore and Russell (at times), subscribed to the thesis that truth is primitive; in his 
words, truth is sui generis and indefinable.  Unlike Moore and Russell, Frege, as hinted in the 
above quote, never abandoned the thesis.  Frege has been interpreted as having two main 
arguments for the primitivity of truth, and it is worth exploring whether or not these arguments 
are successful.  An argument, dubbed the ‘Treadmill’, is present in Frege, and it is in Frege that 
we see the seeds of a family of arguments that have been collectively dubbed the ‘Slingshot’.  I 
propose first to articulate Frege’s account of predication and reference, and then to analyze the 
 Frege, 1897, Logic, in Beaney, 1997, p 228.46
 Frege, 1919, Notes for Ludwig Darmstaedter, in Beaney, 1997 p 363.47
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Treadmill and Slingshot arguments for the primitivity of truth.  While Frege’s account of 
predication might seem an odd place to start, an account of predication does have implications 
for a theory of truth, in that such an account must specify what it is that predicates contribute to 
the truth conditions of the sentences in which they occur.  Likewise, Frege’s theory of reference 
is interesting because Frege thinks not only that singular terms like names and definite 
descriptions refer to objects, but that sentences as a whole refer as well; this is part of the reason 
for his claim that all true sentences refer to the same object.   The present chapter will articulate 48
Frege’s conception of predication, focusing on the role that predicates and singular terms play in 
sentences.  I’ll discuss an argument that has come to be known as Frege’s Treadmill, as well as 
an argument I’ll call Frege’s Proto-Slingshot.  I argue that while both provide Fregean reasons 
for the thesis that truth is in some sense primitive, the latter argument relies on premises that are, 
though not plainly false, dubitable. 
2.2 Frege on Predication 
 Frege’s analysis of the different roles that denoting/referring expressions and predicates 
play in the composition of a thought is novel (though, I’ll argue, ultimately unsatisfactory).  The 
first appearance of Frege’s notion of predication appears in an 1882 letter to philosopher Anton 
Marty: 
A concept is unsaturated in that it requires something to fall under it; hence it 
cannot exist on its own.  That an individual falls under it is a judgeable content, 
and here the concept appears as a predicate and is always predicative.  In this 
 As we’ll see in Chapter 5, Davidson develops a theory of predication that is Fregean in spirit, but that employs the 48
work of Tarski to eliminate both sentential reference and to give a different (and I’ll argue better) account of 
predication, and of the relationship between predicates and properties.
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case, where the subject is an individual, the relation of the subject to predicate is 
not a third thing added to the two, but it belongs to the content of the predicate, 
which is what makes the predicate unsaturated. Now, I do not believe that concept 
formation can precede judgement, because this would presuppose the independent 
existence of concepts, but I think of a concept as having arisen by decomposition 
from a judgeable content.  49
This passage clarifies and condenses a number of themes littered throughout Frege’s published 
papers.  We can see his insistence on the primacy of sentential meaning over term meaning, in 
that term meaning is arrived at via decomposition of a thought.  We can also see his insistence on 
the primacy of simple declarative predication in the study of language, in that what we 
decompose are those things that are judgeable, i.e. true or false. 
 Predicates are unsaturated for Frege because they take singular terms in order to form a 
complete sentence.  Singular terms have a referent or Bedeutung; names refer to the objects they 
are names of, definite descriptions to the objects which they definitely describe.   The 50
unsaturated part of a sentence (predicates) also have a Bedeutung, so a predicate refers to a 
concept, where concepts are functions; functions take arguments and output values.  Predicates 
refer to functions that take objects and output truth values.  One can individuate (create, form, 
etc.) a predicate by taking a judgeable content and removing one or more of the singular terms 
involved.  Thus, by removing ‘Donald’ from ‘Donald is bald’, we arrive at the one-place 
predicate ‘_ is bald’ which  refers to a concept/function that maps objects onto truth values: it 
maps Donald onto The True.  By removing ‘Donald’ and ‘Van’ from ‘Donald is as bald as Van’ 
 Frege, 1882, Letter to Marty, in Beaney, 1997 p 81.49
 As I hope this makes clear, I’m using ‘refer’ in this chapter broadly, intended to mean the relation between a bit of 50
language (whether name, description, predicate, or sentence) and its Bedeutung.  
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we arrive at the two-place predicate ‘_ is as bald as _’.  Predicates, referring to functions, are by 
themselves unsaturated: an n-place predicate doesn’t express a thought until it is saturated with n 
objects.  51
 Frege’s intuition for claiming that predicates have a Bedeutung is as follows.  Having just 
established that proper names have a Bedeutung, Frege argues: 
Now it is surely unlikely that a proper name should behave so differently from the 
rest of a singular sentence that it is only in its case that the existence of a 
Bedeutung should be of importance.  If the thought as a whole is to belong to the 
realm of truth, we must rather assume that something in the realm of Bedeutung 
must correspond to the rest of the sentence, which has the unsaturated part of the 
thought for its sense…. It is inconceivable that it is only for the proper names that 
there can be a question of Bedeutung and not for the other parts of the sentence 
which connect them…. If we split up a sentence into a proper name and the 
remainder, then this remainder has for its sense an unsaturated part of a thought.  
But we call its Bedeutung a concept.  52
I’d note at the outset that the reasoning employed here doesn’t seem compelling; indeed one 
might think it odd that Frege insist that predicates have referents in the way proper names do.  
That is, it isn’t clear that predicates refer because proper names refer, which seems to be what 
Frege claims.  Predicates, one might say, predicate, while names name.  One might plausibly 
claim that the different parts of language serve different purposes by playing different linguistic 
roles.  53
 Strictly speaking Frege deals only with one-place predicates when he is speaking of concepts as functions.51
 Frege, 1906, Introduction to Logic, in Beaney 1997 p 295.52
 This is precisely the move that Davidson makes with regard to predication, which I will concentrate on in 53
Chapters 4 and 5.
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 Not only does Frege think that concepts have a Bedeutung, he also argues that sentences 
themselves have a Bedeutung, though it is unclear whether his argument for why this should be 
so succeeds.  In his Introduction to Logic Frege argues for the claims that sentences as wholes 
have referents, and these referents are truth values: 
We have seen that it is true of parts of sentences that they have Bedeutungen.  
What of a whole sentence, does this have a Bedeutung too?  If we are concerned 
with truth, if we are aiming at knowledge, then we demand of each proper name 
occurring in a sentence that it should have a Bedeutung.  On the other hand, we 
know that as far as the sense of a sentence, the thought, is concerned it does not 
matter whether the parts of the sentence have Bedeutungen or not.  It follows that 
there must be something  associated with a sentence which is different from the 
thought, something to which it is essential that the parts of the sentence should 
have Bedeutungen.  This is to be called the Bedeutung of the sentence.  But the 
only thing to which this is essential is what I call the truth-value - whether the 
thought is true or false…We have two truth-values, the True and the False.  If a 
sentence can be split up into parts, each of which has a Bedeutung, then the 
sentence also has a Bedeutung.  The True and the False are to be regarded as 
objects, for both the sentence and its sense , the thought, are complete in 
character, not unsaturated… A sentence proper is a proper name, and its 
Bedeutung, if it has one, is a truth-value: the True or the False.  54
This passage needs unpacking.  First, Frege claims it is only when we are aiming at truth that we 
are concerned that names in a given sentence have a referent.  That is, sentences containing non-
referring names don’t have a truth value, because there is no object for a concept to map onto a 
truth value, although a sentence employing a non-referring name may express a thought or have 
a sense.  Since this is so, when Frege says there must be something to which it is essential that 
 Frege, 1906, Introduction to Logic, in Beaney 1997 pp 296-297.54
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the parts of a sentence have a Bedeutung, he has in mind that he has just established that the only 
such thing that could be essential to all sentences that are truth-apt is a truth-value. What is 
missing from a sentence like “Godzilla flies”  (which expresses a perfectly sensible thought) is 
an object named by ‘Godzilla’ to be mapped by the concept named by the predicate ‘_ flies’ onto 
a truth value.   When we are concerned with truth we are concerned with what is actually the 55
case, and what is the case depends on the kinds of objects there are and the way those objects are.  
This is truthful predication.  What isn’t clear, and what is essential to Frege’s argument, is the 
implied claim that ‘there must be something associated with a sentence which is different from 
the thought’ and that if that associated thing is the sentence’s truth-value, then the truth-value is 
the sentence’s Bedeutung.  That is, one might plausibly claim that sentences have truth values, 
but that the relation between a sentence and its truth value is not a naming relation.  
 The second part of the quote makes a different argument for the claim that the Bedeutung 
of a sentence is a truth-value.  The argument appears to be that if a sentence can be split up into 
parts, each of which has a Bedeutung, then the sentence itself has a Bedeutung.  This however, 
proves too much.  For if this were true, it is hard to see why paragraphs would not also have 
Bedeutungen, given that they too can be split up into parts (sentences) which have individual 
Bedeutungen, and what goes for paragraphs goes for chapters, books, and the collected literary 
output of a given individual.  The principle ‘things with parts that have Bedeutungen must 
themselves have a Bedeutung’ admits of a reductio ad absurdum here.  This is not to claim that 
the conclusion of Frege’s argument (that sentences as a whole have a Bedeutung) is false.  All I 
am claiming is that the conclusion is, as stated, unsupported. 
 Questions about truth in fiction are outside the scope of this discussion.55
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 The third part of the quote above states Frege’s thesis that truth values are objects, 
sentences are names, and that the objects that sentences name are truth-values.  This claim 
foreshadows claims that will become apparent in discussion of Frege’s Treadmill argument.  The 
True is an object, and, as we have seen, the relation between objects and language is the naming 
relation.  Thus, the relation between sentences and the True is a relation of naming, not of 
predication.  The predicate ‘_is true’ isn’t a proper predicate in the way that ‘_is bald’ is, and 
therefore truth isn’t a property of sentences.  This is clear when Frege says the following: 
If we say ‘the thought it true’, we seem to be ascribing truth to the thought as a 
property…But here we are misled by language.  We do not have the relation of an 
object to a property, but that of the sense of a sign to its Bedeutung.  In fact at 
bottom the sentence ‘It is true that 2 is prime’ says no more than ‘2 is prime’.  56
We should note that properties are the kinds of things that are predicated of objects.  That is, they 
are related to predicate terms and not to object terms.  Thus, since predicates refer to concepts 
that map objects onto truth values, it would be odd if truth were a property, since The True is an 
object, and the relationship between objects and language is one of naming.  So, for Frege, there 
is no concept TRUTH, as truth is an object which is named by all and only those sentences 
which are true (sentences whose concept maps an object onto The True).  This will become 
apparent in the following. 
2.3 Frege’s Treadmill 
 Asay's recent work on the primitive theory of truth takes up and analyzes an argument for 
the primitive thesis that Asay dubs ‘Frege’s Treadmill’.  Asay is concerned with whether TRUTH 
 Frege, 1906, Introduction to Logic, in Beaney, 1997 p 297.56
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is a primitive concept, and so he assumes (contra Frege) that TRUTH is a concept, and marshals 
Fregean arguments for his own contention that the concept TRUTH is primitive but the property 
truth is metaphysically deflationary.   Since, unlike Asay, I don’t believe Frege thinks TRUTH 57
is a property at all, it will be useful to quote the Frege in full to appreciate what Frege himself 
was getting at.  In his unpublished Logic, Frege uses the Treadmill to argue that thoughts cannot 
be things that are private and mental (they must be Fregean senses): 
If a thought, like an idea, were something private and mental, then the truth of a 
thought could surely only consist in a relation to something that was not private or 
mental.  So if we wanted to know whether a thought was true, we should have to 
ask whether the relation in question obtained and thus whether the thought that 
this relation obtained was true.  And so we should be in the position of a man on a 
treadmill who makes a step forewords and upwards, but the step he treads on 
keeps giving way and he falls back to where he was before.   
A thought is something impersonal.  If we see the sentence ‘2+3=5’ written on a 
wall, we have no difficulty at all in recognizing the thought expressed by it, and 
we do not need to know who has written it there in order to understand it.  58
Here it seems clear that Frege is making a kind of third-man argument against a type of 
correspondence theory of truth.  If thoughts are private entities (instead of Fregean senses), and if 
truth is a property, then the truth of a thought could only consist in a relation between the private 
entity and something non-private.  Frege seems to be saying that in order for us to discover 
whether that relation obtained, we would have to ask ourselves whether it was true that the 
relation obtained.  Frege makes a similar point in his published work The Thought: 
 The discussion here will concern only whether TRUTH is primitive.  Discussions about properties being 57
metaphysically substantive or not will be addressed in Chapter 5.
 Frege, 1897, Logic, in Beaney 1997 p 234.58
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But could we not maintain that there is truth when there is correspondence in a 
certain respect?  But which respect? For in that case what ought we to do so as to 
decide whether something is true?  We should have to inquire whether it is true 
that an idea and a reality, say, correspond in the specified respect.  And then we 
should be confronted by a question of the same kind, and the game could begin 
again.  So the attempted explanation of truth as correspondence breaks down.  For 
in a definition certain characteristics would have to be specified.  And in 
application to any particular case the question would always arise whether it were 
true that the characteristics were present.  So we should be going round in a 
circle.  So it seems likely that the content of the word ‘true’ is sui generis and 
indefinable.  59
Asay (2013) has made explicit three versions of Frege’s Treadmill: first as a circularity argument, 
then as a regress, and finally as an argument concerning omnipresence.  Asay thinks only the 
third argument is sound, but notes correctly that it is only the first that can explicitly be found in 
Frege proper, though the latter is arguably available to a Fregean.  
 Asay’s reason for finding Frege’s circularity and regress Treadmills unsatisfying is that 
the arguments seems to turn on the following claim, where C is a substantive definition of 
TRUTH: “For any truth-bearer p, in order to determine that p is C one must first determine that it 
 Frege 1918, The Thought, in Beaney 1997 p 327.59
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is true that p is C,  thereby deploying the concept TRUTH.”   This seems to make explicit what 60
Frege says above: it is also problematic.  The claim exploits the material equivalence of T-
sentences and tries to generate an epistemic priority that is at best questionable.   As Asay notes, 61
if C is a substantive definition of TRUTH, C has a kind of epistemic or explanatory priority over 
TRUTH; what it is for something to be true is explained by that thing’s being C.  It will of course 
be the case that there is a material equivalency between the three claims ‘p’, ‘p is true’, and ‘p is 
C’, but only the latter is explanatorily basic.  Material equivalency is not the same as explanatory 
equivalency in this case: consider as an analogue BACHELOR, UNMARRIED, and MAN.  A 
substantive definition of BACHELOR establishes a material equivalency (hence the material 
biconditional) between BACHELOR and UNMARRIED MALE.  We explain BACHELOR in 
terms of UNMARRIED and MALE, we do not explain UNMARRIED and MALE in terms of 
BACHELOR.   Thus, “what it is to be C is not to be true, according to the view that defines 62
 Here is Asay’s formal argument from circularity: 60
(1) There is some characteristic C that defines the concept TRUTH such that, for any truth-bearer p, P is true if and 
only if p is C. [Supposition] 
(2) For any concept A and characteristic B, if A is defined by B, then in order to determine that something is A one 
must first determine that it is B. [Premise] 
(3) For any truth-bearer p, in order to determine that p is true one must first determine that p is C. [From (1) and (2)] 
(4) For any concept A and characteristic B, if A is defined by B, then in order to determine that something is B, one 
must do so without deploying the concept A, on pain of epistemic circularity. [Premise] 
(5) For any truth-bearer p, in order to determine that p is C, one must do so without deploying the concept TRUTH, 
on pain of epistemic circularity. [From (1) and (4)] 
(6) For any truth-bearer p, in order to determine that p is C, one must first determine that it is true that p is C, 
thereby deploying the concept TRUTH. [Premise] 
(7) For any truth-bearer p, it is impossible to determine that p is true without confronting an epistemic circularity. 
[From (3), (5), and (6)] 
(8) For some truth-bearer p, it is possible to determine that p is true without confronting an epistemic circularity.  
(9) Contradiction [From (7) and (8)] 
(10) There is no characteristic C that denies the concept TRUTH such that, for any truth-bearer p, p is true if and 
only if p is C. [Reductio on (1)-(9)].  Asay, pp 140-141.  The regress argument is similarly structured, and similarly 
problematic.
 Asay 142-144.61
 The bachelor example is straight from Asay.62
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TRUTH in terms of C.  Instead, what it is to be true is to be C.”   This reverses the epistemic 63
priority, demanding that, when determining that p is C, we first determine that it is true that p is 
C.  If C is truly an explanatory definition of TRUTH this demand is unwarranted, so this version 
of the Treadmill fails.  Asay correctly notes that the re-interpretation of the Treadmill as a regress 
argument fails as well, and for the same reason, and puts forward what he calls the argument 
from omnipresence in its stead, claiming that the argument from omnipresence is a successful 
argument that TRUTH is indefinable. 
2.4 The Argument From Omnipresence 
 The argument from omnipresence finds support in Frege’s The Thought.  Remembering 
Frege’s account of predication, Frege argued that “We cannot recognize a property of a thing 
without at the same time finding the thought this thing has this property to be true.”   As we 64
have seen, by ‘thought’ Frege means ‘judgeable content,’ which just means truth-evaluable (is 
susceptible to the question ‘is it true?’).  This is not an uncontentious claim, but I think it is 
plausible.  The idea, then, is that even the most basic form of predication involves possession of 
the concept of truth, because possession of the concept of truth is a necessary condition for 
thought.   Frege says:  65
 Asay, 2013, p 145.63
 Frege, 1918, The Thought, in Beaney 1997 p 328.64
 We’ll see this point echoed in Davidson, who maintains (across both papers and decades) that possession of the 65
concept is both necessary and sufficient for thought.  Slightly modifying Frege’s point here, in “Thought and 
Talk” (1975) Davidson says “It is often wrongly thought that the semantical concept of truth is redundant, that there 
is no difference between asserting that a sentence s is true, and using s to make an assertion.  What may be right is a 
redundancy theory of belief, that to believe that p is not to be distinguished from the belief that p is true.” Truth and 
Interpretation, p 170.
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One can, indeed, say: ‘The thought that 5 is a prime number is true’.  But closer 
examination shows that nothing more has been said than in the simple sentence ‘5 
is a prime number’.    66
So Frege’s claim here is that the thought ‘The thought that 5 is a prime number is true’ is the 
same thought expressed by ‘5 is a prime number’.  Provided that TRUTH is a concept, if this is 
true, then of course the converse holds as well, and any predicative sentence ‘P’  expresses the 
same thought as ‘it is true that P’, which, as we have noted, makes possession of the concept of 
truth a necessary condition of thought generally.  Frege’s argument then turns on any definition 
of truth of the form ‘x is true iff N’.  Since ‘P’ and ‘it is true that P’ express the same thought, the 
purportedly informative definition ‘x is true iff N’ expresses the same thought as ‘it is true that x 
is true iff N’.  Thus, to understand the supposedly substantive definition, one necessarily has to 
possess the concept TRUTH.  Asay has formalized this argument, relying on the following 
premise concerning the Omnipresence of Truth (OT): For all P, the conceptual content that 
composes the thought that P is identical to the conceptual content that composes the thought that 
it is true that P.   Since the thought P is identical to the thought that it is true that P, there is no 67
epistemic priority being wrongfully exploited, as there (arguably) was in the problematic claims 
of the Treadmill construed as a circularity argument.  The  priority problems plaguing the various 
forms of Frege’s Treadmill appear to have been avoided, and we have an argument that the 
concept TRUTH is indefineable. 
 Though I sympathize with Asay’s reconstruction, I want to point out why I think Frege 
would not, and that he would think the above also constitutes an argument for the conclusion that 
 Frege, 1892, On Sinn and Bedeutung, in Beaney, 1997 p 158.  It might be noted that Frege might be taken here to 66
sow the seeds that Ramsey and Horwich harvest with their (respective) redundancy and deflationary theories.
 Asay, 2013, p 167.67
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TRUTH isn’t a proper concept at all.  Remember, Frege maintains a sharp distinction between 
objects and concepts.  What’s more, the classes of concepts and objects appear to be mutually 
exclusive.  Singular terms have as their Bedeutungen objects, and the Bedeutungen of predicates 
are concepts.  Concepts just are functions that take the Bedeutungen of singular terms and map 
them on to other objects: truth values.  The True and The False are objects. Since they are objects 
they can’t be concepts.  In his Comments on Sinn and Bedeutung Frege says: 
We cannot avoid words like ‘the concept’ but when we use them we must always 
bear their inappropriateness in mind.  From what we have said it follows that 
objects and concepts are fundamentally different and cannot stand in for one 
another.  The same goes for the corresponding words or signs.  Proper names 
cannot really be used as predicates.  68
Frege is already committed to the claim that sentences have as their Bedeutungen truth values, so 
of course he would say that ‘_is true’ isn’t a proper predicate.  Suppose ‘_is true’ were a proper 
predicate.  Now consider the kinds of objects the predicate ‘_is true’ would apply to: it seems 
clear that the only entities that would saturate the predicate ‘_is true’ are propositional, i.e. whole 
sentences themselves.  Since predicates refer to concepts, and concepts are functions which take 
the Bedeutungen of singular terms and map them on to a truth value, and since a sentence is a 
singular term with a truth value as its Bedeutung, the predicate ‘_is true’ just maps truth values 
onto truth values.  Clearly, then, ‘_is true’  would map The True onto The True.  This line of 
reasoning leads Frege to think that ‘_is true’ does no work, and therefore that  ‘_is true’ is not a 
proper predicate at all.  Note however, that what motivates this argument are Frege’s dual claims 
 Frege, 1892, Comments on Sinn and Bedeutung, in Beaney, 1997 p 174-175.  The flip side of this coin is the much 68
discussed passage where Frege argues that the concept ‘horse’ isn’t a concept, for when we say ‘the concept ‘horse’’ 
we treat the concept like an object, and objects are not concepts, they are not unsaturated.  The horse example is 
Frege hammering home the idea that concepts are not objects.  When I say ‘_is true’ is not a proper predicate I mean 
to hammer home what I think Frege would say, namely that objects are not concepts. 
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that concepts are functions, and that sentences have Bedeutungen.  It is only because Frege is 
committed to functions being the Bedeutungen of predicates that sentences must have referents 
(if concepts are functions they must map arguments onto something), and it is only because 
Frege thinks that predicates must have Bedeutungen that he chooses functions (that predicates 
refer to functions explains the unity of the sentence - predicates are unsaturated until objects 
saturate them).  Neither of these claims is immune from doubt.  
 I agree with Asay that the argument from omnipresence is the best possible way to 
construct a Fregean argument concerning the primitive nature of TRUTH, and like Asay I want 
to claim that there is a concept of TRUTH.  Doing this requires taking a much broader 
conception of what a concept is than Frege’s strict functional account; concepts must be 
something like ‘the constituents of thought’.  So, while something like the argument from 
omnipresence is useful to have in one’s arsenal defending the primitivity of truth, it will be 
useful to people (like Asay) who have a broader conception of what a concept is.  Frege doesn’t 
need such an argument; since The True is an object ‘_ is true’ can’t be a proper predicate. 
 Asay defends OT from attacks on all fronts, but I think he misses articulating a key virtue 
of OT: it helps us determine which kinds of things can properly be said to think.  If possession of 
the concept TRUTH is a necessary condition of thought, we can thereby rule out thermostats, 
sunflowers, and stones as candidates for the possession of thoughts or beliefs.  Only a creature 
that recognizes that they can make a mistake, can mis-apply a concept, can be said to be in 
possession of the concept TRUTH.   Asay’s argument for the equivalence of ‘P’ and ‘It is true 69
that P’ concerns the indistinguishability of the two thoughts.  While I sympathize with this claim 
 I’ll air these claims out in the end of Chapter 4, which concerns a positive proposal of the Primitive Thesis.69
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and with Asay’s argument for it, I think that we can supplement them with a Davidsonian 
account of interpretation.  Such an account tells us how to go about interpreting the (hitherto 
untranslated) behavior of others, but also (and this is what is important for the present point) 
when it makes sense to attribute thoughts to other entities.  We are justified in attributing thought 
to such entities when they appear to possess the concept of truth; this is just what rules out 
thermostats, sunflowers, and stones.        70
 I want to register one further slight hesitation about the argument Asay is pushing with 
OT.   Just because we must employ a concept in the definiens of a definition, that might not 71
preclude us from shedding light on that very concept by means of providing an account of that 
concept that looks like a definition, but is in fact conceptually circular.  It is important to note 
that the argument from omnipresence is compatible with a strong correspondence theory of truth 
(a statement is true iff it corresponds to a fact) provided that the correspondence theory of truth is 
not taken to be a conceptually reductive analysis of TRUTH.  If the conclusion of the argument 
from omnipresence is true, then of course there is no non-circular definition of TRUTH in terms 
of more basic concepts.  However it can still be illuminating to relate TRUTH to other concepts 
like those of BELIEF, OBJECTIVITY.  Furthermore, provided that we can individuate facts in a 
non-problematic way, a strong correspondence theory of truth seems compatible with the 
conceptual primitivity of TRUTH, in the same way that an account of yellow in terms of EMR 
radiation can be illuminating even though (arguably, following Moore) YELLOW is a primitive 
concept.   
 This will be made more explicit in Chapter 4.70
 Or, at least with an interpretation of Asay’s argument.  Asay admits later that the omnipresence argument is 71
consistent with a full-fledged correspondence theory, and hints that he is sympathetic to such an account of truth, 
provided that it isn’t taken as a conceptually reductive account.
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2.5 A Fregean Proto-Slingshot 
 Slingshot arguments typically purport to show that if truth bearers stand in a referring 
relationship to anything, they must refer to something no more finely grained than the truth 
predicate itself.  It is Frege who sowed the seeds of Slingshot-type arguments, in his seminal On 
Sense and Reference, though it is unclear that Frege intends his discussion to be an explicit 
argument.  What I’ll call the Fregean Proto-Slingshot aims to show that because sentences (in 
addition to singular terms) stand in a referring relation to something, they must refer to their truth 
value.  Frege’s passage is worth quoting in full: 
If our supposition that the Bedeutung of a sentence is it’s truth-value is correct, 
the latter must remain unchanged when a part of the sentence is replaced by an 
expression with the same Bedeutung.  And this is in fact the case.  Leibniz gives 
the definition ‘Those things are the same which can be substituted for one another 
without loss of truth’.  If we are dealing with sentences for which the Bedeutung 
of their component parts is at all relevant, then what feature except the truth-value 
can be found that belongs to such sentences quite generally and remains 
unchanged by substitutions of the kind just mentioned?  If now the truth value of 
a sentence is it’s Bedeutung, then on the one hand all true sentences have the same 
Bedeutung, and so, on the other hand, do all false sentences.  From this we see 
that in the Bedeutung of the sentence all that is specific is obliterated.  72
Frege here makes no distinction between the different roles that names and descriptions play in 
picking out objects and events.  The argument I have in mind (and that many see implicit in 
 Frege, 1892, On Sinn and Bedeutung, in Beaney, 1997, p 158-159.  I’ve taken the liberty of translating the 72
Leibniz from the latin that appears in Frege’s paper proper.  The phrasing is no accident; Frege uses just this 
conception of identity in his Foundations of Mathematics, noting that it is a definition of identity (there he claims 
identity, sameness, and equality are negligibly different terms for the same concept).  See Frege, 1884, Foundations 
of Mathematics, in Beaney, 1997, p 112.
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Frege) can be constructed along the following lines.  Take ‘the morning star’, ‘the evening star’, 
and ‘Venus’.  Since, according to Frege’s semantics, all three of these terms have the same 
Bedeutung, they are substitutable, salva veritate, in sentences which contain them.   Note also 73
that the Leibnizian account of identity that we find not only in Frege’s On Sense and Reference, 
but also in his Foundations of Arithmetic, seems to license separate, but sometimes conflated, 
principles of substitution. Co-referential names may be substituted without loss of truth, but note 
that co-denoting definite descriptions may also be so substituted.  Thus in ‘Cicero denounced 
Catiline’, we may substitute ‘Tully’ for ‘Cicero’ without a change in truth value, and since we 
may do so, the Bedeutung of the sentences as a whole does not change. We may also substitute 
‘the greatest Roman orator’ for ‘Cicero’, provided that Cicero was indeed the greatest Roman 
orator, without changing the Bedeutung of the sentence.  Assuming that Cicero was indeed the 
greatest Roman orator, the sentence ‘Cicero was the Greatest roman orator’ would have to have 
the same Bedeutung as ‘Cicero was the individual x such that x was the greatest roman orator 
and P’, where P is any true sentence whatsoever. Finally, when we reflect that ‘Cicero was the 
individual x such that x was the greatest roman orator and P’ is true if and only if P is true (since 
‘Cicero’ and ‘the greatest roman orator’ both pick out the same person), P must refer to the same 
thing that ‘Cicero was the greatest Roman orator’ does.  Hence, the obliteration of specifics that 
Frege speaks of above, for it seems that what P and ‘Cicero was the greatest Roman orator’ share 
could be nothing other than their truth value.  
 My Fregean Proto-Slingshot delivers the conclusion that all true sentences refer to the 
same thing, an entity which Frege calls ‘The True.’  It is not clear, however, that the argument 
 The present discussion excludes intensional contexts.73
 42
does so on premises that are compelling under close reading.  First, it is unclear why sentences as 
a whole ought to stand in a referring relationship to anything at all.   Second, the Leibnizian 74
account of identity and substitutability employed here is extremely permissive, and the argument 
seems problematically question-begging.  Frege’s Leibnizian substitution principle endorses the 
biconditional (let us call it LSP) ‘one may substitute A for B in any sentence containing B 
without loss of truth (and vice versa; B for A) iff A=B’.   Due to the presence of the 
biconditional, this tells us not only when we can substitute A and B in a sentence, but also when 
things are the same, or rather when ‘A’ and ‘B’ have the same Bedeutung, and thus is an account 
of identity.  Leibniz intended his principle to be apply only to singular terms, while Frege thinks 
A and B can be interpreted to stand for expressions generally: names, descriptions, clauses, or 
even entire sentences.  This, combined with the use of the biconditional is wildly permissive, and 
arguably begs the question.   75
 LSP, as a biconditional, entails both a substitution principle and an identity principle, as it 
may be read in either direction.  Consider if we modify LSP to be read only as a conditional.  
Read in one direction, LSP would then be only a substitution principle.  Let us call this the Weak 
Leibnizian Substitution Principle (WLSP): one may substitute A for B in a sentence containing B 
without loss of truth (and vice versa; B for A) if A=B.  This tells us when we may substitute A for 
B in a sentence without loss of truth (when A is identical to B), but it does not tell us when A and 
B are identical.  Note the following sentences, where P is, again, any arbitrary true sentence: 
 The argument depends on assuming that sentences themselves have a Bedeutung.  Abandoning this premise would 74
allow us to escape the conclusion that all true sentences are co-referential.  If sentences as a whole do not require a 
Bedeutung, the argument is a non-starter.
 I’m not here accusing Frege of begging the question (as he can arguably be read as explaining a consequence of 75
his view, not as making an argument).  Rather, I’m saying that the Fregean Proto-Slingshot, the argument we can 
assemble with Fregean parts, begs the question.
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 (1) Cicero was the greatest roman orator. 
 (2) Tully was the greatest roman orator. 
 (3) Tully was the unique x such that x was the greatest roman orator. 
 (4) Cicero was the unique  x such that x was the greatest roman orator and such that all  
 bachelors are unmarried.  
 (5) Cicero was Cicero 
 (6) Cicero was the unique x such that x was Cicero. 
 (7) Cicero was the unique x such that x was Cicero and P. 
 (8) P 
 (9) Davidson was bald and P. 
 (10) Davidson was bald and Cicero was the unique x such that x was Cicero and P.  
Here we may see the substitution principle in action. In (1) - (7), the expressions on either side of 
the copula all have the same Bedeutung.  For Frege, if singular terms A and B (whether they be 
descriptions or names) have the same Bedeutung, then A=B, and A may be substituted for B 
salva veritate.  Since (1)-(7) all say of Cicero that he was Cicero WLSP by itself licenses the 
substitutions involved in moving from (1)-(7).  What about the move from (7) to (8)?  It isn’t 
obvious that (7) and (8) share the same Bedeutung, and since WLSP doesn’t provide a criterion 
for sameness of Bedeutung it is unclear whether (8) may be obtained from (7) in the same way 
that, for instance, (2) can be derived from (1).  WLSP alone does not appear to license the move 
from (7) to (8). 
 Here we introduce the other half of the LSP biconditional.  Read in this direction, it 
becomes an identity principle, so I’ll call it the Leibnizian Identity Principle (LIP):  A=B if one 
may substitute A for B in any sentence containing B without loss of truth (and vice versa; B for 
A).  Remembering that Frege wants LSP to apply not just to names and descriptions but to 
expressions, it is important to note that (8) and (7) appear in (9) and (10) as expressions, 
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expressions which may be substituted without loss of truth.  Application of LIP thus entails that 
(7) and (8) have the same Bedeutung.  When we remember that P is any arbitrary true sentence, 
we can see why I think the Fregean slingshot begs the question; the biconditional in LSP, applied 
to expressions (broadly construed to include some types of embedded sentences) guarantees that 
the Bedeutung of any sentence be its truth value.   Thus, no one who objects to Frege’s 76
conclusion will agree to his premises, particularly LIP with regard to expressions.  Thus, we may 
conclude that the Fregean proto-slingshot argument fails as an argument for the claim that all 
true sentences are co-referential.  Frege’s argument does reinforce a point which will re-emerge 
in our discussion of correspondence theories, which is that questions about substitution 
principles and reference/denotation place constraints on our ontology.  In later chapters, we’ll see 
how Church, Davidson, and Gödel(via Neale) constructed ever more powerful slingshot 
arguments based on ever more plausible substitution principles.   77
 Strictly speaking the argument shows that all true sentences share a Bedeutung; since the only other feature they 76
all share is their truth value, it is natural to assume that the Bedeutung they share is just their truth value.
 I should note again that it isn’t clear that Frege intends his remarks to be slingshot-style arguments, rather than 77
simply remarks about the consequences of his views; that is, as a kind of stipulation rather than a conclusion.  What 
is clear is that both Church and Gödel, who both did explicitly craft slingshot arguments, take their inspiration from 
Frege.  Church explicitly credits the argument to Frege.  My purpose in formulating the Fregean Proto-Slingshot is 
twofold.  First, I want to set the stage for the next chapter, in which I discuss slingshot arguments generally.  Second 
though I don’t claim the argument is explicitly put forward by Frege, it can certainly be assembled from parts found 
in Frege.  Many readers of Frege think the argument is in Frege (as Church obviously does).  For a contemporary 
analysis of Frege’s work that does take Frege to be presenting a (failed) slingshot style collapsing argument, see 
Michael Beaney’s Frege: Making Sense which concludes with “Even if we understand his motivations, then, the 
conclusion can only be that Frege offers us no convincing argument for his doctrine that the Bedeutung of a sentence 
is its truth-value” Beaney, 1996 pp 155-165,
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“The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe the fact which corresponds to 
a sentence without simply repeating the sentence.” 
-Ludwig Wittgenstein  78
Chapter 3   
Truth, Correspondence and The Slingshot 
3.1 Overview 
 Slingshot arguments, as a class, are arguments which are usually deployed in the fashion 
of a reductio.   That is, in Davidson’s classic formulation, we assume that sentences refer to 79
entities.  Then, plausible-sounding premises are introduced concerning substitution principles 
and the effect substitutions have on the referent of any given sentence.  The result is the 
conclusion that the referent of any sentence can be no more finely grained than the truth 
predicate itself.  Such a conclusion is thought problematic for most, and so Davidson argues that 
we ought to drop the assumption that sentences stand in a referring relation to anything at all.  
However, there are other ways to cope with so-called slingshot arguments.  One might, with 
Frege, accept the conclusion.  One also might forego abandoning the claim that sentences are 
referring entities, and instead jettison the substitution principles which, together with the 
assumption that sentences refer to entities, weaponize the slingshot.   
 Wittgenstein, 1984, p 10e.  The quote is altered slightly from the printed text, which inserts ‘(is the translation of)’ 78
parenthetically between ‘corresponds to’ and ‘a sentence’, and adds the claim that the thought expressed is the 
Kantian solution to philosophy.  My omission of the parenthetical remark follows Hintikka, who thinks the omission 
is a better reading of the original german: Hintikka, 1997, p 24
 The clear exception we have discussed so far is Frege, who as we have just seen endorses the eleatic conclusion of 79
his proto-slingshot. 
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 In this chapter I’ll start by looking at the appeal of certain varieties of so-called 
correspondence theories of truth: those that define truth as correspondence between a truth-
bearer and a fact.  These theories are the specific targets of the slingshot arguments I’ll consider 
here.  Next, I’ll articulate three versions of so-called slingshot arguments.  Starting with Church, 
and moving through Davidson and into Gödel (via Stephen Neale), I’ll show that we can 
construct increasingly stronger slingshots, based on increasingly plausible substitution principles.  
Church and Davidson both argue that plausible substitution principles result in a kind of 
sentential-referential fusion: the referent of any truth apt sentence is no more finely grained than 
the truth predicate itself.  I’ll explain the force of Davidson’s slingshot, while arguing that one 
might reject Davidson’s conclusion by denying one of his substitution principles.  Gödel’s 
slingshot relies on more plausible substitution principles than either Church’s or Davidson’s, but 
again, these principles may be denied to avoid the conclusion that all sentences alike in truth 
value co-refer.  I’ll argue, however that denying the substitution principles which lead to the fact 
fusion problem spawns what I’ll call the fact fission problem, which arises when the referents of 
sentences are as finely grained as the sentences themselves.  I’ll argue that the fission problem 
ought to be recognized, as the fusion problem generally is, as terminal to certain correspondence 
theories of truth. 
3.2 Truth and Correspondence 
 Versions of the correspondence theory are attractive, as they seem to ground truth in a 
relation to reality; our language answers to the world.  This is intuitively appealing, as it is a kind 
of realism.  The version of correspondence I want to examine here is correspondence as a 
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reductive and explanatory definition of truth.  According to a view of this sort, whatever truth-
bearers are, those that are true are true in virtue of their correspondence to facts.  Similarly, since 
truth bearers are made true by their correspondence to facts (so a correspondence theorist 
argues), correspondence to facts is the nature of truth, and by stating the correspondence thesis 
we are giving an explanatory definition of ‘truth’.  The correspondence theorist has an answer to 
Pilate; truth is correspondence with a fact: call this theory of truth (FC). 
 If (FC) is correct, it supports a kind of realism about truth; the correspondence thesis 
posits objective entities (facts) which truth-bearers either do or do not stand in a relationship of 
correspondence with.  Supporters of (FC) argue that (FC) also implies the following truth-maker 
principle: 
(TM): Necessarily, if <p> is true, then there is some entity in virtue of which <p> 
is true.  80
It is of course easy to see why (FC) would imply (TM); (FC) implies that there are entities true 
sentences correspond to.  (TM) merely spells out the existential claim implicit in (FC) in an 
attempt to flesh out the truth-making relationship.  (FC) does imply (TM).  I also claim that 
(TM), if it is to be informative, implies something like (FC). 
 To see why (TM) implies something like (FC) let us pause and consider what kind of 
entities (TM) requires, in light of the discussion of Frege from the last chapter.  Frege, remember, 
thought that sentences designated truth values, which were objects.  Could truth values 
themselves serve as the entities (TM) requires?  Surely not.  For it arguably makes no sense to 
say that truth bearers are true in virtue of their correspondence to the truth values; and even if it 
 Rodriguez-Pereyra, in Beebee and Dodd, 2005, p 18.  Pereyra makes clear that the entities he thinks are up for the 80
truth-making job are facts.
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does make sense (in that it is a coherent view), the view surely does no work as a substantive 
definition of truth.  We have learned nothing about what truth is if the nature of truth is defined 
by relating true sentences to truth values.  Truth values, then, would fail to satisfy as adequate 
truth-makers in a correspondence theory of truth. 
 Might other kinds of objects suffice?  Surely the world is populated with physical objects: 
trees, birds, stones, and of course other humans.  Let us suppose that abstract objects exist as 
well (as Davidson noted, they cost us nothing): equilateral triangles, the integers, love, 
democracy and the angst of postmodern man.  Both classes of objects (the physical and the 
abstract) are just the types of objects that can be picked out by the subject phrases in predicative 
sentences.  Will physical objects suffice as truth makers?  I claim they cannot.  For the claim 
‘Bill is angry’ isn’t made true by the object denoted by the subject term, as the predicate may be 
switched to ‘_ is placid’ which would, provided that Bill really is angry, change the truth value of 
the sentence in question.  Physical objects alone are insufficient to ground (TM).  And it is 
difficult to see just how abstract objects of the sort we explicitly admitted into our ontology 
would suffice either.  Triangles, democracy, and the integers all seem like very good candidates 
for being the objects that are named or described by the subject terms (names and descriptions) 
in sentences, but they don’t seem to suffice as truth-makers for sentences.  
 What kind of objects might suffice as truth-makers?  Stephen Neale has argued that the 
worry that (TM) requires more than just an ontology of objects is at the foundation of modern 
correspondence theories of truth : 81
 It isn’t actually clear that Neale thinks that (TM) does require this.  In the passage in question he is summarizing 81
what he takes to be the Russellian position that resulted in the modern correspondence theory.  So he does think this 
kind of reasoning was operative in Russell’s thought, but it’s unclear he thinks that it is sound. 
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Thus emerged a modern “correspondence” theory of truth: a sentence (or belief) is 
true just in case there is some fact to which it corresponds, where a fact is a non-
linguistic entity in an objective external world.  In recent years, the sort of 
rationale Russell provided for facts has been converted into something forming 
the core of a linguistic and modal statement of the correspondence theory.  Every 
true sentence, it is said, must have a truth-maker, something in the world that 
grounds or explains its truth, for there is no other way of making sense of the idea 
that the world must be a certain way in order for the sentence in question to be 
true.  T is a truth-maker for sentence S if, and only if, it is necessary that if T 
exists then S is true.  Objects and properties seem not to suffice as truth-makers.  
Brutus and Caesar and the relation expressed by “stabbed” do not make [the] 
sentence [‘Brutus stabbed Caesar’] true — they could all exist without the 
sentence being true, just as they all exist without [‘Caesar stabbed Brutus’] being 
true.  Enter facts: the fact that Brutus killed Caesar does the trick — or so it is 
claimed.   82
At least some contemporary truth-maker theorists agree.  Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra defends 
(TM), and is committed to (FC).  He argues that facts must be the kind of entities which (TM) 
requires.  Facts, being truth makers, are entities over and above the objects we have so far 
(explicitly) admitted in our ontology.  It is facts, in explicitly this sense of an entity which is an 
empirical truth-maker, a ‘non-linguistic entity in an objective external world’, which a 
correspondence theorist must have in mind in order for (FC), coupled with (TM), to be 
explanatory. 
Neale 2001 pp 85-86.82
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3.3 Two Possible Problems for Correspondence Theories 
 I am going to argue that there are two particular problems which may arise for someone 
who holds the combination of (FC) and (TM): the problem of fact fusion, and the problem of fact 
fission.  Just how many facts are there?  I want to suggest that if (FC) is to be explanatory, there 
must be neither too few facts, nor too many.  First, consider what would be the case if there were 
too few facts; suppose there were only one.  Then, the situation appears to be similar to what we 
encountered in Frege: all true sentences refer to the same thing. This is problematic because it 
renders the correspondence definition of truth either circular or explanatorily useless or both; if 
the referent of a true sentence is no more finely grained than the truth predicate itself, then all 
true sentences refer to a single ‘Great Fact.’  And, it is hard to see what that Great Fact could be 
other than something like ‘the true,’ which renders the notion of correspondence explanatorily 
useless, circular, or both.  For instead of a correspondence relation between all true sentences and 
a single entity ‘the true’ we could get by just as well with the one-place predicate ‘_is true’.  Fact 
fusion, I argue, is terminal to the combination of (FC) and (TM).  83
 Since I’ve argued that a fusion of facts is terminal to correspondence theories, we might 
now consider when a plurality of facts becomes problematic.  Suppose I claimed that every 
unique true sentence corresponds to a unique fact.  This, I want to argue, would be problematic.  
We know how to individuate sentences - how to tell them apart.  What someone who endorses 
(FC) and (TM) seems to be claiming is that the way we sort the true sentences from the false 
sentences is by determining whether such a sentence corresponds to a fact - what it is for a 
 This is not a new argument: Davidson pushed this line of thought from 1967 until his death in 2003, and while 83
many critics argue that the slingshot doesn’t doom correspondence theories, they mostly agree that were there but 
one fact the correspondence theory would lose its attraction; they therefore often argue that the collapsing 
conclusion doesn’t follow.  See Neale 1995, 1997, and 2001 for detailed accounts of possible ways to skirt the 
collapsing conclusion. 
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sentence to be true is for that sentence (or whatever your favored truth-bearer is) to correspond to 
a fact.  If the only way to individuate facts is by individuating the truth-bearers that correspond 
to them, facts don’t appear to be capable of doing the empirical work in the way that the 
correspondence theorist endorsing (FC) and (TM) requires.  Let me be more clear; there seem to 
be two options available if this is the case.  First, since facts are (in this scenario) as finely 
grained as the sentences we use to individuate them, perhaps facts are propositional; facts just 
are true truth-bearers.  This, however is terminal to (FC) and (TM), as facts are simply truths or 
truth-bearers, not truth-makers (this strategy just bleeds into a version of the identity theory of 
truth).  Neither Truths nor truth-bearers can serve as truth-makers.  The other option appears to 
be the following; holding on to (TM) and (FC), we realize that facts must be as finely grained as 
the true sentences to which they correspond; we therefore postulate entities that must be 
individuated by and correspond to the finely grained true truth-bearers.  This is also problematic. 
Under this conception facts look like theoretical postulates, and  theoretical postulates cannot 
serve as empirical truth-makers.  If facts are individuated as finely as the sentences or 
propositions which purport to correspond to them, then we have what I call fact fission, which I 
claim is just as problematic as fact fusion, in that both are terminal to the combination of (FC) 
and (TM).  
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3.4 Church’s Slingshot 
 In his Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Church deploys what we may call Church’s 
Slingshot as an argument for the Fregean conclusion that sentences name their truth-values.   84
Church is concerned with the following four sentences: 
(C1)  Sir Walter Scott is the author of Waverly. 
(C2)  Sir Walter Scott is the man who wrote twenty-nine Waverly Novels 
altogether. 
(C3)  The number, such that Sir Walter Scott is the man who wrote that many 
Waverly Novels altogether, is twenty nine. 
(C4)  The number of counties in Utah is twenty nine.  85
Church reasons as follows.  First, sentences have denotations.  Second, parts of sentences also 
denote; descriptions and names denote objects.  Third, when part x of a denoting phrase S which 
itself has a denotation is replaced by part y, and when part y has the same denotation as part x, 
then the denotation of S remains unchanged.  Fourth, sentences which are synonymous denote 
the same thing. 
 So, (C1) and (C2) must have the same denotation, because what follows ‘is’ in both (C1) 
and (C2) is a denoting phrase, and though the phrases differ, their denotation does not; both 
denote Sir Walter Scott.  The descriptive phrases ‘the author of waverly’ and ‘the man who wrote 
twenty-nine Waverly Novels altogether’ may be substituted without loss of sentential denotation.  
 Church’s first slingshot was deployed in his 1943 review of Carnap’s Introduction to Semantics; the slingshot I’ll 84
discuss is the one he deploys in his 1944 Introduction to Mathematical logic.  This is for two reasons; the 1943 
version is more technical than the 1944 version; more technical than need be.  The 1944 version is no less plausible 
than the 1943 version, with the virtue of economy and clarity.
 Church, 1944, pp 24-25.85
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The same reasoning applies to (C3) and (C4), with respect to the descriptions before the last ‘is’ 
in each; each description denotes the number twenty-nine.  The reasoning for believing that (C2) 
and (C3) denote the same thing, is that, according to Church, (C2) is synonymous with (C3), or 
“if it is not synonymous…it is at least so nearly so as to ensure its having the same denotation.”   86
Since (C1), (C2), (C3), and (C4) all thereby share the same denotation, and since (C1) and (C4) 
appear to have nothing in common other than that they are both true, Church postulates two 
abstract objects, the true and the false, and claims that all true sentences denote the former, all 
false sentences correspond to the latter.  87
 Church’s conclusion would be terminal to a combination of (FC) and (TM), as it would 
be a case of fact fusion.  We should note that Church accepts the conclusion; he presents the 
argument originally in a critical review of Carnap’s semantics, against Carnap’s claim that 
sentences denote their meanings.   Church is arguing for the Fregean idea, discussed last 88
chapter, that meanings are not the denotations of sentences but rather what those sentences 
express.  Church is happy with the eleatic conclusion that all true sentences share a denotation; 
he will be the last author we consider who takes solace in the claim that all true sentences co-
denote.  
 Church, 1944, p 25.86
 Church, 1944, p 26.87
 Strictly speaking, Church’s argument concerns meanings, not facts (that is, it concerns propositional content, not 88
truth-makers).  This concern is what motivates his claim that C2 and C3 co-denote (they are synonymous, or at least 
nearly so).  I don’t elaborate on ways to avoid Church’s slingshot, but since it supposedly concerns meanings and 
not truth-makers, someone concerned with avoiding Church’s conclusion might agree that C2 and C3 co-denote but 
argue that since C3 and C4 arguably have different propositional content (similarly with C1 and C2), they do not co-
denote and so Church’s slingshot fails.  
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3.5 Davidson’s Slingshot 
 Donald Davidson employs slingshot-style arguments throughout his career, directed at 
multiple targets, but always employed as a reductio.   Where Church and Frege were happy with 89
the conclusion that all true sentences co-designate, Davidson thinks it pointless to claim that 
sentences as a whole designate, denote, refer, or correspond to anything at all.  Davidson’s 
slingshot, like Church’s, relies on premises concerning substitution principles: how much can we 
change in any given sentence without altering that sentence’s denotation?  Consider the 
following three sentences, which I argue a proponent of (FC) and (TM) ought to claim 
correspond to the same fact: 
(SJ1)  Smith insulted Jones exactly once. 
(SJ2)  It was Smith who insulted Jones exactly one time. 
(SJ3)  Jones was insulted by Smith exactly once. 
Presumably, if (SJ1), (SJ2) and (SJ3) correspond to any facts, they correspond to the same fact; 
the same individuals appear in each of the three sentences playing the same roles.  Further, if any 
of the sentences are true then all are true, and presumably this is the case because they are made 
true by the same thing (exactly one instance of insulting of Jones by Smith).  It would be odd 
indeed to say that (SJ1) and (SJ2) corresponded to different facts; facts would then appear to be 
(as Strawson charged against Austin’s correspondence theory) ‘shadows of true propositions’.  
Since a combination of (FC) and (TM) ought to lead one to the conclusion that (SJ1), (SJ2), and 
 Davidson (“Truth and Meaning”, 1967) argues that if sentences refer to their meanings, then all true sentences co-89
designate (there is but one meaning), while elsewhere Davidson (“True to the Facts”, 1969) argues that if true 
sentences correspond to facts, there is but one fact.  Finally, Davidson (“The Individuation of Events”, 1969) argues 
that given certain conceptions of events (those that take events to be the referents of true sentences), there is but one 
event.  All are collapsing arguments that take the form I’ll be elaborating on.
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(SJ3)  all correspond to the same fact, what would we have to change in order for any of the 
three to correspond to a different fact? 
 Davidson has questions such as this in mind when, in True to the Facts, he wonders when 
different sentences might correspond to the same fact: 
When does [the statement that p corresponds to the fact that q] hold?  Certainly 
when ‘p’ and ‘q’ are replaced by the same sentence; after that the difficulties set 
in.  The statement that Naples is farther north than Red bluff corresponds to the 
fact that Naples is farther north than Red Bluff, but also, it would seem, to the fact 
that Red Bluff is farther south than Naples (perhaps these are the same fact).  Also 
to the fact that Red Bluff is farther south than the largest Italian city within thirty 
miles of Ischia.  When we reflect that Naples is the city that satisfies the following 
description: it is the largest city within thirty miles of Ischia, and such that 
London is in England, then we begin to suspect that if a statement corresponds to 
one fact, it corresponds to all. 
Davidson presumably has the following statements in mind: 
(DE1)  Naples is farther north than Red Bluff. 
(DE2)  Red Bluff is farther south than Naples. 
(DE3)  Red Bluff is farther south than the largest city within thirty miles of Ischia 
and such that London is in England. 
All three are true.  Now, (DE2) differs from (DE1) only in that the names ‘Red Bluff’ and 
‘Naples’ have switched places, while ‘farther north than’ has been ditched in favor of the 
complementary comparative ‘farther south than’ in order to preserve truth. (DE3) differs from 
(DE2) only in that the name ‘Naples’ has been replaced by a description that uniquely describes 
Naples, namely ‘the largest city within thirty miles of Ischia and such that London is in 
England’.  This isn’t a collapsing argument; (DE1)-(DE3) are introduced to set up Davidson’s 
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slingshot, his formal argument that if sentences as a whole correspond to anything, all true 
sentences correspond to the same thing, which would be a case of fact fusion, and would be 
terminal to the combination of (FC) and (TM). 
 Davidson’s slingshot argument against (FC) and (TM) proceeds by arguing that, given 
plausible premises, the following four sentences would correspond to the same fact: 
(D1)  P 
(D2)  ix(x=d) = ix(x=d * P) 
(D3)  ix(x=d) = ix(x=d * Q) 
(D4)  Q 
P and Q are two arbitrary unique true sentences, while ‘ix(x=d)’ stands for the definite 
description ‘the unique x such that x is Diogenes’, and ‘ix(x=d * S) stands for ‘the unique x such 
that x is diogenes and S’.  Here are the assumed substitution principles that lead to fact fusion: 
(DA1)  Two true sentences which are logically equivalent correspond to the same 
fact. 
(DA2)  Two true sentences which differ only in the substitution of materially 
equivalent singular terms correspond to the same fact. 
Populating the variables of Davidson’s slingshot with actual sentences, and translating the  logic 
into plain english make the steps in the argument easier to grasp.  Consider the following: 
(D1’)  “Davidson was bald.” 
(D2’) “The unique x such that x is Diogenes and such that Davidson was bald is  
 identical to the unique x such that x is Diogenes.” 
(D3’)  “The unique x such that x is Diogenes and such that Quine was bald is  
 identical to the unique x such that x is Diogenes.” 
(D4’)  “Quine was bald.” 
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The statements in black are true but unrelated.  The statements in italics are logically equivalent 
(they are true just in case Davidson was bald).  The underlined statements are logically 
equivalent (they are true just in case Quine was bald).  The blue descriptions are identical (and 
they both describe Diogenes).  The red descriptions are materially equivalent (they both describe 
Diogenes).  The red descriptions and the blue descriptions are materially equivalent (all uniquely 
describe Diogenes).  The green clauses are logical operators. 
 (D1’) and (D2’) are, Davidson argues, logically equivalent; they are both true in all and 
only the possible worlds in which ‘Davidson was bald’ is true.  The same reasoning holds for 
(D3’) and (D4’) with respect to ‘Quine was bald’.  So, by (DA1), (D1’) and (D2’) correspond to 
the same fact, and (D3’) and (D4’) correspond to the same fact.  What is needed to effect the 
factual collapse Davidson seeks is a principle that tells us why (D2’) and (D3’) correspond to the 
same fact.  Strictly speaking, both (D2’) and (D3’) say of Diogenes that he is identical to 
Diogenes.  The descriptions on either side of the identity operator in both (D2’) and (D3’) 
uniquely identify Diogenes and so are materially equivalent.  Since all descriptions in (D3’) and 
(D4’) are materially equivalent, the descriptions on the right hand side of the identity operator in 
(D2’) and (D3’) are materially equivalent singular terms, and therefore (D2’) and (D3’) 
correspond to the same fact.   Thus, via transitivity, (D1’) and (D4’) correspond to the same 90
 The move from D2 to D3 is widely misunderstood.  In particular, two of the best articulations of Davidson’s 90
position seem to misconstrue Davidson’s argument.  Neale writes that “the assumption of co-reference in moving 
from [D2 to D3] … amounts to an assumption about sentences, namely that ‘ix(x=d *P) = ix(x=d *Q)’ is a logical 
consequence of ‘(P * Q)’. (Neale, 2001, pp 54-55).  I have been arguing that this is not the way the slingshot is 
supposed to be conceived of as operating.  The move from D2 to D3 does not depend on the assumption about 
logically equivalent sentences (which is the provenance of DA1), but rather on DA2, which is an assumption about 
correspondence in the face of substitution of co-referential singular terms.  More on this in the section below 
concerning the plausibility of Davidson’s substitution principles.
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fact.  Since P and Q, or ‘Davidson is bald’ and ‘Quine is bald’, have nothing in common save 
their truth values, facts fuse together and there is but one fact. 
 There are two ways to deny the conclusion of Davidson’s slingshot: one may deny (DA1) 
or deny (DA2).  Can this be plausibly done?  Lets start with (DA1), according to which two true 
logically equivalent sentences correspond to the same fact.  Historically, (DA1) has been the 
target most of Davidson’s opponents zero in on.   If we are able to deny (DA1), we can prevent 91
the claim that sentences in both pairs [(D1), (D2)] and [(D3), (D4)] denote the same thing, and 
thus we would be able to stop Davidson’s slingshot before it gets off the ground: (D1) and (D2) 
would not co-designate.  
 I want to suggest that many of the supposed refutations of Davidson’s slingshot that 
attempt to thwart his conclusion by denying (DA1) are problematic for a proponent of (FC) and 
(TM).  Part of the problem surely lies with Davidson himself: Davidson over-deployed his 
slingshot, and even when Davidson did deploy his slingshot at the appropriate time, I’ll argue 
that Gödel’s slingshot is stronger: that is, Davidson might have deployed the wrong slingshot for 
the job.  Davidson, we will remember, deployed the slingshot first (as did Church) against 
meanings.  When Davidson’s slingshot is deployed against meanings, denying (DA1) seems like 
the obvious first move.  Logical equivalence need not preserve sameness of meaning, as (D1’) 
and (D2’) arguably differ in propositional content: (D1’) is about Davidson, while (D2’) is about 
Diogenes (similar comments apply to (D3’) and (D4’) with respect to Quine and Diogenes).  
Note, however, that his move is less plausible when the slingshot is deployed against truth-
makers.  While (D2’) is arguably about something different than (D1’), it is more plausible that if 
 Searle takes this line of argument in The Construction of Social Reality, 1995, pp 221-226.  Searle denies (DA2) 91
as well, but his denial of (DA1) is more plausible.  
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(D1’) and (D2’) have truth-makers they both have the same one.  So, denying (DA1) seems 
plausible as a response to a slingshot against meanings, but is less plausible as a response to a 
slingshot against truth-makers (facts).  Second, Gödel's slingshot, which we’ll examine shortly, 
delivers Davidson’s collapsing conclusion with respect to truth makers without reliance on 
anything as strong as (DA1).  So attempts to avoid the eleatic conclusion with respect to truth-
makers by denying (DA1) ultimately fail.  92
 One might also deny (DA2).  Denying (DA2) would thwart Davidson’s argument by 
denying that (D2’) and (D3’) correspond to the same fact.  Remember that (D2’) and (D3’) both 
say of Diogenes that he was self-identical, and differ only in that materially equivalent 
descriptions of Diogenes are used on either side of the identity operator.  (DA2) has less often 
been the target of criticism, as denying (DA1) seems like low-hanging fruit in an argument 
against Davidson’s  conclusion.  As we’ll see, it is something like (DA2) which a proponent of 
(FC) and (TM) must deny in order to avoid fact fusion.   
3.6 Gödel’s Slingshot 
 In 1944, Kurt Gödel contributed an article to volume five of the then-infant Library of 
Living Philosophers; the subject of the volume was Bertrand Russell.  Buried near the end of 
Gödel’s article, titled ‘Russell’s Mathematical Logic’, is a discussion of Russell’s theory of 
descriptions, a footnote to which contains what Julian Dodd calls ‘the best slingshot money can 
buy.’   The passage from Gödel states: 93
 This is why Searle’s refutation of slingshots fails.92
 Dodd, 2003, p 562.93
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An interesting example of Russell’s analysis of the fundamental logical concepts 
is his treatment of the definite article “the.”  The problem is: what do the so-called 
descriptive phrases (i.e., phrases as, e.g., “the author of Waverley” or “the king of 
England”) denote or signify and what is the meaning of sentences is which they 
occur.  The apparently obvious answer that, e.g., “the author of Waverley” 
signifies Walter Scott, leads to unexpected difficulties.  For if we admit the further 
apparently obvious axiom, that the signification of a complex expression, 
containing constituents which have themselves a signification, depends only on 
the signification of these constituents (not on the manner in which this 
signification is expressed), then it follows that the sentence “Scott is the author of 
Waverley” signifies the same thing as “Scott is Scott;” and this again leads almost 
inevitably to the conclusion that all true sentences have the same signification (as 
well as all the false ones).  94
A brief footnote to this passage details the argument and the assumptions driving Gödel's 
slingshot:   
The only further assumptions one would need in order to obtain a rigorous proof 
would be: 1) that “Φ(a)” and  the proposition “a is the object which has the 
property Φ and is identical with a” mean the same thing and 2) that every 
proposition “speaks about something,” i.e., can be brought to  the form Φ(a). 
We may more clearly and formally state the assumptions which drive Gödel's slingshot against 
facts the following way: 
(GA1) “Φa” and the truth-bearer “a is the object which has the property Φ and is 
identical to a”, if true, correspond to the same fact (note that this is weaker than 
logical equivalence). 
 Gödel, in Schlipp, ed., 1989, pp 128-129.  It is interesting that both Gödel and Church formulated their slingshots 94
within a year of each other; indeed, it is an open question whether either Church or Gödel had read each other’s 
paper, and who can claim priority.  Regardless of priority, Gödel's slingshot remains the most powerful.
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(GA2) All sentences that correspond to a fact can be put in predicate-argument 
form. 
(GA3) Principle of composition: the fact corresponding to a composite expression  
containing constituents which themselves have a signification depends only on the 
signification of those constituents (not on the manner in which this signification is 
expressed).  This allows correspondence-maintaining substitution between co-
signifying descriptions, and between names and descriptions which uniquely 
describe the object, event, or person named.  95
Gödel himself doesn’t bother to walk us through the argument his footnote suggests, but Stephen 
Neale has done the dirty work for us in a series of articles culminating in his book Facing Facts.  
According to Neale, Gödel's argument concerns the following seven propositions, with the 
stipulation that they are all true: 
(G1) Fa 
(G2) a ≠ b 
(G3) Gb 
(G4) a = ix (x = a & Fx) 
(G5) a = ix (x = a & x ≠ b) 
(G6) b = ix (x = b & Gx) 
(G7) b = ix (x = b & x ≠ a) 
 Neale, 2001 pp 130-131.  I have altered the assumptions so that they deal specifically with factual 95
correspondence, and not with any arbitrary sentential extension.  This strengthens, not weakens, the Slingshot as 
presented by Neale.  As I later argue, Gödel's slingshot is terminal to a correspondence theory of truth, but not to the 
claim that sentences can have extensions.  My claim is that if sentences have extensions, the extensions cannot serve 
as truth-makers.
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Populated with normal english, these may be read as: 
(G1’) Davidson is bald. 
(G2’) Davidson is not Quine. 
(G3’) Quine is bald. 
(G4’) Davidson is the unique x such that x is Davidson and x is bald. 
(G5’) Davidson is the unique x such that x is Davidson and x is not Quine. 
(G6’) Quine is the unique x such that x is Quine and x is bald. 
(G7’) Quine is the unique x such that x is Quine and x is not Davidson. 
Gödel's assumptions entail the conclusion that if any of (G1) - (G3) have a truth-maker, then 
(G1) - (G3) all have the same truth-maker. Since (G1) and (G3) are arbitrary true sentences, if 
Gödel's conclusion obtains then we have a case of fact fusion.   
 The reasoning behind Gödel's slingshot works as follows.  The assumptions guarantee the 
following:  The statements in italics correspond to the same fact.  The statements in bold 
correspond to the same fact.  The statements that are underlined correspond to the same fact.  
The statements with red descriptions correspond to the same fact, and the statements with blue 
descriptions correspond to the same fact.  Thus there is but one fact.  This bears spelling out in 
precise detail. 
 Formally, the reasoning goes as follows.  Stipulating that (G1), (G2) and (G3) are all true, 
let (G1), (G2) and (G3) correspond to facts f1, f2 and f3 respectively.  By (GA1), since (G1) 
corresponds to f1, so does (G4).  Looking at (G1’) and (G4’) illustrates why this is so: both (G1’) 
and (G4’) arguably correspond to the same fact; after all, Davidson is bald.  By (GA1), since 
(G2) corresponds to f2, so does (G5).  Looking at (G2’) and (G5’) illustrates why this is so: both 
(G2’) and (G5’) arguably correspond to the same fact; after all, Davidson is not Quine. 
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 By (GA3), since the descriptions on the right hand side of the identity operator in (G4) 
and (G5) are both descriptions of the form ix(Φ), and both stand for the same thing (namely a), 
those descriptions may be substituted for one another without changing the fact the sentence 
those descriptions are embedded in correspond to.  (G4) and (G5) therefore both correspond to 
the same fact.  Looking at (G4’) and (G5’) we can see this clearly.  The descriptions in red 
uniquely identify Davidson, and so may be substituted for one another without changing the fact 
that the sentences in which the red descriptions are embedded correspond to.  Thus, (G4’) and 
(G5’) both correspond to the same fact.  After all, Davidson is Davidson.  Since (G1) and (G4) 
correspond to f1, (G2) and (G5) correspond to f2, and since (G4) and (G5) correspond to the 
same fact, f1=f2.   
 By (GA1), since (G3) corresponds to f3, so does (G6).  Looking at (G3’) and (G6’) 
illustrates why this is so:  Quine is bald.  By (GA1), since (G2) corresponds to f2, so does (G7).  
By (GA3), since (G6) and (G7) both contain descriptions of the form ix(Φ), and both 
descriptions uniquely identify the same thing (namely b), those descriptions may be substituted 
for one another without changing the fact the sentence those descriptions are embedded in 
correspond to.  (G6) and (G7) therefore correspond to the same fact. Looking at (G6’) and (G7’) 
makes this clear; in both (G6’) and (G7’), the blue descriptions uniquely identify Quine, and so 
may be substituted for each other without changing the fact that the sentences containing the 
descriptions correspond to.  Thus, (G6’) and (G7’) correspond to the same fact.  After all, Quine 
is Quine.  Since (G2) and (G7) both correspond to f2, and since (G3) and (G6) both correspond 
to f3, and since (G6) and (G7) both correspond to the same fact, f2=f3.  Last paragraph we 
established that f1=f2.   Since f1 = f2, and f2 = f3, f1 = f2 = f3, and there is but one fact. 
 64
3.7 Escaping Gödel's Slingshot 
 Gödel's Slingshot relies on premises much less controversial than the Slingshot implicit 
in Frege, or the slingshots in either Church or Davidson.  Accepting the premises means that 
facts fuse: there is but one fact, and this is terminal to the view that holds both (FC) and (TM).  I 
want to discuss two issues.  First, I’ll highlight why I think Gödel's assumptions are plausible, 
and prima facie ought to be hard for a proponent of (FC) and (TM) to dismiss, even though their 
truth leads to fact fusion.  Second, I’ll examine the problematic consequences of denying either 
(GA1) or (GA3).   I’ll argue that denying either premise is terminal to the combination of (FC) 96
and (TM), as it would problematically lead to fact fission.  Since accepting Gödel's premises is 
terminal to the combination of (FC) and (TM), and denying Gödel's premises is terminal to the 
combination of (FC) and (TM), I argue that the combination of (FC) and (TM) is, for all intents 
and purposes, dead. 
 Let us look specifically at (GA1): this principle claims that any truth-bearer of the form 
“Φa” and any truth-bearer “a is the object which has the property Φ and is identical to a”, if true, 
correspond to the same fact.  Remember that according to (FC) and (TM) facts are entities: 
entities which are empirical truth makers.  Whatever empirical entity makes “Φa” true arguably 
makes “a is the object which has the property Φ and is identical to a” true as well; namely, a’s Φ-
ness.  Both sentences share a subject (a), and predicate the same thing (Φ) of that subject.  That 
is, if facts are truth-making entities which exist out there in the world, then it seems intuitive that 
 I here don’t talk about denying (GA2), as it doesn’t do any work in the argument as we have presented it.  96
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“Φa” and “a is the object which has the property Φ and is identical to a”, if true, share a truth 
maker. (GA1) seems difficult to dispute. 
 When we look specifically at (GA3), we find that it too seems initially plausible.  (GA3), 
remember, is the assumption regarding compositionality which states that “the fact 
corresponding to a composite expression  containing constituents which themselves have a 
signification depends only on the signification of those constituents (not on the manner in which 
this signification is expressed).”  Names and descriptions often signify the same thing; “Tully” 
and “Cicero” both name the same man, and given that Tully was the greatest Roman orator, “the 
greatest Roman orator” and “Tully” both signify the same man; the former does so by describing 
Tully, the latter by naming him.  “Tully” and “the orator who denounced Catiline” have the same 
signification.  Consider the following sentences, stipulating that they are all true: 
(TC1)  Tully denounced Catiline. 
(TC2)  Cicero denounced Catiline. 
(TC3)  The greatest Roman orator denounced Catiline. 
Since, according to (TM) and (FC), facts are non-linguistic truth-making entities, I think it is 
intuitive that  (TC1) and (TC2) correspond to the same fact - they have the same truth-maker.  
(GA3) licenses the claim that (TC1) and (TC2) correspond to the same fact, because though 
“Tully” and “Cicero” are different, Tully and Cicero are not .  Holding (GA3), and noting that 
“Cicero” and “The greatest Roman orator” signify the same object, (TC3) corresponds to the 
same fact that (TC2) does.  If facts are empirical truth-makers, if facts are part of the furniture of 
the external world, it seems intuitive that (TC3) corresponds to the same thing (TC2) does; co-
signifying subject terms, since they signify the same external object (Cicero), ought to be prima 
facie substitutable while retaining the fact to which the true sentence corresponds.  Since facts 
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are external empirical entities presumably composed of objects and events signified by subject 
terms (when such true sentences do contain such subject terms), merely picking out the same 
object in a different way shouldn’t change the identity of the entity the object is a constituent of.  
Thus ends my argument for the intuition that (GA1) and (GA3) are hard to reject for the 
proponent of (FC) and (TM).  
 Suppose we instead reject (GA3).  Since I’ve argued that (GA3) is prima facie plausible, 
what might motivate us to jettison the assumption?  Stephen Neale has argued that there is a 
plausible interpretation of Russell under which descriptions and names, because of their different 
semantic functions, may not be substituted for each other without changing the fact that 
corresponds to the given true statement.  Neale also claims that such a move saves facts from 
Gödel's slingshot.  Specifically, according to Russell’s theory, names refer while descriptions 
denote.  Co-referring names may be substituted while preserving factual correspondence, but co-
denoting definite descriptions cannot: call this principle (RF), and note that subscribing to (RF) 
means denying (GA3).  Neale claims that according to Russell, “two co-denoting definite 
descriptions will not, in general, contribute the same (denotation-determining) properties to a 
fact.”   Subscribing to this does disarm Gödel's slingshot.  To see why, lets look at the following 97
sentences:   
 Neale, 1997, p. 155.97
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(TC1)  Tully denounced Catiline. 
(TC2)  Cicero denounced Catiline. 
(TC3)  The greatest Roman orator denounced Catiline. 
(TC4)  Tully is Cicero. 
(TC5)  Tully is Tully. 
(TC6)  Tully is the greatest Roman orator. 
(TC7)  Tully is the unique x such that x is Tully. 
(TC8)  Tully is the unique x such that x is the greatest Roman orator. 
If (RF) obtains, (TC1) and (TC2) correspond to the same fact, since “Tully” and “Cicero” are 
both names with the same referent.  However, (TC3) doesn’t correspond to the same fact that 
(TC1) and (TC2) do, as “The greatest Roman orator”, though it denotes Cicero, does not refer to 
Cicero.  Interestingly, accepting (RF) entails that (TC4) and (TC5) refer to the same fact.  Note 
also that accepting (RF) entails denying not only (GA3), but (GA1) as well.  For if we consider 
(TC5) and (TC7), we can see that in (TC5) there is a name on both sides of the identity operator; 
in (TC7) the right side of the identity operator is populated with a definite description.  Thus, 
(TC5) and (TC7) correspond to different facts.    98
 It is now that I want to claim that (RF) problematically entails fact fission.  If (TC5), 
(TC7), and (TC8) all correspond to different facts, there are a problematically infinite number of 
facts.   Consider the following: 99
  (TC9) Tully is the unique x such that x is the _est Tully. 
Clearly, (TC9) will be true when populated with any non-contradictory adjective.  Thus, (TC9) 
may be used to generate an infinite number of unique true statements, all of which will, 
 Neale thinks this is tenable.  See 2001, p 126, where he says “Officially Russell must say that Fa and Fix(x=a), if 98
true, stand for distinct facts, because the former stands for a singular fact and the latter a general fact.”
 An infinite number of facts isn’t in itself problematic.  I hope to make clear why this particular infinity of facts is 99
problematic for the combination of FC and TM.
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according to (RF) correspond to a unique fact.  Facts here are finely grained; too finely grained.  
I argue that (RF) does save facts from Gödel's (and any other) slingshot, but it does so with a 
price: the facts we are left with do not suffice as plausible truth-makers.  What the description on 
the right hand side of (TC9) does is pick out a piece of the objective world: it picks out Tully.  
Populating (TC9) with an infinite number of adjectives does not change the entity in the 
objective world that the description on the right to the first identity operator picks out.  The entity 
that the name on the left hand side of the first identity operator picks out doesn’t change when 
we populate (TC9) with any arbitrary adjective.  If a truth maker is supposed to be an empirical, 
nonlinguistic entity that exists independently of our linguistic activity, why should it be the case 
that (TC9)’s truth maker changes, when the objects in the world that the subject terms pick out 
remain unchanged? 
 One might here hold fast to (RF), and claim that facts are simply true truth-bearers.  No 
one denies that (TC9) generates different truth-bearers.  This is, of course, terminal to a 
combination of (FC) and (TM), as the combination attempts to explain away the correspondence 
relation altogether; this is the identity theory of truth.  Another attempt might be to hold fast to 
(RF) and to the claim that the facts are as finely grained as (RF) implies.  Then, holding fast to 
(TM) and (FC), we claim that (TC5) and (TC7) correspond to different facts, and thus have 
different truth-makers.  The problem here is that facts are mere theoretical postulates.  Gonzalo 
Rodriguez-Pereyra holds something like this position.  Pereyra concludes his paper arguing for 
the truth of (TM) with the following: 
The idea that truths have truth makers has important and problematic ontological 
consequences.  Not only does one have to admit an extra entity, over and above 
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the rose, to account for what makes true that the rose is red - one has to find a 
truth maker, for instance, for negative existential truths, like the truth that there 
are no penguins in the Northern Pole.  What that truth maker is, I don’t claim to 
know.  All I claim is that there must be one.  100
Facts here sure do appear to be theoretical postulates.  Why does Pereyra know that there is a 
fact that corresponds to ‘there are no penguins in the Northern Pole’?  He knows it because he 
knows that ‘there are no penguins in the Northern Pole’ is true.  It should be clear that theoretical 
postulates cannot suffice as empirical truth makers.   Basing a correspondence theory on a 101
conception of facts under which facts are mere theoretical postulates seems to employ, in 
Russell’s famous phrase, ‘the advantages of theft over honest toil.’  We merely postulate entities 
which are supposed to ground truths.  And if this is the case, then we only know that any true 
sentence corresponds to a fact because we know that the sentence is true, which gets the 
(supposed) explanatory relation exactly backwards.   Thus I argue that such a finely grained 102
conception of facts is terminal to (FC) and (TM). 
 Rodriguez-Pereyra, in Beebee and Dodd, 2005, p. 31.  100
 Interestingly, if we were committed to the idea that true sentences corresponded to truth-makers, and that truth-101
makers were merely postulated entities, Occam’s razor would require of us that we not multiply those entities 
unnecessarily.  This is exactly the position of Frege and Church, who postulated only two such entities, the True and 
the False.  
 Some are perfectly happy with such an account.  Samuel Wheeler III (2013) has recently put forward an account 102
of facts along exactly these lines.  In earlier work I argued that “If facts are individuated by truths, they cannot serve 
as truthmakers; the situation is rather more like truths serving as fact makers, which is … terminal for the 
correspondence theory of truth.” Clarke, 2014, p 73.  On Wheeler’s account of facts, “Facts construed in this way 
are not referents of sentences and they are not truth-makers.  Rather, truths make them.” Wheeler, 2013, p 132.  Note 
that Wheeler agrees with my assessment, but is willing to abandon (TM) and (FC).  I’d also note that I think 
Wheeler’s position is a coherent one, but given that he deprives facts of their role as truthmakers, there is little 
philosophical work for them to do.
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3.8 (FC) and (TM): A Toxic Combination 
 I have argued in this chapter that we must abandon a version of the correspondence 
theory that holds (FC) and (TM).  I have hoped to show that a slingshot type argument in Gödel’s 
model spells trouble for any attempt to define truth as correspondence to a fact.  For if Gödel’s 
assumptions hold, then there is fact fusion: there is but one fact, and then the correspondence 
theory is explanatorily useless, circular, or both.  If we deny Gödel's assumptions, then fact 
fission occurs: facts are here unfit to serve as truth-makers.  Since accepting Gödel's assumptions 
is terminal to (FC) and (TM) and denying Gödel's assumptions is terminal to (FC) and (TM), I 
argue that we ought to jettison (FC) and (TM).  Neale ends his splendid book Facing Facts, from 
which my construction of Gödel's slingshot was taken, with the following passage: 
The task for the fact-theorist is clear: provide a logic of [Factual Identity 
Conditions] that (i) avoids the collapse that Gödel's argument demonstrates will 
take place if [Gödel's assumptions are granted], (ii) does justice to the semi-
ordinary, semi-philosophical idea of what facts are, and (iii) permits facts to do 
some philosophical work.  103
I have argued that such a task is impossible.  104
 Neale, 2001, p 223.103
 Meg Wallace, forthcoming in Acta Analytica, argues that we can re-weaponize Gödel’s slingshot in Neale with a 104
modified version of Kaplan’s dthat demonstrative.  Wallace argues that so conceived, no theory of descriptions will 
save Neale from the collapsing conclusion of the slingshot.  I want to note a couple of hesitations.  First, Wallace 
doesn’t notice that fact fission is problematic, and so notes that Neale’s strategy saves fact from fusion without 
realizing the problems this poses for TM and FC (indeed, in this she is not alone; this is the position that Neale 
himself takes).  The second thing I’d note is that Wallace is unclear about what the target of her new slingshot is: this 
she is explicit about.  She explicitly argues for the truth of the following conditional: if Neale’s original slingshot is 
potentially problematic but amenable to being defused, then her new slingshot is equally problematic but not 
amenable to being defused.  Thus, she sometimes elides between the slingshot targeting TM and FC, and the 
slingshot as directed against modal claims.  She claims to be agnostic as to whether the slingshot is in fact 
problematic; she just explicitly argues that a slingshot can be constructed which Neale can’t defuse.  The claim of 
this chapter is that slingshots are problematic, particularly to FC and TM; I spent considerable time showing why 
they are problematic, and I argued that Neale’s solution will not save FC and TM, even for his slingshot, as his 
proposed solution results in fact fission.
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Chapter 4 
The Primitive Thesis: A Positive Proposal 
4.1 Overview 
 According to Davidson, TRUTH is primitive: it is a concept which resists analysis, where 
analysis is an explanatory reduction of a complex concept into simpler, more basic concepts.  
This chapter will pursue the following strategy:  First, I’ll articulate Davidson’s position with 
regard to the concept TRUTH.  Then, I’ll argue that the concept of truth plays an essential role in 
our mental and linguistic activity, one that cannot be eliminated or explained away; here I’ll 
emphasize the role the concept of truth plays in a Davidsonian theory of meaning, triangulation, 
and radical interpretation.  Finally, I’ll look at some implications of Davidson’s view, and address 
some criticisms from John Campbell that I think are in need of elaboration and correction. 
4.2 Davidson, Truth, and Primitivity 
 Davidson spoke of primitivity throughout his career, so it is useful to remember exactly 
what Davidson means when he asserts that a given concept is primitive: 
I think of a concept as irreducible [primitive] if it cannot be defined in terms that 
are as general as the concept to be reduced, at least as clear, and that do not lead 
in a circle.  With respect to the concepts I have listed [the good, truth, belief, 
knowledge, physical object, cause, and event] I think the search for such a 
definition or analysis is doomed.  105
 Davidson, 1998, “The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self”, In Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective , p 85.105
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This account of primitivity squares with Moore’s account of primitivity that we discussed in 
Chapter One (and includes the very concept which Moore was concerned with: the good).  
Elsewhere Davidson elaborates: 
It is a mistake to look for an explicit definition or outright reduction of the 
concept of truth.  Truth is one of the clearest and most basic concepts we have, so 
it is fruitless to dream of eliminating it in favor of something simpler or more 
fundamental.  106
Finally: 
For the most part, the concepts philosophers single out for attention, like truth, 
knowledge, belief, action, cause, the good and the right, are the most elementary 
concepts we have, concepts without which (I am inclined to say) we would have 
no concepts at all…Truth is, as G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and Frege 
maintained, and Tarski proved, an indefinable concept. This does not mean we 
can say nothing revealing about it: we can, by relating it to other concepts like 
belief, desire, cause and action.  Nor does the indefinability of truth imply that the 
concept is mysterious, ambiguous, or untrustworthy.  107
So, to be clear, to claim that TRUTH is primitive is to claim that TRUTH resists reductive 
analysis.  This is not to say that truth is mysterious, problematic, nonexistent, relative, or 
ineffable.  The concept of truth is patently clear.  TRUTH is conceptual bedrock. 
 This view is not unique to Davidson.  As we have seen in chapters one and two, 
something similar to this view was present in Frege, and at times in Russell and Moore.  Similar 
claims are currently promoted by Asay, Merricks, and Sosa.   All three authors argue, however, 108
that the primitivity of TRUTH is compatible with some version(s) of the correspondence theory 
 Davidson,  Truth and Predication, p 55.106
 Davidson, 1996, “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth”.  In Truth, Language, and History, p 21.107
 Asay, 2013; Merricks, 2007; and Sosa, in Lynch (ed) 2001, respectively.108
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with regard to some classes of statements.   Davidson combines conceptual primitivity with a 109
particular positive role for TRUTH to play in interpretation and linguistic activity generally.  It is 
to that positive role that TRUTH plays that I now turn. 
4.3 Davidson’s Positive Program 
 To begin to understand the role that TRUTH plays in Davidson’s overall picture, it is 
important to note that an important part of that overall picture is the contention that there can be 
no more to meaning than what could be learned in a situation of radical interpretation.  Here we 
can most clearly see Davidson’s debt to Quine.  Davidson describes reading Word and Object as 
a Saul on the road to Damascus moment: 
When I finally began to get the central idea, I was immensely impressed; it 
changed my life.  What I had found so hard to take in was the idea that there could 
be no more to meaning than could be learned by being exposed to the linguistic 
behavior of the speakers… But what struck me had not really struck me before: 
when we learn or discover what words mean, the process of learning is bestowing 
on words whatever meaning they have for the learner… What the teacher may 
think of as a matter of bringing the learner into step with society is, from the 
learner’s point of view, giving the word what meaning it has.  The appreciation of 
this point, and of it’s consequences, constitutes the biggest forward step in our 
understanding of language since the onset of the “linguistic turn”.  110
 For instance, Asay defers to Neale’s interpretation of the slingshot (and thus thinks that his primitive thesis is 109
compatible with a kind of factual correspondence theory concerning the property truth).  Sosa argues that primitivity 
is compatible with correspondence.  Finally, Merricks argues against (TM) by arguing that while correspondence 
makes sense for certain empirical statements, true negative existential statements and hypothetical conditionals are 
terminal for (TM).  I have argued in the previous chapter that such approaches yield too much ground to a 
correspondence theorist, and that one cannot make sense of the correspondence theory, period.
 Davidson, 1999, in Hahn ed. p. 41.110
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The passage just quoted will serve as a keystone in the discussion in this and the following 
chapter.  It is from Quine that Davidson adopts the strictly second-person approach to a theory of 
meaning.  Davidson builds on Quine’s approach, utilizing Tarski’s method for giving the 
extension of the truth predicate for certain well-behaved formal languages, and Ramsey’s work 
on probability and decision theory. 
   Davidson reverses the traditional or intuitive roles of truth and meaning.  One might 
think, for any sentence S of language L, that we use the meaning to solve for truth.  That is, we 
first ascertain what S means, and then determine whether or not S is true.  Davidson turns this 
picture on its head, arguing that the path to meaning goes through truth.  If we are in search of a 
theory of meaning for a language L, we should rest content with an acceptable Tarskian-style 
theory of truth for L in a metalanguage which we (the interpreter) understand. 
 What we really want, Davidson thinks, is a theory that enables us to understand each 
other, to correctly interpret the utterances of each other.  If we had a learnable theory for a 
language L that enabled us to understand (correctly interpret) the sentences of that language, that 
would be sufficient for a theory of meaning for that language.  Davidson thinks a theory of truth 
similar to the one that Tarski provides is just such a type of theory.  Davidson’s version of 
Tarski’s theory of truth is relativized to a language (and eventually a speaker and a time), and is 
actually an enumerative definition of truth for that language, of the form ‘S is true in L iff P,’ 
where S is a statement in the language L, and P is a statement in a metalanguage.  Once we have 
such a theory of truth for that language, we may be said to understand that language: 
There is no need to suppress, of course , the obvious connection between a 
definition of truth of the kind Tarski has shown how to construct, and the concept 
 75
of meaning.  It is this: the definition works by giving necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the truth of every sentence, and to give truth conditions is a way of 
giving the meaning of a sentence.  To know the semantic concept of truth for a 
language is to know what it is for a sentence - any sentence - to be true, and this 
amounts, in one good sense we can give to the phrase, to understanding the 
language.  111
If you know truth conditions for a sentence, the argument goes, then you thereby understand that 
sentence - you know when it is true.   Knowing the truth conditions for every sentence (which 112
is what a fully enumerative truth definition for a language L would do) would suffice for 
understanding every sentence of that language, because you would know the conditions under 
which such a sentence would be true, and you would therefore have an accurate theory of 
meaning for a language L. 
 This can be seen as the first premise in a modus ponens argument: if you had a truth 
theory (in the form of a Tarski truth definition) for a language L, you would thereby have a 
theory of meaning for language L.  However, to actually get at meaning we need to supply the 
second premise of such an argument: we need to show that we have a  correct Tarskian style truth 
theory for L, or at least that it is in principle possible to acquire one.  Davidson’s trio of articles, 
“Truth and Meaning”, “Radical Interpretation”, and “A Unified Theory of Thought, Meaning, 
and Action” can be seen to supply both premises of the argument.  In “Truth and Meaning” 
Davidson argues that a (correct) truth theory for a language is sufficient to generate 
understanding or meaning, while “Radical Interpretation” coupled with “A Unified Theory” 
 Davidson, “Truth and Meaning”, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, p 24111
 Of course, Davidson insisted, the form such truth theories must take is a Tarski-style truth theory amended so as 112
to be law-like.
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supply an attempt to show how one may acquire such a truth theory even under the most 
unfavorable circumstances: when we are completely ignorant of the meaning of the language that 
another is speaking. 
  
4.4 Truth and Triangulation 
 What we would do in a position to radically interpret another speaker (interpret a speaker 
of a language we are ignorant of), Davidson thinks, is go about constructing a Tarski style truth 
theory for his language: 
A good place to begin is with the attitude of holding a sentence true, of accepting 
it as true.  This is, of course, a belief, but it is a single attitude applicable to all 
sentences, and so does not ask us to be able to make finely discriminated 
distinctions among beliefs.  It is an attitude an interpreter may plausibly be taken 
to be able to identify before he can interpret, since he may know that a person 
intends to express a truth in uttering a sentence without having any idea what 
truth.  113
The idea is that even if we don’t initially speak a language, we can still observe when an agent 
makes an assertion, that is, when the subject holds an utterance true.  To see how this works, 
Davidson gives the following example: 
(T) ‘Es regnet’ is true-in-German when spoken by x at time t if and only if it is 
raining near x at t.... 
(E) Kurt belongs to the German speech community and Kurt holds true ‘Es 
regnet’ on Saturday at  noon and it is raining near Kurt on Saturday at noon.  114
 Davidson, 1973, “Radical Interpretation”, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, p 135.113
 Ibid, p 135.114
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Davidson thinks that (E) is the kind of publicly available evidence that an interpreter would have 
access to, and counts as evidence for (T) as a theorem in a correct Tarski-style truth theory for 
Kurt’s language (German), and (T) is sufficient for understanding ‘Es regnet’.   
 What we must do, in radical interpretation, is impose our logic and beliefs on the subject 
we wish to interpret.  There is no choice but to assume, at first blush, that the subject of an 
interpretation has massively true beliefs.  This is the picture we get from Quine in Word and 
Object.  We observe a rabbit run by, we observe a subject observe the rabbit, and we observe the 
subject subsequently utter ‘Gavagai’.  We interpret the utterance as ‘Lo, a rabbit’, ‘There goes a 
rabbit’ or perhaps ‘That’s a rabbit’.  Note that at this stage, attribution of error doesn’t make 
sense.  The field linguist must interpret the subject as ‘getting it right’.  It simply wouldn’t make 
sense to interpret the subject as meaning ‘that’s a porcupine’ and being wrong; at least not this 
early in the interpretive story.  In order to plausibly attribute a mistaken classification of an 
object to subject, we must first understand what the subject’s sentences normally mean, and at 
this stage the only evidence for what a subject normally means just is the linguistic performance 
of uttering ‘gavagai’.  This is a stage of interpretation that must be prior to doubt.   
 This observational triangle of speaker, interpreter, and objects and events in a shared 
external world, is essential to Davidson’s later thought, and grounds a particular form of 
externalism with regard to mental content that is unique to Davidson’s thought, but shares 
elements with the externalism of Tyler Burge and Hilary Putnam.   That the triangulating 115
situation is central to his project is evident in a reply to an essay by Pascal Engel: 
 Davidson’s externalism differs from Putnam’s in that Davidson’s externalism generalizes more broadly than 115
simply to natural kinds, and from Burge’s in that Burge’s account of social externalism entails that a speaker may be 
wrong more often than Davidson thinks is plausible.  For more on this, see Davidson’s “Knowing One’s Own Mind” 
in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective.
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It seems to me that the basic justification for holding empirical sentences true is 
given by the conditions under which we observe them to be held true.  When we 
have succeeded in matching up a speaker’s observation sentences with our own, 
we have discovered what justifies the speaker in holding them true.  Of course, 
such matching is not to be trusted simply on the basis of a few successes; 
logically connected sentences must come out right, and so must explanations of 
error.  The interpretation of any sentence depends on placing it in a network of 
other sentences.  But the network must be tied to the world through that kind of 
triangulation that is fundamental to radical interpretation.  116
Note that this qualifies which claims we take as evidence; the qualification is holistic, 
interpretive, and takes the form of the principle of charity.  Our provisional theorem of our truth 
theory for the subject in question, of the form “‘Gavagai’ is true if uttered by X in L iff that is a 
rabbit” may be altered when we observe the same subject uttering ‘Gavagai’ in the presence of 
any animal.  If we observe a subject uttering P in one circumstance and ~P later, we assume 
(before we try to interpret P) that the subject isn’t irrational, and therefore that P must be context-
sensitive.  The qualifications we apply map the subject’s utterances onto our own beliefs. 
 Thus, if we succeed in radical interpretation, we necessarily end up interpreting the 
subject as being mostly in agreement with us; since our beliefs are just those that we hold true, 
we necessarily take those we interpret to be mostly correct.  It should also be clear that for 
radical interpretation to get off the ground via triangulation, the interpreter and the subject need 
to be similar in a certain way.  More accurately, both need be at least similar enough in 
disposition to respond similarly to relevant classes of distal stimuli: this is why it makes sense to 
 Davidson, 1999, in Hahn ed. p 460.116
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begin radical interpretation (and to learn a first language) at the level of nearby medium sized 
objects.   Davidson elaborates: 117
It is clear that for triangulation to work, the creatures involved must be very much 
alike.  They must class together the same distal stimuli, among them each other’s 
relations to those stimuli.  In the end, it is just this double sharing of propensities 
that gives meaning to the idea of classing things together.  We say: that creature 
puts lions together into a class.  How do we tell? The creature reacts in relevantly 
similar ways to lions.  What makes the responses similar?  Our concepts do; we 
have the concepts that define these classes.  It takes another creature enough like 
the first to see and say this.  118
Remembering that triangulation involves two subjects observing each other react to distal 
stimuli, the argument for the constraint that interpreter and subject be similar in disposition may 
be put as follows.  Were the creatures not sufficiently similar in disposition, how could either 
creature be in a position to think that the other was reacting to a triangulated object?  It is 
similarity of reaction which fixes the distal stimuli, and is the germ of propositional content.   119
Two creatures hide from a lion.  When the situation repeats itself enough, each creature is 
warranted in taking the lion to be the cause of the other’s reactions, and so when the situation 
 Surely two creatures reacting similarly to each other satisfy this requirement.  I argue later that Davidson actually 117
utilizes a weaker version of similarity, where the similarity is not between the two creature’s simultaneous reaction, 
but rather a similarity of individual reactions to the same repeated distal stimuli.  This weaker version of similarity 
means that the creatures don’t need to share anything like a basic vocabulary; their reactions don’t have to be similar 
to each other, they merely have to notice that they react in a consistent, that is, in a self-similar manner, in 
circumstances that the interpreter has a self-similar reaction to.
 Davidson, 2001, “What Thought Requires” in Problems of Rationality, p 143.118
 This germ isn’t sufficient for propositional content; animals other than humans hide from lions.  While I don’t yet 119
argue that such animals don’t have propositional thought (though I do believe that they do not), I certainly don’t 
want to imply at this point that such animals do possess propositional thought.
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later arises where one creature observes another creature hiding, they may take it as an indication 
that there is a lion present and hide, without having themselves seen a lion.  120
 Triangulation is essential in fixing the location of distal stimuli, and triangulation requires 
multiple points of view (at least two).  Here is Davidson explaining triangulation at the most 
basic level: 
It takes two points of view to give a location to the cause of a thought, and thus to 
define its content.  We may think of it as a form of triangulation: each of two 
people is reacting differently to sensory stimulus streaming in from a certain 
direction.  Projecting the incoming lines outward, the common cause is at their 
intersection.  If the two people now note each other’s reactions (in the case of 
verbal reactions), each can correlate these observed reactions  with his or her 
stimuli from the world.  A common cause has been determined.  The triangle 
which gives content to the thought and speech is complete.  But it takes two to 
triangulate.   121
What this makes clear is that triangulation is what fixes the distal stimulus, and since Davidson’s 
position is a form of semantic externalism, by fixing the stimulus the triangulation also fixes the 
meaning of any reaction, if that reaction can be said to be propositional.  We are now in a 
position to ask when a reaction can be deemed evidence of thought or meaning, and hence 
propositional. 
4.5 Truth, Error, and the Nature of Belief 
 I turn now to belief attribution: up to this point we have been concerned with 
triangulation as a method of interpretation, of matching up our sentences with a subject’s 
 Davidson, 2001, “What Thought Requires” in Problems of Rationality, pp 141-142.120
 Davidson, 1991, “Three Varieties of Knowledge” in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, 2001 pp 212-213.121
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behavior.  Thus I have primarily been concerned with belief individuation.  Our interpreter must 
match (individuated) sentences the interpreter believes he knows with those of a subject, and one 
does this by triangulating with the subject with regard to distal stimuli.  However, humans are 
not the only animals that triangulate with each other, nor are humans the only kind of thing we 
can observe reacting to distal stimuli.  Certain trees change their growth patterns when exposed 
to light of a certain wavelength; this indicates that similar trees are present and so the tree’s root 
system receives more nutrients.  We may colloquially say that the tree thinks there are similar 
trees nearby and so decides to do root work rather than canopy work; it is counter intuitive to 
take the attribution of belief literally, as the claim that the tree really does have beliefs (and, 
apparently, the relevant desires necessary to motivate goal-directed behavior with regard to those 
beliefs).  Intuitively, we want to say that most adult humans think, while trees, thermostats, and 
sunflowers do not.  Yet sunflowers, trees, and thermostats reliably respond in predictable ways to 
distal stimuli, while other animals, such as schools of fish, seem to be capable of triangulation 
(they respond to each other’s responses to distal stimuli).  When can we credit an entity with 
thought? 
 Davidson denies that any entity that lacks the concept of objective truth properly 
thinks.   Thus, the possession of the concept of truth is necessary for thought generally: 122
A creature does not have the concept of a cat merely because it can discriminate 
cats from other things in its environment.  Mice are very good at telling cats apart 
from trees, lions, and snakes.  But being able to discriminate cats is not the same 
thing as having the concept of a cat.  You have the concept of a cat only if you can 
 This doesn’t commit one to the thesis that non-linguistic animals are automata, unconscious, or don’t experience 122
mental events (like pain); those events are just not propositional thought, and thought is propositional in nature.
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make sense of the idea of misapplying the concept, of believing or judging that 
something is a cat which is not a cat.  123
It is only with knowledge that one may be misapplying a concept that one can be counted as 
possessing that concept.  But to know that a concept may be misapplied is already to possess not 
just that concept, but the concept of truth, and of error:  
To apply a concept is to make a judgement... and this requires the application of 
the concept of truth, since it is always possible to classify or characterize 
something wrongly.  To have a concept, in the sense I am giving this word, is, 
then, to be able to entertain propositional contents: a creature has a concept only if 
it is able to employ that concept in the context of a judgement.   124
And later, in the same essay, Davidson elaborates on the thesis that TRUTH is our most 
fundamental concept: 
There is no more central concept than that of truth, since having any concept 
requires that we know what it would be for that concept to apply to something - to 
apply truly, of course.  The same holds for the concept of truth itself.  To have the 
concept of truth is to have the concept of objectivity, the notion of a proposition 
being true or false independent of one’s beliefs or interests.  In particular, then, 
someone who has a belief, who holds some proposition to be true or false, knows 
that that belief may be true or false.  In order to be right or wrong, one must know 
that it is possible to be right or wrong.  125
So according to this position, the possession of the concept of truth is both necessary and 
sufficient for thought, and the concept of truth brings with it other central concepts like belief 
and objectivity.  To possess the concept truth one needs to understand what it is for that concept 
 Davidson, 1997, “The Emergence of Thought” in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, p 124.123
 Davidson, 1995, “The Problem of Objectivity” in Problems of Rationality p 10.124
 Davidson, 1995, “The Problem of Objectivity” in Problems of Rationality, p 10.125
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(TRUTH) to correctly apply to a thing (a belief): this requires an understanding that merely 
having a belief is different from having a correct belief, we want our beliefs to correspond to the 
objective world.  126
 Two questions remain; the first relates to Davidson’s criterion for thought, and pertains to 
when we ought to attribute thought to a potential subject, the second concerns the source of the 
concept of truth.  Turning to the first question: what counts as evidence of possession of the 
concept of truth?  The answer is an awareness that one’s classification may be incorrect.  One 
cannot possess the concept of truth without knowing that any particular classification might be 
incorrect.  This is not to say the subject commands the word ‘true’.  Rather, this only means that 
the subject is aware of the possibility of error with regard to the subject’s own classifications.  
 Surely possession of the concept of truth is sufficient for thought.  Many balk at the claim 
that it is necessary; this conception denies that dogs, dolphins, and even infants think.  I think the 
restriction is less worrisome than one might think.  Anything other than predicative propositional 
structure combined with evidence of awareness of the possibility of error is going to be a 
problematically broad definition of thought, one that will arguably attribute thought to 
sunflowers (who track the sun), and earthworms who can reliably distinguish between moist and 
dry soil (in the sense of reliably finding moist soil).  The complaint against the claim that 
possession of the concept of truth is necessary for thought must be that the restriction is too 
 Here a correspondence theorist might employ talk of facts.  Note that the option is not open to me, as I have 126
argued in the last chapter that the factual correspondence theory of truth is unworkable.  However, remember that 
what was problematic about such a theory was that truth-makers are subject to fusion or fission.  Supposing that 
truth makers fuse, there then is nothing wrong with saying that true beliefs correspond to the (objective) world, 
provided we don’t try to individuate truth-makers in a more finely grained manner.  This talk of correspondence is, I 
argue, innocent, precisely because it is circular in exactly the way that dooms a factual correspondence theory of 
truth.  There is but one thing to which true things correspond, which may be called the world, the true, the great fact, 
etc.  This simply reiterates that our beliefs answer to reality, that truth is objective.
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narrow.  While it is narrow, it isn’t, I claim, problematically narrow.  It is merely a constraint on 
interpretation.   127
 What counts as evidence that one possesses the concept of error?  Marcia Cavell has done 
more than anyone else to square Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation with the results of 
empirical child psychology.   In Becoming a Subject, Cavell gives roughly three stages of child 128
development.  In the first stage, a babbling child and an adult share interest in an apple, and the 
child makes a sound enough like ‘apple’ to warrant the reward of more attention or praise.  In 
this stage, Cavell notes that the child is no different than a trained dog.   The second stage 129
arrives when the child is capable of differentiating between reality and make-believe, usually 
around age 2-3.  The third stage is when a child, around age 4-5, is fully capable of 
understanding false belief and attributing false beliefs to others of the form ‘they thought x but 
were wrong’.    Clearly a child at stage 3 is thinking, and clearly a child at stage 1 is 130
triangulating.  The child at stage 2 is capable of differentiating between objectivity and fantasy, 
 The situation seems parallel (in my mind) to certain debates concerning wrongness of killing and abortion.  Don 127
Marquis argues convincingly that the question of the moral permissibility of abortion is subordinate to the question 
of when it is morally permissible to kill generally.  It is only when we have a general theory of the wrongness of 
killing that we then turn to abortion and see whether it fits the bill as a permissible killing.  Marquis argues that most 
defenses of abortion end up endorsing rules concerning the permission to kill that are overly permissive (such that 
they would permit killing infants, or even us).  Marquis starts with the claim that it is wrong to kill us, and then 
formulates a theory concerning the wrongness of killing that he thinks explains why it is wrong to kill us.  Applying 
this theory of the wrongness of killing to the case of abortion, he concludes that most cases of abortion are immoral 
for the same reason that killing us is immoral.  Those who disagree with his conclusion must show that his criterion 
for permissible killing is problematically narrow.  Davidson’s strategy makes the parallel assumption that we think, 
and traces the implications.  In both cases, denying the assumption is problematic.  Two things follow from this kind 
of methodology: first, what counts as thought will be inextricably tied to the kind of thought that we have, and 
second, that the concept thought will not exhaust mental activity, as thought conceived in this way is necessarily 
propositional, while mental events (arguably) are not.
 As Davidson’s widow, she was in the unique position to empirically ground Davidson’s theoretical work as he 128
was sharpening his views on triangulation.  If she is right, Davidson’s triangulating situation accords with 
contemporary research into child development.
 Cavell, 2006, p 66.129
 Cavell, 2006, pp 65-68.130
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and so in some sense has the concept of truth (though it is not until the third stage that they have 
the word ‘true’).  Somewhere along the way the child has developed into what Cavell terms a 
subject, and what we might as well call a thinker.  Do we need to say where?  The demand for 
more here seems unwarranted; we may simply claim, as Davidson does, that “the abilities to 
speak, perceive, and think develop together, gradually.”  131
 As a caveat, the former criterion for thought is narrow, but just because the criterion for 
thought is narrow, the criterion for mentality can be wider.  Cavell makes the point well: 
The implication is not that before the infant has propositional thoughts and 
intentional states, nothing at all is going on in her head, though it is hard to say 
what is.  At the very least infants have feelings, emotion, sensations, purposes, 
instincts; they communicate, perceive, and learn.  132
It should be clear that the narrow conception of thought doesn’t prevent us from ascribing 
consciousness or other mental capabilities to infants or some animals, capabilities that arguably 
place constraints on what we can ethically do to them. 
 There remains the question concerning the source of the concept of truth.  Davidson 
argues that the triangular situation is the only possible source of our conception of the possibility 
of error, and hence of our concept of truth.  Thus, the social triangle is necessary not only for 
fixing the distal stimulus of any common reaction, but also for the concept of truth generally.  
The argument is peppered throughout Davidson’s writings, usually casually as an off-hand 
argument that Tyler Burge’s version of social externalism is incorrect, or at least woefully 
incomplete.  Burge argues that the content of a perceptual belief is the normal cause of that 
 Davidson, 1997, “Seeing Through Language” in  Truth, Language and History p 141.131
 Cavell, 2006, p 70.  Italics added.132
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belief.  This is problematic; for there are simply too many candidates for the ‘normal cause’.  Say 
the belief is Bob’s, and is the belief ‘that’s a cow’.  Possible candidates include the cow, the 
photons hitting Bob’s eye, the neural firings in Bob’s brain, or, to drive the problem in the other 
direction, the Big Bang.  The attention of a second person with similar dispositions provides the 
other perspective to fix the distal stimulus: the cow.   Once the distal stimulus is fixed, we can 133
describe situations where a distal stimulus provokes divergent responses.  Of course, this can 
only happen when there has been a background of similar responses.  When the same distal 
stimulus provokes divergent responses, there exists a possibility of the emergence of the concept 
of error: 
If you and I can each correlate the other’s responses with the occurrence of a 
shared stimulus, however, an entirely new element is introduced.  Once the 
correlation is established it provides each of us with a ground for distinguishing 
the cases in which it fails. Failed natural inductions can now be taken as revealing 
a difference between getting it right and getting it wrong, going on as before, or 
deviating, having a grasp of the concepts of truth and falsity.  A grasp of the 
concept of truth, of the distinction between thinking something is so and its being 
so, depends on the norm that can be provided only by interpersonal 
communication; and of course interpersonal communication, and indeed, the 
possession of any propositional attitude, depends on a grasp of the concept of 
objective truth.  134
It might seem like Davidson is arguing in a circle here, as communication requires the concept of 
truth, and the concept of truth requires communication; the point is that they must develop 
 Gavagai type problems might be raised here, but they are less problematic than the proximal vs. distal stimulus 133
problem that an untriangulated individual faces; they merely illustrate the point that both Quine and Davidson 
accept, that there is no such thing as ‘the’ correct interpretation/translation manual; this is an acceptable 
indeterminacy.
 Davidson, 1994, “The Social Aspect of Language” in Truth, Language and History,  p 124.134
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together.  To make sense of this claim, I think we need to move very slowly through the steps of 
Davidson’s argument, as he sometimes blithely elides between the historical emergence of 
thought and the concept of truth, the emergence of the concept in individuals in a culture, and 
radical interpretation of another linguistically equipped creature. 
 First, why must the second person exist to ground our concept of truth?  Why wouldn’t 
something like surprise be enough?  The answer is that to be surprised is to have expectations 
not met; but, since expectations take the form of beliefs, and to have a belief is to understand that 
such a belief may be false, being surprised requires that one already have the concept of truth.   135
What we have been trying to explain is the origin of the notion that our beliefs answer to 
something, that truth is objective while belief is personal.  It is the second person who provides a 
‘double take’ on the world, and provides a source of ‘failed natural inductions’ mentioned in the 
quote above.   On this account, surprise requires the concept of truth, and so cannot ground it.  136
Divergent reactions to shared distal stimuli do not require the concept of truth and so can serve 
to ground it. 
 Now I want to turn to a specific question about the kind of similarity (and hence 
divergence) that successful triangulation requires.  So far we have been using examples in which 
 Lepore and Ludwig, 2005, in their interpretation of Davidson’s argument, make exactly the move I here dismiss 135
as incorrect.  On p 402, they claim that our past selves can serve as sources of the concept of error; in effect, they 
claim that we can triangulate with our past selves.  We note that there is no book on the table, though we previously 
believed there was a book on the table.  Rather than think some physical objects (books) come in and out of 
existence willy-nilly, we may, in the face of objective evidence (the present book) which conflicts with our past 
belief (that there was no book on the table), think that our past belief was false.  This kind of situation, Lepore and 
Ludwig maintain, can be the source of the concept of error.  Note that this implies that the subject acquires the belief 
that there is an external world filled with physical objects that endure through time prior to their acquisition of the 
concept of error and the idea that there are other minds.  On Davidson’s account, the belief in an objective world, the 
concept of error, and the recognition of other minds in an objective world emerge together.  On this account, we 
wouldn’t have the belief that external objects endured through time unless we had another mind with which to 
triangulate our simultaneous responses to distal stimuli. 
 This idea is elaborated in Davidson’s unpublished manuscript The Concept of Objectivity, some of which was 136
given in a preliminary form in lectures in Munich in May of 1993.  The manuscript, and the lecture, are held with 
Davidson’s papers at The University of California, Berkeley.
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similar creatures respond similarly, in the sense that their responses are similar to each other. It is 
unclear what counts as a similar response for Davidson.  One might think that he has in mind two 
creatures simultaneously observing each other and a shared distal stimulus, and reacting 
similarly to each other (such as the example earlier, of hiding from a predator).  Surely this is 
sufficient for triangulation.  What’s more, it looks like it is in line with the kind of ‘skeptical 
solution’ that Kripke draws from Wittgenstein: this looks like a shared practice.   However, 137
Davidson’s proposal is weaker, in that he doesn’t think that two speakers must share a practice in 
anything like the specific sense that Kripke implies.  For, Davidson asks, consider agents A and 
B, one of which utters ‘cow’ and the other ‘vache’ in response to cows.  Couldn't such subjects 
come to understand each other, though they don’t share, in practice, similar responses?  Their 
responses are self-similar, and since they don’t share a vocabulary, they don’t share the kind of 
practice Kripke seems to argue that following a rule requires.  However, in one relevant sense 
they do share a practice; responding in predictably similar ways to similar distal stimuli over 
time.  Thus, what will count as divergent responses need not be two creatures responding in 
different manners (‘vache’ and ‘cow’ would then count as different), but rather responses which 
diverge, from the view of the interpreter, with the subject’s past behavior.  Since radical 
interpretation seems possible, the most we ought to say is that the practice that radically 
interpreting subjects share is simply the practice of interpretation, and as we have seen, this 
involves assuming that the subjects are in the main in agreement and correct about the world and 
each other; they see each other as veridical.  They possess and deem the other in possession of 
the concept of truth.  The concept of truth, then, is central. 
 Kripke, 1982, pp 108-113137
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4.6 Implications, Complications, and Interpretation 
 It is important that Davidson’s proposal for theories of meaning in the form of Tarski 
style truth definitions be combined with Davidson’s later views concerning triangulation and the 
nature and content of belief.  Early in his career, Davidson argued that reference is a theoretical 
relation that is subordinate to the prefers true relation.  Thus when radically interpreting a 
subject, we postulate reference on the evidence of what the subject prefers true.  Davidson has 
also argued that this may generate mutually exclusive theories of reference for particular 
languages that nonetheless have the same truth conditions, and thus that reference is inscrutable.  
Davidson famously uses the argument concerning Wilt and his shadow.   John Campbell is 138
concerned that the conclusion Davidson accepts is ‘absolutely crackers.’  Though the problem 
traces to Quine and ‘Gavagai’, it is useful to spell it out in full.  We can imagine a simple 
language consisting of two names, ‘Raleigh’ and ‘Isaac’ and two predicates ‘_smokes’ and 
‘_fishes’ (call this language L1).  One way to interpret the language (call this interpretation C1) 
is this: ‘Raleigh’ refers to Raleigh, ‘Isaac’ refers to Isaac, ‘_smokes’ is true of an object x if x 
smokes, and ‘_fishes’ is true of an object x if x fishes.  So, ‘Raleigh smokes’ will be true iff 
Raleigh smokes, and ‘Isaac fishes’ will be true iff Isaac fishes.  Here’s the rub; another possible 
interpretation of the language is the following (call this interpretation C2).  ‘Raleigh’ refers to 
whatever is exactly 1 mile to the East of Raleigh, and ‘Isaac’ refers to whatever is exactly 1 mile 
to the east of Isaac, and ‘_smokes’ is true of an object x if whatever is exactly one mile to the 
West of x smokes, and ‘_fishes’ is true of an object x if whatever is exactly one mile to the West 
 Davidson, 1979, “The Inscrutability of Reference” in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation  pp 230-231.138
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of x fishes.  The two interpretations are materially equivalent.   Which is the correct 139
interpretation?  According to this picture of Davidson (and Quine), neither is the correct one.  
There will be multiple interpretations or translation manuals that yield the same set of T-
sentences, and so any will do.  Since we test a theory of meaning at the level of the sentence, and 
since the truth conditions of (C1) and (C2) are the same, we cannot say that either is more 
plausible than the other; they test exactly the same (or so the argument goes). 
 If we are to take Davidson seriously that Tarski style truth theories will do duty as 
theories of meaning, must we say that it is unclear what the individual words mean, that (C2) and 
(C1) are equally plausible?  Here is Campbell: 
The reason for these bizarre implications of the view Davidson is recommending 
is that it is just a mistake to think that the only level at which we can discern 
norms of language-use is at the level of the whole sentence.  The fundamental 
point of contact between language and the world is not between the sentence and 
the patterns of stimulation which causes assent or dissent; the fundamental point 
of contact is rather between the demonstrative and the conscious attention to the 
object which sets the standards of right and wrong for the information-processing 
that swings into play to allow you to verify or act on the basis of propositions 
about the object.  140
This is, I think, confused.  I think we can make a distinction between the kinds of E-sentences 
that count as evidence for a theory, and the T-sentences that the full theory will eventually take 
the form of.  Remembering Kurt from earlier in the chapter, (E) counts as evidence for (T).  A 
full Tarski-style truth theory for a language L presumably won’t make use of demonstratives, but 
 The example is Campbell’s, and improves upon the Wilt’s shadow example, as not everyone has a shadow, but 139
everyone is exactly one mile east of something.
 Campbell, 2002, p 228.140
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the evidence we use to formulate the truth theory certainly will.  Furthermore, since we can state 
the kind of evidence we take for (T) sentences in terms of (E) sentences, there is a sense in which 
Davidson and Campbell disagree with what is going on in cases of ostension via demonstrative.   
 Campbell seems to think that ostensive learning involves simply tagging an object with a 
name, emphasizing the ‘demonstrative and the conscious attention to the object’ that ‘sets the 
standards of right and wrong’ for ‘propositions about the object.’  Of course this is one way to 
interpret such a practice, but it is not the only way.  For it seems just as plausible that what we 
are doing, rather than tagging an object with a name, is ascribing a name to that object via 
demonstrative and description which fixes the referent of the name.   The question is how to 141
interpret “Susan” uttered by a Susan, pointing at herself, to a potential interpreter.  In the case of 
names, Campbell must think that the concept of truth isn’t involved at all at; this ‘tagging’ is 
what ‘sets the standards of right and wrong’ and thus is prior to employment of the concept of 
truth.  I want to suggest a few reasons why we shouldn’t think such a view is decisive.  142
 First, it seems perfectly plausible to think of a Susan-type utterance as truth-functional; it 
would take the form of a demonstrative and either a name or a definite description.  Davidson 
makes the point at the end of Truth and Predication, noting: 
 This is in partial accord with Russell’s claim that the only really logically proper names are ‘this’ and ‘that’.  A 141
key difference is that while Russell took the referents of ‘this’ and ‘that’ to be private sensations, under this 
conception ‘this’ and ‘that’ refer to publicly triangulated objects and events in the external world (in the basic 
ostensive learning example).  Proposals similar to this can be seen in Quine and Burge, and are summarized and 
defended in Delia Graff Fara’s forthcoming “Names are Predicates”, Philosophical Review, Vol. 124, No. 1, 2015.
 Another problem with the Campbell account is that it seems to conflate Davidson and Quine.  Davidson has 142
always maintained that the stimulus is distal (as in, an object), and the quoted passage seems to saddle Davidson 
with Quine’s view of proximal stimulus in the form of ‘patterns of stimulation at nerve endings’.  Of course, for 
Davidson, there are patterns of stimulation, but those patterns do not consist in nerve ending stimulation but in 
repeated responses to a shared distal stimulus, the very thing that, on Campbell’s view, is supposed to be the ‘object 
of our attention.’
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Some names are learned by direct ostentation and as if they were unaided in 
sentences: what may be said aloud is just a name, understood as a short sentence 
(‘This is Peter’, ‘That is Paul’).  Names learned in this way are guaranteed a 
reference.  Names learned less directly can then be treated as definite 
descriptions.  143
Clearly Davidson thinks that what we are doing is attaching a name to an object via conscious 
attention; he thinks we do this by employing the concept of truth in a triangulating situation.  The 
sentence ‘This is Peter’ is true and informative, and fixes the referent of ‘Peter’ for the 
interpreter.  I’ll move on to consider ostensive predication for things like colors in the next 
chapter, but I’ll tell a similar story. 
 Second, remember how simple (L1) is, with two names and two predicates.  It’s not clear 
that we ought to credit an entity with such a limited vocabulary with thought at all, and hence it’s 
not clear that what we’ve described is actually a language at all.  Recalling that possession of the 
concept of truth is, on this account, necessary and sufficient for thought and language, we may 
question whether (L1) is expressive enough to demonstrate knowledge of the possibility of error.  
Arguably, (L1) is insufficient in this regard; most modern thermostats exhibit behavior at least as 
complex as the behavior that (L1) allows.  Consider a thermostat controlling two areas, which we 
may call ‘upstairs’ and ‘downstairs’, set to keep temperatures at a comfortable 72 degrees 
Farenheit.  We may, for pragmatic reasons, describe the thermostat as possessing a language like 
(L1), which we may call (L2).  (L2) is composed of two names and two predicates; the names are 
‘Upstairs’, ‘Downstairs’, the predicates are ‘_needs cooling’ and ‘_needs warming’.  The 
thermostat may even display the phrases ‘Upstairs needs cooling’ ‘Downstairs needs warming’.  
 Davidson, 2005, Truth and Predication, p 162.143
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And we may raise the parallel question here that (C1) and (C2) raised for (L1).  Do we interpret 
‘Upstairs’ as referring to upstairs, or as the place below upstairs?  Well; we could plausibly 
interpret ‘Upstairs’ as meaning whatever is below upstairs, and ‘_needs cooling’ as true of an 
object x if whatever is above that object needs cooling.  Again, we will hold the same sentences 
true in the same situations.  Which does the thermostat mean?  Well, I’d argue that since the 
thermostat doesn’t display enough behavior for us to credit it with thought, and hence can’t have 
beliefs or hold statements true, that the thermostat doesn’t mean anything; it simply reacts.  One 
can say the same thing, for the same reasons, encountering something which commands (L1).  
What creatures or objects that command (L1) or (L2) lack, which explains why we may exclude 




“Language is the organ of propositional perception.  Seeing sights and hearing sounds does not 
require thought with propositional content; perceiving how things are does, and this ability 
develops along with language.” 
 -Davidson   144
Chapter 5  
Truth, Predication, and Properties 
5.1 Overview 
 I ended the last chapter by endorsing a Davidsonian version of triangulation that, through 
ostension, ties language directly to distal stimuli in the external world.  I argued that the concept 
of truth was central to interpretation and to triangulation.   In this chapter I will outline 
Davidson’s conception of predication.  I’ll start by framing Davidson’s conception of the 
problem of predication, and I’ll highlight just how Davidson thinks that the problem can be 
solved using Tarski’s theory of truth.  I then note that Davidson’s conception of  predication 
makes no use of properties or universals, and I claim that because Davidson’s conception doesn’t 
explain predication in terms of properties or universals, we can construct a plausible account of 
both properties and universals in terms of predication.  I claim that this account of properties, 
coupled with the interpretive triangle I outlined in the last chapter, may be used to dissolve 
concerns about ‘nature’s joints’.  What results is a form of externalism, and I examine 
Davidson’s claim that his version of externalism and interpretation ward off the skeptic.  In the 
 Davidson, 1997, “Seeing Through Language” in Truth, Language, and History, p 135.144
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last three sections I apply Davidson’s views on predication to three important topics.  First, I 
apply the view of properties I outlined early in the chapter to the property truth itself.  Second, I 
connect Davidson’s views on predication to certain contemporary claims that names are 
predicates, and consider the possibility of collapsing the naming relation into the predication 
relation.  Lastly, I argue that we may collapse what I call the ‘common name’ relation into the 
predication relation, but argue that, consistent with the experimental and philosophical work of 
Zenon Pylyshyn, we still ought to keep the notion of logically proper names, restricting their 
application to demonstratives. 
5.2 Predication 
 The problem of predication, as Davidson interprets it, is simply what has elsewhere been 
called the problem of the unity of the proposition.  Davidson’s favorite example is the simple two 
word sentence ‘Theaetetus sits’.  The problem of the unity of the proposition is that some strings 
of words can be meaningful when uttered together, in the sense that they have truth-evaluable 
propositional content (‘Theaetetus sits’ is a prime example), while other strings of words appear 
similarly meaningless (‘Susan’, ‘Bill, James, The king of France’, or even ‘Theaetetus, the 
property of sitting’).  The strings I’ve just deemed meaningless don’t have propositional unity, in 
that as written (or uttered) they cannot be true or false:  the first is simply a name, the second a 
list of names and definite descriptions, the third a list containing a name and a definite 
description of a property.  Lists are not typically things that can be true or false, and unless 
singular terms like ‘Susan’ are read as abbreviated sentences, short for ‘That is Susan’ , such 
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utterances do no linguistic work.  This is the position I outlined at the end of the last chapter with 
regard to interpretation of singular terms like ‘Susan’.   
 The problem of predication is a problem of regress.  The problem stems from considering 
the roles that subjects and predicates are supposed to play in sentences (that is, strings of words 
that have propositional unity, that are truth-evaluable).  What is it about such sentences that 
accounts for their having a truth value?  Take ‘Theaetetus sits’, with its two parts, the 
‘Theaetetus’ part, and the ‘sits’ part.  We may say that the ‘Theaetetus’ part contributes to the 
truth conditions by standing for Theaetetus.  This leaves the ‘sits’ part.  If we help ourselves to an 
ontology of properties, we might say that it names a property.  The sentence then denotes two 
things, Theaetetus and the property of sitting.  Problematically, the sentence looks like a 
meaningless list again.  We must then insist that the noun and the verb stand in a certain relation 
to each other, the relation of instantiation.  So the sentence now concerns three entities; 
Theaetetus, the property of sitting, and the property of instantiation.  Again, this looks like a list; 
the entities must be related to each other in a certain way.  What does the relating?  Surely it will 
be a relation, which now may be added to the list of objects.  Bradley’s regress looms.   145
Davidson’s point is that postulating the existence of properties as entities does not solve the 
problem of the unity of the sentence; if the function predicates play is explained by postulating 
that predicates have extensions that are objects, the sentence dissolves into a list. 
 Davidson rightly credits Frege with a major advance in the problem of predication.  We 
can recall from Chapter 2 that Frege thought that singular terms have objects as their 
Bedeutungen, while predicates have concepts as their Bedeutungen.  Concepts are functions.  
 This is a condensed form of the argument that Davidson gives on pp 85-87 of Truth and Predication.145
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Functions map objects onto other objects.  Concepts are functions that map objects onto truth 
values.  Frege avoids the regress by declaring concepts to be incomplete: they are like functions.  
Frege noted that concepts are like functions, and declared that they are functions; they ‘take’ 
objects in their conveniently incomplete slot and map those objects onto the truth values.  
Davidson praises Frege’s grasp of the problem and his attempt at a solution: 
Of all the efforts to account for the role of predicates that we have reviewed, 
Frege’s is the only one that, by its treatment of predicates, clearly makes 
sentences semantic units.  Of the attempts we have considered, Frege alone has 
assigned a semantic role to predicates which promises to explain how sentences 
are connected to truth values.  146
Frege’s account explains why sentences can be true or false. On Frege’s account a meaningful 
sentence isn’t merely a list of objects; there must be a concept involved. Concepts are, 
importantly, unsaturated or incomplete.  The concept/object combination accounts for the truth or 
falsity of the sentence, as the concept maps the object onto ‘The True’ or ‘The False’.   There 147
are of course famous problems with this account.  According to Frege, anything we can 
definitely describe is an object, and so it is very hard to talk about concepts without somehow 
converting them into objects.  Any answer to the question ‘Which concept are you talking 
about?’ looks like it has three possible answers; a definite description, a name, or an ostension.  
For Frege, the things such speech acts identify are all and only objects.  148
 Davidson, 2005, Truth and Predication, pp 133-134.  Strictly speaking, sentences still look like lists in Frege: 146
they are lists of terms which stand for objects and terms which stand for concepts.  Frege has explained why 
thoughts are true or false: thoughts are what sentences express.  Thus, he has a solution for the unity of the 
proposition, not the unity of the sentence.
 This is meant to be a summary of the more detailed explanation of Frege’s views which I undertook in Chapter 2.  147
Readers who find this blithe should revisit Chapter 2 for more detail; the current discussion is merely to set a 
historical precedent for Davidson’s appropriation of Tarski’s theory.
 Hence his claim that this forces him to say that the city of Berlin is a city, but the concept horse is not a concept.  148
Frege, 1892, On Concept and Object, in Beaney, 1997, p 185.  
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 Davidson credits Tarski with solving the problem of predication.   Tarski notes Frege’s 149
insight that predicates are like functions in that they are incomplete, as opposed to objects.  
Unlike Frege, Tarski doesn’t say that since predicates are like functions, they must be functions; 
if this were so Tarski could be read as a correspondence theorist, which he is not:  Tarski does not 
provide discrete entities that true sentences map on to.   Tarski thought of predicates in roughly 150
the same way that Frege did, without taking Frege’s position of associating entities with 
predicates or whole sentences.  Tarski’s (and Davidson’s) conception of what a predicate is 
coincides nicely with the view that I attributed to Frege in Chapter 2: “A predicate is any 
expression obtained from a sentence by subtracting one or more singular terms.”   Davidson 151
notes that: 
[Tarski’s] focus on the role of variables or the spaces they occupy [in incomplete 
expressions like ‘x is bald’] is analogous to Frege’s, and was inspired by him.  
Tarski ’s essential innovation is to make ingenious use of the idea that predicates 
are true of the entities which are named by the constants that occupy their spaces 
or are quantified over by the variables which appear in the same spaces and are 
bound by quantifiers.  152
 Though, of course, not realizing that he had solved the problem of predication. 149
 Note that my argument in Chapter 3 claims that, as a result of either fact fission or fact fusion, the only entities 150
which would serve as sentential extensions are either no more finely grained than the truth predicate itself, or so 
finely grained that they look like theoretical postulates rather than empirical truth-makers.  A strategy open to 
anyone who wants to claim that predicates are functions might be to claim that predicates are functions which map 
objects onto either the true or the false, or perhaps onto the world or the null set (or any two objects).  Such a theory 
is consistent with what I argued in Chapter 3, although it renders correspondence useless as an informative 
definition of truth; the simple one place predicate ‘_is true’ seems capable of doing all the necessary work that such 
a theory of predication requires.
 Davidson, 2005, Truth and Predication, p 132.  Again, as I noted in the footnote to the definition in my 151
discussion in Chapter 2, Frege considers only one-place predicates, and so would omit the ‘or more’ from this 
definition.  Since we want an account of predication that accommodates predicates with n-many places, the ‘or 
more’ is apt for our discussion.
 Davidson, 2005, Truth and Predication, p 159.152
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If predicates are true of objects and events, we don’t need to posit entities to associate with the 
predicates, and we can avoid regress.  The claim is that it was a mistake to look for some kind of 
glue that holds the entity associated with the subject and the entity associated with the predicate 
together and that explains why the utterance is truth functional.  The right explanation works the 
other way around; it is because predicates are true of objects and events that the sentences have 
propositional unity.  Again, we find that Davidson’s position is that the concept of truth is 
central.  This is Davidson’s point: he ends Truth and Predication with “Thus, the contribution of 
predicates to the truth conditions of sentences depends on and is explained by our grasp of the 
concept of truth.”  153
   
5.3 Predicates, Properties, and Universals 
 Davidson assigns no entities to either the predicate or the sentence as a whole.  Properties 
aren’t in the picture yet, but this is not to deny that talk of properties makes sense.  The moral so 
far is that the postulation of properties isn’t needed for an account of predication which explains 
the unity of the sentence in general. This leaves us with the attractive possibility of explaining 
properties in terms of predicates, instead of the other way around: we may say an object x has 
 Davidson, 2005, Truth and Predication, p 163.153
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property p just in case the predicate ‘_is p’ is true of x.   In a discussion of properties, Davidson 154
notes: 
Red objects tend to cause us to believe the objects are red, square objects tend to 
cause us to believe the objects are square…It is because the objects and events 
have the properties they do that they cause us to have the attitudes they do…What 
makes our judgements of the “descriptive” properties of things true or false is the 
fact that the same properties tend to cause the same beliefs in different observers, 
and when observers differ, we assume there is an explanation.  155
Here Davidson again commits himself to the kind of externalism I noted in the last chapter.  Note 
that Davidson doesn’t here say that properties are in the objects we predicate them of.  Rather, 
the position I attribute to Davidson is the following: our predicates are true of objects that have 
properties.  Properties, on this view, aren’t anywhere.    156
 Davidson applies this view not only to properties, but to universals.  Davidson credits 
Ramsey with noting that in ‘Socrates is wise’ the subject is Socrates, and ‘_is wise’ is the 
 This depends on how we want to couch our property-language.  If properties are ‘being p’, like ‘being red’ then 154
we can alter the definition to read ‘an object x has the property of being p just in case ‘_is p’ is true of x’.  The point 
is that properties are defined in terms of predicates.  Similarly, the simple sentence ‘Theaetetus sits’ has no copula, 
but if we want to say that the sentence shows that Theaetetus has the property of sitting (or of being a seated thing, 
etc.), we should recognize that ‘Theaetetus sits’ whatever we take its truth conditions to be (does it mean that 
Theaetetus occasionally sits, parallel to ‘Theaetetus kills’ or that Theatetus is currently - or perpetually - sitting?) can 
be stated in terms employing the predicative copula.  Finally, even if it were not the case that such sentences could 
be stated in terms employing the predicative copula of the form ‘_is p’, we could simply amend our definition of 
properties.  We already agree that ‘Theatetus flies’ displays sentential unity, so we could simply add ‘_p’ to our 
definition of properties.  Again, the important thing is that we define properties in terms of predicates.
 Davidson, 1995, “The Objectivity of Values” in Problems of Rationality, p 47.155
 Davidson doubles down on this point in many places.  For instance, in his reply to Bill Martin in Davidson’s 156
Volume of the Library of Living Philosophers, Davidson says “Of course, it is true that evaluative properties are not 
in the objects and events we ascribe them to, for being properties (if we like to talk this way), they are not 
anywhere.” Davidson 1999 LLP p 358 (emphasis added).  In “The Objectivity of Values”, Davidson, discussing 
values, says “It is strange to speak of values as being, ‘out there’.  The things and events to which he attach values 
are certainly out there (for the most part, anyway); the properties we predicate of such things are neither here nor 
there, for properties have no location… The same is true of weights, colors, and shapes.  These aren’t ‘out there’ — 
or anywhere else.”  Davidson 2004 PR pp 43-45 (emphasis added).  In his unpublished manuscript The Concept of 
Objectivity, Davidson argues “It is simply a property of an individual that he means this or that by what he says, and 
properties, I never tire of saying, ‘Ain’t anywhere’.  An example which I have often used is sunburn: the property of 
being sunburned is nowhere, but the burn, though characterized in terms of its cause when we call it ‘sunburn’, is 
certainly on the skin of the victim.” p. 15.
 101
predicate.  However in ‘Wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates’ wisdom is the subject, and ‘_is a 
characteristic of Socrates’ is the predicate.  Davidson notes “Ramsey is right, of course, that 
universals are particulars as much as Socrates is.”   This means there is no particular problem 157
with the existence of universals or abstract objects.  Davidson is often misleadingly read as a 
kind of nominalist, which he explicitly isn’t.  In a reply to David Lewis, Davidson notes: 
David Lewis says that ontological parsimony is not the subject we’re discussing, 
so we may as well assume any entities that can do us any good.  That is exactly 
my attitude, and always has been.  Abstract entities take up no space and cost us 
nothing.  158
Elsewhere, Davidson says, “being no nominalist, I think patterns, like shapes and numbers, are 
as real as can be.”   Abstract objects and universals, like properties, are not invoked in order to 159
explain the extension of predicates: predicates have no extension.   Rather, predicates are true of 
objects and events, some of which are abstract.  We start with the medium sized (non-abstract) 
objects that evolution has equipped us to detect, and to detect each other detecting.   We 160
predicate of some of them that they have a property (p).  When we are enough in agreement 
about what objects ‘_is p’ is true of, we are in a position to quantify over the property p itself, to 
say of p that it is q, or that anything that is a p is not a q.  This is how we introduce abstract 
objects.  Davidson’s conception of object and properties, rather than being that of a nominalist, is 
actually quite catholic. 
 Davidson, 2005, Truth and Predication, pp 145-146.157
 Davidson, 1974, “Replies to Lewis and Quine” in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation p 281.158
 Davidson, 1997, “Indeterminism and Antirealism” in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, p 82.159
 In his unpublished The Concept of Objectivity, Davidson asks what makes the similarities (both in the causes of 160
creature’s responses, and the responses themselves) that count as relevant similarities the relevant ones, and answers 
“The answer again is obvious; it is we, because of the way we are constructed (evolution had something to do with 
this), that find these responses natural and easy to class together.” p 17.
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 The view that properties, universals, and abstract objects (i) aren’t anywhere, and (ii) are 
defined in terms of predicates, has some interesting implications; doubly so when we combine 
the view with the triangular externalism I outlined in Chapter 4.  Backing up a bit, recall that 
‘This is Peter’ is informative and true in the triangular ostensive situation.  Remembering that 
from the point of view of the radical interpreter, it makes no sense to doubt that ‘This is Peter’ is 
true (at least not until we can place ‘This is Peter’ against a background of other mostly true 
beliefs).  Davidson noted that “names learned this way are guaranteed a reference”.   Why are 161
names learned this way guaranteed a reference?  It must be because we (as learners) must take 
‘This is Peter’ to be true.  In the very same passage Davidson says the following: 
This leaves predicates.  As with names, some unstructured predicates must be 
learned by ostension: again, what is uttered may be single words, treated as 
sentences (‘This is green’, ‘That is a book’).  Predicates less directly tied to 
perception are interpreted as they occur in sentences which also contain ostensibly 
learned predicates, or through their relations to sentences containing such 
predicates.  162
I suggest we move very slowly through this passage.  Now, for the same reason that an 
interpreter necessarily needs to count ‘This is Peter’ as true, the interpreter must count ‘This is a 
book’ as true.  Note what this buys us given (ii) above: we take ‘_is a book’ to be true of the 
object that the ostensive ‘This’ picks out via triangulation.  Since an object x has property p just 
in case ‘_is p’ is true of x, we may say that we have introduced the property book.   Since 163
properties are explained in terms of predicates, for there to be a property book is simply for ‘_is a 
 Davidson, 2005 Truth and Predication, p 162.161
 Davidson, 2005, Truth and Predication, p 162162
 Or being a book, or bookness, or whatever your preferred property-language is.163
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book’ to be true of an object.  This works for ‘This is green’ as well: we assume that the speaker 
is speaking truly, and therefore that the object really is green, and this is all there is to the 
property green. 
  
5.4 Externalism and Propositional Content 
 Note that this approach makes no appeal to ‘cutting nature at the joints.’  According to the 
approach to predicates I have outlined, our predicates joint nature, and intersubjective agreement 
is the ultimate standard for whether or not certain properties exist.  The appeal to ‘nature’s joints’ 
is, on this account, the attempt to project conceptual distinctions (properties) out into spacetime, 
an attempt to give a location of properties, and on my account properties aren't anywhere.  
Davidson agrees.  Discussing the benefits of the account of triangulation as the source of the 
concept of truth, and of thought generally, Davidson summarizes some benefits of his account: 
(1)  With two creatures in general responding in characteristic ways to distal 
stimuli, we can speak of the focus of their responses, the common cause of the 
most frequent cases. 
(2)  If thought were present, this would provide an obvious indication of the 
content of the thought. 
(3)  There is a space for the concept of error, since when there is a divergence in 
normally similar reactions, we can say what they deviate from, namely the norm 
set by the usual cases. 
(4)  Finally, and perhaps most important, and this is what we are most apt to miss: 
we have moved the reliance on the notion of relevant similarity into the realm of 
animal interests, where it surely belongs.  Here is the sense in which we have 
moved reliance on the concept of relevant similarity into the realm of animal 
interests.  We have done it not by projecting thought-like distinctions onto 
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inanimate nature, as Plato and Aristotle both did in their ways (“dividing at the 
joints”), or, as we still find sophisticated philosophers like John McDowell doing, 
but rather by seeing the relevant similarity of one animal’s responses through the 
eyes of another animal.  In other words, it is by accepting the Wittgensteinian 
intuition that the only legitimate source of objectivity is intersubjectivity.    164
The passage provides a succinct summary of what work the interpretive triangle is supposed to 
do.  (1) assures us that, in the most basic cases, our thought is grounded in external reality.  (2), 
given (1), by fixing the content of thoughts with proximal causes, assures us that our thoughts are 
mostly true.  (3) explains how error is possible; the second person provides a simultaneous other 
perspective against which we measure our own responses.  This should be familiar from the 
previous chapter. 
 I want to focus momentarily on (4).  Since there is, on this account, nothing more to there 
being a property than that a predicate be true of an object, we don’t need to posit that nature has 
joints which our predicates do (or, in our fearful skeptical moments, don’t!) really correspond to 
or identify.  On this view, there is no more sense to the claim that we succeed in dividing nature 
at the joints than there is to the claim that we fail to divide nature at the joints.  We joint nature.  
Davidson says: 
It is a brute fact — a fact about each brute, including you and me — that each 
reacts to stimuli as it does;  but it is a suggestive fact that many of these brutes 
react in more or less the same ways.  165
What does this suggest?  Well, for one, it suggests that things are more or less the way we think 
they are; the suggestion follows from (2) above: (2) is a version of triangular externalism.  
 Davidson, The Concept of Objectivity, pp 23-24.164
 Davidson, The Concept of Objectivity, p 20.165
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Intersubjectivity, according to Davidson, grounds objectivity.  Intersubjective agreement, then, is 
our guide to what kinds of things there are (objects and events), and the way those things are 
(properties).  Davidson notes what his externalism shares with the externalism of Tyler Burge:   
The externalist grants that the world might be very different than I believe it to be 
and yet my sense organs be stimulated as they now are.  But in this case the 
contents of our thoughts would be different.  This is the externalist thesis (ET): 
the contents of our perceptual beliefs are fixed by their normal distal (not 
proximal) causes.  166
Davidson agrees with Burge that distal causes fix the content of our perceptual beliefs.  The 
natural question is how to individuate the distal cause of perceptual belief.  Davidson thinks that 
Burge’s approach, which lacks the second person, fails to fix such a cause.  Burge claims that the 
distal stimuli that we should consider as the cause for a given “perceptual representation” is what 
“in some complex sense of ‘normally’, they normally stem from and are applied to”.   As I said 167
in the last chapter, this leaves the choice of stimulus infinitely broad, from retinal impressions, to 
the distal object, to the Big Bang: simply saying that what we mean by ‘normally stem from’ is  
the correct stimulus without appeal to triangulation seems to assume what we want to explain. 
According to Davidson,  “Burge’s perceptual externalism is intuitively attractive, but by failing 
to say what picks out the relevant cause of our perceptual beliefs it fails to account for the 
content of those beliefs.”   To the question of ‘what picks out the relevant cause’, Davidson has 168
 Davidson, The Concept of Objectivity, p 16.  The (ET) abbreviation was added by me, to make exposition easier 166
later in the chapter.
 Burge, “Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception” in McDowell and Pettit (eds.), 1986 p 131.  Note that 167
the ‘representation’ verbiage is Burge’s not Davidson’s.  Davidson eschews talk of representations in favor of talk of 
beliefs.
 Davidson, The Concept of Objectivity, p 18.168
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an answer: it is triangulation that picks out the relevant cause, that fixes the distal cause, which 
via (2) fixes the content of the perceptual belief.  
5.5 Semantics, Stroud and Skepticism 
 We have been moving slowly through (1)-(4). If Davidson is right, then radical 
skepticism cannot get off the ground: 
It should now be clear what insures that our view of the world is, in its plainest 
features, largely correct.  The reason is that the stimuli that cause our most basic 
verbal responses also determine what those verbal responses mean, and the 
content of the beliefs that accompany them.  The nature of interpretation 
guarantees both that a large number of our simplest perceptual beliefs are true, 
and that the nature of these beliefs is known to others…. Any particular belief or 
set of beliefs about the world around us may be false.  What cannot be the case is 
that our general picture of the world and our place in it is mistaken, for it is this 
picture which informs the rest of our beliefs and makes them intelligible, whether 
they be true or false.  169
This passage echoes others found throughout Davidson’s later work.  Barry Stroud has taken 
Davidson’s arguments against global skepticism very seriously.  Stroud argues that Davidson has 
not shown that skepticism is false, though Stroud does think that Davidson does have an 
argument that skepticism may not be coherent.   Thus, Stroud thinks a kind of skepticism can 170
survive Davidson’s (and Burge’s) externalism.  171
 Davidson, 1991, “Three Varieties of Knowledge” in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, pp 213-214.169
 Note that Davidson himself vacillated between seeing his account as an argument against skepticism, or rather as 170
an attempt not to refute the skeptic but to tell the skeptic to ‘get lost’.  Stroud thinks that Davidson only has 
ammunition for the latter view.
 Stroud often groups Davidson and Burge together, which can be problematic.  As I said in the last chapter, 171
Burge’s account lacks a triangulating second person, which does open Burge up to some skeptical attacks that 
Davidson’s position can avoid (i.e. what the distal perceptual cause of a perceptual belief is).
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 Stroud puts the skeptical problem in terms of accepting two independent conjuncts; he 
argues that no one can coherently hold both conjuncts true: 
The possibility we are asked to consider [radical skepticism] at the beginning has 
two parts, or conjuncts.  It is the possibility that we have all the beliefs we now 
have in this, that, and the other aspect of the world, and that those beliefs are all or 
for the most part false.  [Externalism] with respect to our thoughts about and 
attribution of beliefs means that we could not consistently find the first half of the 
possibility to be realized without finding its second half not to be so.  And if we 
found the second conjunct to be true, we could not consistently find the first half 
of the possibility to be realized.  Attribution of the beliefs we attribute requires 
finding them for the most part true; finding a certain set of propositions for the 
most part false rules out assigning them as contents of the beliefs of the people 
with whom one shares a common world.  172
This is essentially correct, and it is exactly the position Davidson proposes.  What Stroud thinks 
Davidson has successfully established is that we must necessarily find others in agreement with 
us if we are to interpret them at all; since we hold our beliefs true, we must hold the beliefs of 
others as (mostly) true as well.   
 Stroud stresses that at this point, all he thinks Davidson has successfully established is 
that interpretation ensures agreement that subject and interpreter hold the same sentences true; 
Stroud thinks we haven’t shown that the sentences held true are thereby largely true.  Stroud 
makes an interesting analogy to Moore’s paradox: 
Our position with respect to [radical skepticism] is therefore similar to a person’s 
relation to the apparently paradoxical sentence ‘I believe that it is raining, and it is 
not raining’.  That is not something one could consistently believe or assert—but 
 Stroud, 2011, p 269.  Stroud here is discussing both Burge and Davidson, and so uses Burge’s ‘Anti-172
individualism’ instead of ‘externalism’.
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not because it says something that could not possibly be true.  It is possible that I 
believe that it is raining when it is not raining.  That is a possibility with two 
parts, or conjuncts.  The first does not imply that the second is false, and the 
second does not imply that the first is false.  It is in that sense a genuine 
possibility.  But no one can consistently hold in his own case that the possibility is 
actual, that both conjuncts are true.  173
Stroud argues that the analogy between his two examples holds; as in the case of Moore’s 
Paradox, the two conjuncts in the radical skepticism example might be jointly satisfied, but it 
would be incoherent to think and maintain that they were. 
 I think Stroud’s conclusion, that it would be incoherent for an agent to hold true both 
conjuncts, is correct in both the examples.  However, I don’t think the conclusion is correct 
because Stroud’s analogy holds.  Stroud’s analogy, I argue, does not hold; the case of radical 
skepticism concerns belief generally, the case of Moore’s Paradox a specific belief.  If we have 
been following Davidson so far, then only in the latter case can the two conjuncts both be true.  It 
certainly is true that one might assert ‘I believe that it is raining’ and it not be the case that it is 
raining.  However, if Davidson is right about the nature of belief, then it simply cannot be the 
case that one could have all the same beliefs one currently has, and yet those beliefs be mostly 
false.  Davidson makes the point most forcefully in “Three Varieties of Knowledge”: 
It has seemed obvious to many philosophers that if each of our beliefs about the 
world, taken alone, may be false, there is no reason why all such beliefs might not 
be false.  This reasoning is fallacious.  It does not follow, from the fact that any 
one of the bills in my pocket may have the highest serial number, that all the bills 
in my pocket may have the highest serial number, or from the fact that anyone 
 Stroud, 2011, p 269.173
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may be elected president, that everyone may be elected president.  Nor could it 
happen that all our beliefs about the world might be false.  174
Davidson accuses ‘many philosophers’ of arguing that if two situations, A and B, each possibly 
obtain, then it is possible that both A and B obtain.  This clearly cannot be the case in cases 
where A and B are mutually exclusive (i.e. A = the Republican candidate will win the presidency, 
B = the Democratic candidate will win the presidency, or A =it is currently raining at location L, 
B = it is not currently raining at location L).  
 Stroud’s position is more nuanced than that of ‘many philosophers’; he doesn’t argue that 
because both conjuncts can obtain independently, both conjuncts can obtain jointly.  Rather, 
Stroud argues that we can’t coherently maintain both conjuncts.  This incoherence, though, does 
not guarantee that both conjuncts don’t in fact jointly obtain.  Stroud thinks that interpretation 
necessarily involves agreement, and that agreement means an interpreter assigns sentences the 
interpreter holds true to the agent being interpreted.  Agreement, Stroud thinks, is not enough to 
justify the claim that the sentences jointly held true are actually true. 
 We should explore Davidson’s claim that ‘many philosophers’ are wrong in their claim 
that “if each of our beliefs about the world, taken alone, may be false, there is no reason why all 
such beliefs might not be false.”  The examples Davidson provides clearly show that the 175
argument’s form is invalid; we can see that the reason their argument is fallacious has to do with 
the entities involved in both possible conjuncts.  Sometimes such reasoning works: if it is 
possible that any of our three tosses of the same coin are heads, then it is possible that all our 
three tosses of the coin are heads.  Sometimes the reasoning fails: if it is possible that any of our 
 Davidson, “Epistemology Externalized” in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, pp 194-195.174
Ibid, pp 194-195.175
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three draws from a single deck are the red Queens, then it is possible that all of our 3 draws from 
a single deck are the red Queens.  What accounts for us knowing that the former is good 
reasoning and the latter is not is that we know some things about coin tosses and card decks that 
render the first example possible and the second example impossible: the results of separate coin 
tosses don’t place constraints on each other, while the results of separate draws from a single 
deck do.  Furthermore, we know of each individual (standard) card deck that it contains only two 
red Queens. 
 In Davidson’s example concerning the serial numbers of the bills in his pocket, we know 
a few things about the serial numbers on bills that render the two conjuncts mutually exclusive.  
We know that no two bills have the same serial number, and that no two unique numbers can 
both be the highest.  We also know of the Presidency that it is a position that only one person 
may occupy at a time.  Analogously, if (ET) is correct, then we know that the normal distal 
causes of perceptual beliefs fix the content of those beliefs.  Similarly, since (2) identifies the 
content of the belief with the triangulated distal cause, if (2) is correct our basic perceptual 
beliefs must be mostly true.  We know of decks that they have only two red Queens, and we 
know of any system of perceptual beliefs that is complex enough to constitute thought that most 
of those perceptual beliefs must be true. 
 I opened this section by saying that if Davidson is right, then skepticism cannot get off 
the ground.  In a very real sense, even if only Stroud is right, skepticism cannot get off the 
ground: for while the radical skepticism is a possibility, it is a possibility that could never be 
coherently entertained.  I argue that Stroud’s position is coherent, but that in order to deny that 
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interpretation yields not just agreement but truth, Stroud must deny (ET).   For (ET) fixes the 176
content of our beliefs via the triangulated distal causes of those beliefs.  According to (ET) the 
distal cause of a perceptual belief is that which fixes the content of the belief.  As stated earlier, 
had the distal causes been different “the contents of our thoughts would be different.”   So if 177
you follow Davidson closely, Stroud’s analogy between radical skepticism and Moore’s paradox 
does not hold.  Stroud argues that if we found that the second conjunct of radical skepticism 
obtained we wouldn’t be able to assert the first conjunct.  If (ET) is true, then it would simply be 
impossible to find that the second conjunct obtained, for the same reason that it would be 
impossible to draw three red queens from the deck.  If Davidson’s particular version of 
externalism is correct, then belief is necessarily veridical, as standard card decks necessarily 
contain only two red Queens. 
5.6 The Metaphysics of Truth  
 I want to take up an issue that I tabled a few chapters ago, concerning the metaphysical 
status of the property truth.  What I have said about properties generally applies to the property 
truth as well.  That we normally understand each other and agree about when and what things are 
green is what assures us that the things we normally agree are green are in fact green.  This is 
enough to permit us to say both that we possess the concept GREEN, and that some things have 
 In this sense Stroud’s position is stronger than Davidson’s, for Davidson’s conclusion depends on accepting (ET) 176
while Stroud’s does not.  This is welcome news; even if we don’t have Davidson’s conception of belief, Stroud 
claims that skepticism is not a coherent combination of beliefs that one could hold.  We may still tell the skeptic to 
‘get lost’.
 Davidson, The Concept of Objectivity, p 16.  Italics added177
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the property (instantiate the property, etc.) green.   It should be clear that triangulation (and 178
hence the concept TRUTH) play a leading role in this.  What might not be clear is that since this 
conception of properties applies to properties simpliciter, it applies to the property truth as well. 
 Note also that the conception of properties I’ve put forward makes no appeal to cutting 
nature at the joints.  Since this is true for properties generally, there isn’t a problematic question 
about whether the property truth is ‘metaphysically substantive,’ and the same goes for any 
property that we can truly ascribe of any object.   For the Davidsonian, the question does not 179
arise.  If our concepts and predicates are what joint nature, I argue that it makes little sense to say 
that our predicates succeed or fail at cutting nature at the real joints; this is like wondering 
whether we have cut a pie into the correct number of pieces.  We may cut the pie any way we 
like, and it will have the number of pieces it does because of the way in which we cut it.  Our 
purposes, our capacities, and features of the pie itself may place constraints on what counts as an 
 Note that ‘x has the property p’ here is just a fancy way of saying that ‘_is p’ is truthfully predicable of x.  Having 178
in this sense does not mean containing.
 Asay (2013), defends his version of the primitive thesis by arguing that truth is a metaphysically deflationary 179
property.  The distinctions Asay uses to draw this conclusion are the conceptions of properties as ‘sparse’ or 
‘abundant’, where abundant properties are metaphysically deflationary: “The sparse properties are those that account 
for the genuine resemblances between objects .  Abundant properties, by contrast, can be shared between objects 
without bestowing any resemblance upon them.  There need not be any genuine feature held in common between all 
the objects within a three-and-a-half mile radius of the exact center of Missouri, though there are genuine features 
held in common between all samples of gold.” p 105.  A Davidsonian might say that, since properties (or features, 
whatever they are) aren’t in the objects that have them, it is clear that the things that are all within a three-and-a-half 
mile radius of the exact center of Missouri do have a genuine feature or property in common: the feature of being 
within an three-and-a-half mile radius of the exact center of Missouri.  The objects have this property in common in 
virtue it being the case that ‘_is within a three-and-a-half mile radius of the exact center of Missouri’ is true of them.   
Asay doesn’t  hold (FC) or (TM) explicitly.  Rather, he wants his form of primitivism to accommodate other 
commitments.  The position Asay is trying to accommodate is a correspondence theory of truth that accepts (TM) 
and (FC), and that would explain (FC) in terms of objects and properties.  I’ve argued that the correspondence 
theorist’s combination of (TM) and (FC) is a toxic one in Chapter 3, and I’ve argued earlier in this chapter that (a) 
properties aren’t needed to explain the unity of the proposition, and (b) we can fruitfully explain properties in terms 
of predicates, instead of predicates in terms of properties, so the question doesn’t require an answer from my 
standpoint.  Since properties aren’t anywhere, aren’t invoked as components of truth-makers, and aren’t invoked as 
entities in order to explain the propositional unity of the sentence, from the standpoint I advocate we don’t need the 
sparse/abundant distinction, and, hence, don’t need to draw the distinction clearly.
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acceptable cutting, but there is no single privileged way to cut the pie, no single way to cut that is 
in accordance with what the real pieces of the pie qua pie are. 
5.7 Naming and Predication  
 There are many difficulties with the Davidsonian approach.  One difficulty springs from 
the surface similarity of the sentences ‘This is Peter’ and ‘This is green’.  In neither case will a 
single ostensive definition serve to unambiguously fix the reference of the name or the class of 
entities the property is true of.  Problematically, at the time of a purported ostensive definition, 
Peter might actually be green.  What the interpreter needs to do is observe that a subject utters 
the first sentence (mostly) only while triangularly and ostensively indicating Peter, and the 
second (mostly) while triangulating on and ostensively identifying green things.  This will 
provide evidence that ‘green’ is a general term (because it can be truthfully applied to many 
things), ‘Peter’ a name of a unique individual.  So the story goes, I think, according to Davidson, 
for he does seem open to the claim that there is a difference between names like ‘Peter’ and 
predicates like ‘_is green’.  180
 I am going to suggest a different, but I argue Davidsonian, interpretation of what are 
traditionally considered proper names: names like ‘Peter’.  I suggest we treat such names as a 
kind of definite description.  I want to look very closely at the following paragraph at the very 
end of Truth and Predication: 
Some names are learned by direct ostentation and as if they were unaided in 
sentences: what may be said aloud is just a name, understood as a short sentence 
 At the very least he is agnostic between the view that there is a difference and the view which I am going to 180
articulate.  My view is open to Davidson, and is the one which I think he ought to take.  See footnote 186 for why I 
think Davidson ought to make the move as well.
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(‘This is Peter’, ‘That is Paul’).  Names learned in this way are guaranteed a 
reference.  Names learned less directly can then be treated as definite descriptions.  
This leaves predicates.  As with names, some unstructured predicates must be 
learned by ostentation: again, what is uttered may be single words, treated as 
sentences (‘This is green’, ‘That is a book’).  Predicates less directly tied to 
perception are interpreted as they occur in sentences which also contain ostensibly 
learned predicates, or through their relations to sentences containing such 
predicates.  181
It’s clear that Davidson thinks that some names can be treated as definite descriptions: those that 
are ‘less directly learned’.  I want to suggest some reasons for treating any ‘common’ name (i.e. 
names like ‘Peter’, ‘Paul’ and ‘Mary’) as a kind of definite description.   182
 I want to recall Davidson’s claim (which he also claims is Frege’s), that a predicate is 
“any expression got from a sentence by removing one or more singular terms.”   When we look 183
at ‘This is Peter’ we can see that ‘_is Peter’ would then be a predicate.  I claimed last chapter that 
in learning the name ‘Peter’, we shouldn’t think that we simply use ‘Peter’ to tag an object, 
rather we should think that ‘_is Peter’ is informatively true of a triangulated person. So, ‘_is 
 Davidson, 2005, Truth and Predication, p 162.181
 Someone might object at this point, claiming that names are rigid designators while descriptions are (usually) not.  182
There are two things to say about this objection.  First, Davidson’s project has no foundational role for reference to 
play, as it takes the primary semantic unit to be the sentence as a whole.  On this picture, reference is a theoretical 
relation, one that is inscrutable and indeterminate in the Quinean sense: if one referential scheme (interpretation of 
names and predicates) successfully interprets a subject, there will be another, different interpretation with the same 
truth-conditions (remember last chapter’s interpretation of ‘Raleigh smokes’ in C1 and C2).  Davidson himself has 
no need for the concept of rigid designation: at one point, discussing and disagreeing with Putnam’s Twin Earth-
based claim that the experiment shows conclusively that ‘Water’ rigidly identifies H20, Davidson says “I realize that 
this remark, like many others in this piece, may show that I don’t know a rigid designator when I see one.  I don’t.” 
Davidson, “Knowing One’s Own Mind” in SIO p 29.  Second, supposing we want to keep the notion of rigid 
designation, we might argue that some descriptions do designate rigidly: ‘the successor of 2’ for example.  Someone 
here might say that such descriptions designate rigidly only de jure, not de facto, and that proper names and only 
proper names de facto designate rigidly.  The descriptions I will employ in the next section do designate rigidly, and 
arguably do so de facto.  If someone wants to press me on the issue and claim that they are not de facto rigid 
designators, then I am happy to get along without de facto rigid designation.
 Davidson, 2005 Truth and Predication, p  149.183
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Peter’ is, according to this treatment, a predicate which introduces the name ‘Peter’, a predicate 
that is true of the object which is triangulated via the ostensive ‘This’.  The picture I have in 
mind then is that the real logically proper names of a language will be the demonstrative terms 
‘this’ or ‘that’.   Of course there is no problem in maintaining that what we think of as names 184
really are names, provided we don’t think they are, in Russell’s sense, logically proper.  The 
point is that we introduce names via predication, not by simply tagging.  185
 Why Davidson should think this is so stems from his commitment to restricting a theory 
of meaning to what can be learned through radical translation.  For, I noted earlier that Peter may 
be green at the time either ‘This is Peter’ or ‘This is green’ is uttered.  There is no unique 
linguistic mark that indicates that a subject is using a general or a singular term.  How do we 
understand that ‘This is Peter’ will apply uniquely, while ‘This is Green’ will not?  One answer is 
that we have a theory that ‘Peter’ is a name, and names are distinct from predicates in that names 
are always unique.  Another way to approach this is by reducing the naming relation to 
predication, quantification, and ostension.  We might construe names like any other predicate, 
and hold that what we learn when we successfully learn the name ‘Peter’ is better understood as 
 This of course looks like a version of Russell, and it is.  The difference is that ‘this’ and ‘that’ will not stand for 184
sense data, but rather for (at least at the ground floor of language) triangulated medium sized objects in the distal 
environment of at least two interpreters. 
 Delia Graff Fara argues for a similar interpretation in the forthcoming “Names are Predicates” Philosophical 185
Review, Vol. 124, No. 1, 2015.  Fara explicitly claims “names are true of their bearers.”  On my view, predicates 
involving names will be true of their bearers, and there is nothing special about common names like ‘Peter’ that 
separates them from terms like ‘Green’.  Fara thinks names like ‘Peter’, when used as a subject term, really conceal 
an unpronounced definite article ‘the’, and so ‘Peter sits’ should be read as ‘the Peter sits’ (I use strikethrough to 
indicate something unpronounced).  Fara's position that names ‘are true of’ their bearers isn’t something that I 
subscribe to; while I’m happy to grant that ‘_is Peter’ or even ‘_is the Peter’ is true of Peter, I don’t think that ‘Peter’ 
or ‘the Peter’ is true of Peter.  Since the view of predicates I’m taking is that of a sentence with one or more of the 
singular terms removed, we can see that the operation involved in extracting ‘the Peter’ from ‘This is the Peter’ has 
extracted more than one or more singular terms: the copula was removed as well.
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‘this is the unique x such that x is Peter’, where the ‘is’ in the quoted sentence is the is of 
predication.   186
 Interestingly, Neale provides some ammunition for the view that names can be thought of 
this way.  Consider the name a, and the definite description ix(x=a) which reads “the unique x 
such that x is a” Neale says: 
The expression ix(x=a) is technically a Russellian description, but there is some 
inclination, even among the staunchest Russellians, to view it as a verbose form 
of a, which technically it is not (since it is an incomplete symbol).  Nevertheless, 
there is an itch here that needs scratching.  187
I suggest we scratch this itch until it bleeds.   Neale here seems to be saying that we might 188
think that a and ix(i=a) are the same, and so ix(i=a) is a verbose form of a.  Well, we might 
make the same move in the other direction, and think that since a and ix(i=a) are the same, a is 
an abbreviated form of ix(i=a).   If this is the case, then we can explain common names in 189
 The uniqueness claim would be otiose if uniqueness were built into the name relation machinery.  Note that this 186
account is leaner than a name-relation theory; we can do the work of common names with predicates, quantification, 
and ostension, all of which a proponent of the name relation theory needs anyway.  My theory has fewer moving 
parts.  That I think Davidson ought to adopt this view is bolstered by Davidson’s claim: “Is the name-relation the 
sole point at which the entire conversation is tied to the real world?  No, for we quantify over endless un-named 
entities.  It is the name-relation which may be superfluous, either by use of Russell’s theory of descriptions or in 
some other way.  Any desired distinctions between objects can be made if there is a one-place predicate , no matter 
how complex, which is true of one of the objects but not of the other.  This was, of course, Russell’s thought when 
he suggested that most of what are considered proper names should be supplanted by definite descriptions.” 
Davidson, 1995, Truth and Predication, p 161.
 Neale, 2001 pp 125-126.187
 I would remind the reader that I’ve already made use of the similarity between Fa and a = ix (x = a & Fx) in my 188
discussion of slingshots in Chapter 3, so the itch might well already be bleeding.
 Someone might claim that I am smuggling in the is of identity in the use of ‘ix(x=a)’.  Neale’s discussion is in the 189
context of a passage where he is discussing descriptions of the form ix(xRa), where R is an unspecified relation.  
Neale asks about cases where R is the relation of identity; that is, R represents the is of identity.  We should note that 
if we take R to be a symbol expressing the (ordered) is of predication, we can simply substitute R for = and obtain 
‘ix(xRa)’, a description that has as its denotation only a.  Or, similarly, we might employ ‘ix(Ax)’ which might be 
read ‘the unique x such that A is true of x’, and we might claim that ‘ix(Ax)’, since it makes the uniqueness claim (as 
A is true of only x) and remembering that x here is a demonstratively ostended object, allows us to then use a as a 
common name and quantify over a.  Again, on this view the only logically proper names are the demonstrative ‘this’ 
and ‘that’ which refer to triangulated objects.
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terms of predicates.   If this is the case, quantification and predication enter the picture early 190
(very early: at the very beginning of interpretation).  Since Davidson thought that the naming 
relation itself might be replaced by Russell’s theory of descriptions, I argue that this move is 
open to him.  Given that Davidson wants to take reference as theoretical, I argue that this move is 
one he ought to welcome. 
5.8 Predicates, Triangulation, and Reference 
 I have shown how I think one may explain away common names via predication.  I noted 
that according to this view, the real logically proper names are demonstratives.  My account of 
triangulation depends on demonstratives functioning like logically proper names.  In this sense, 
we have not dispensed with the notion of reference, but have restricted its role considerably.  The 
strict notion of reference still plays a crucial role: the medium sized objects that we can 
ostensively individuate are our way into language and thought generally via triangulation.  One 
might wonder what accounts for this ability.  I think Davidson’s account fits nicely with the 
theories of awareness and of Multiple Object Tracking of Zenon Pylyshyn. 
 Pylyshyn’s research purports to establish that there are visual capacities in (at least) 
humans to track distal objects over time: 
  Recently, E.J. Lowe alluded to employing this strategy (which he immediately abandons).  Lowe notes that some 190
philosophers try to eliminate predication by reducing predication to identity and reference.  “A more promising 
strategy might seem to be to try to eliminate reference in favour of predication and quantification, by construing 
‘Mars is red’ as meaning ‘There is exactly one thing that is Mars and it is red’, in line with Russell’s theory of 
descriptions.”  Lowe immediately adds “However the predicate ‘_is Mars’ ostensibly means ‘_is identical with 
Mars’, in which reference is again apparently made to Mars.” Lowe, E.J. 2013, p 204.  Note that if we take the route 
I just advocated, where ‘Mars’ is fixed descriptively, and ‘Mars’ is shorthand for ‘the unique x such that Mars is true 
of x’, we don’t smuggle in reference in the way Lowe deplores.  Interestingly, Lowe himself is sympathetic to the 
view that truth is primitive. 
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I have proposed that the capacity to individuate and track several independently 
moving things is accomplished by a mechanism in the early vision module that I 
have called FINSTs (I call them “Fingers of INSTantiation” because they were 
initially viewed as a mechanism for binding the arguments of visual predicates to 
objects in the world).  This primitive, non conceptual mechanism functions to 
identify, reidentify, and track distal objects.  It is an ability we exercise every 
waking minute, and it has also been understood to be fundamental to the way we 
see and understand the world.  191
Roughly speaking, Pylyshyn’s FINSTs can be conceived of as visual ‘tags’ which we are able to 
apply to medium-sized objects and track over time (according to Pylyshyn’s experimental 
evidence, normal people can do this for around four items).  These pre-conceptual ‘tags’ can be 
conceived of as fixing the referent of each of the two interpreter’s distal stimuli: agreement helps 
assure each interpreter that they have their ‘tags’ affixed to the similar objects.   Thus we may 192
argue that the ‘tagging’ of objects by individuals is done at the pre-conceptual stage, via 
Pylyshyn’s FINST’s, not by the common name relation, which is explained as a form of 
predication. 
 Finally, I want to close by looking once more at the quote from Davidson with which I 
began the chapter: 
 Pylyshyn, 2007, p x.191
 Pylyshyn states that according to his account there is a possible problem concerning which object (or, as 192
Pylyshyn puts it, ‘FING’) that a FINST tags; a single causal chain alone is insufficient to fix the tag, as the chain has 
too many links.  This is the same question (what is the external stimulus for our perceptual beliefs?) that Davidson 
thinks Burge’s externalism can’t answer, and that Davidson thinks his version of triangulating externalism does 
answer.  Interestingly Pylyshyn thinks a form of triangulation helps solve the problem (literally using the term 
‘triangulation’), an idea Pylyshyn credits not to Davidson, but to Fodor.  Pylyshyn, 2007, p 97fn.
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Language is the organ of propositional perception.  Seeing sights and hearing 
sounds does not require thought with propositional content; perceiving how things 
are does, and this ability develops along with language.   193
If my appropriation of Pylyshyn is sound, then we have moved the notion of demonstrative 
reference into the animal realm, where it surely belongs; for animals see sights and hear sounds.  
This realm is also pre-conceptual; it is only when we begin to predicate of the things that we 
pick out demonstratively that they are a certain way, that language, and therefore thought, enter 
the picture. 
 Davidson, 1997, “Seeing Through Language” in Truth, Language, and History, p 135.193
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